Auditor and client commitment to audit preparation in a quality audit process by Marsh, Stuart
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor and client commitment to audit preparation in a quality audit process 
 
By 
 
Stuart Marsh 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment for the requirements of the Doctorate in Business 
Administration (DBA) at the University of Central Lancashire 
May 2018 
  
1 
 
 
Student Declaration 
 
Concurrent registration for two or more academic awards 
I declare that while registered as a candidate for the Doctorate in Business 
Administration degree, I have not been a registered candidate or enrolled student for 
another award of the University or other academic or professional institution. 
 
Material submitted for another award 
I declare that no material contained in the thesis has been used in any other 
submission for an academic award and is solely my own work. 
 
Signature of Candidate:    ……………………………………. 
 
Type of Award                   DBA 
 
School:                               Lancashire School of Business and Enterprise  
2 
 
Abstract 
Reflecting on the growing interest from scholars and practitioners and their awareness 
of the necessity to appreciate the involvement of the client in an audit process 
(Canning, Malsch & O’Dwyer, 2017), the aim of this study is to explore the importance 
of audit client commitment to comprehensive audit preparation, to improve the quality 
of a UK financial statements audit. This research is based on a qualitative approach 
employing semi structured interviews as a research method.  Accordingly, interviews 
were undertaken with audit engagement leaders from a range of auditing firms as well 
as with finance directors from a range of audited clients. The perspectives as to the 
levels of preparedness for the first day of the financial statements audit commencing 
from each participant group were examined and were shown to reveal interesting 
results. 
 
The study unveiled the differences between what auditors and their clients perceived 
to be ‘ready’ for the financial statements audit. The availability of a completed set of 
financial statements when the auditors commence their audit has been identified as 
an issue that causes a significant amount of time pressures on the auditors. 
Additionally, the thematic analysis of data revealed that as a result of such pressures 
auditors were adopting practices whereby insufficient/substandard work was 
completed, which could potentially not only have an adverse effect on the overall 
quality of the audit, but also contribute to an inappropriate audit opinion being signed. 
Amendments to current auditing practices and the periods between a reporting period 
end and the audit work commencing to enhance audit quality was found to underpin 
the pressures on auditors when forming a time pressured audit opinion. This study of 
the challenges faced by auditors to plan and complete their audit with conflicting 
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targets and time scales as well as the pressures felt by audit clients, provides audit 
preparedness specific, evidence based implications on which these may be 
surmounted to enable a quality, fully documented audit and supported audit opinion to 
be completed.  
This study addresses the pressing need to overcome the lack of theoretical 
discussions on the auditees’ perspectives on auditing practices, and their views on the 
specific factors enhancing audit quality. Based on the existing literature to date, no 
study has explored the “auditee” as a research object in scholarly discussions on the 
quality of a UK financial statements audit.   
The findings of this study, along with subsequent recommendations have relevance 
for the key stakeholders of audit engagements and regulators concerned with the 
enhancement of the quality of a UK financial statements audit, and for scholars 
interested in broadening their understanding of the audit process as a two-sided 
relationship. 
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1.1.1 Introduction 
 
The external audit of UK organisations’ financial statements remains a key element of 
the financial reporting environment. The auditor’s report tends to be one of the key 
disclosures within an organisation’s annual report and financial statements upon which 
users of those reports (predominantly investors/providers of finance) usually place 
reliance and base their investment decisions upon. Indeed, after many financial 
scandals the first questions to be asked are normally where the auditors were and of 
what level of quality was the work completed by those auditors (Zeune,1999; 
Chetkovich,1977). Such scandals have called into question the amount of fees 
auditors charge and the services delivered (or the relevance of those services), 
whereas auditors time pressures, workloads and stresses appear to be ignored. 
There continues to be ongoing debates surrounding the purpose, usefulness and 
quality of financial statement audits. Audit quality has been at the top of auditing firms’ 
agendas over recent years and in particular has more recently been a focus of 
academic studies. There have been numerous academic studies that have 
investigated differing aspects of what is deemed to be quality in terms of audit; mainly 
those studies have focused on topics which include: relationships between the audit 
team characteristics and financial reporting quality (audit inputs), industry expertise, 
the role of the industry structure, rules and regulations and the consequences of the 
outcomes arising as a result of the audit. Less importantly audit fees and the hours 
attributed towards completing an audit by the staff employed to complete audit 
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procedures (Laitinen and Laitinen, 2015). Such hours and fee pressures impact on the 
stresses and time pressures laid upon auditors and as a result impact on the quality 
of the audit work performed, and the quality of the final audit opinion within the financial 
statements. 
Historically the perceptions of audit quality differ between individuals and 
organisations, Francis states that "audit quality can be conceptualised as a theoretical 
continuum ranging from very low to very high quality" (Francis, 2004, p346) and these 
varying levels of quality could be dependent upon the workloads and pressures 
experienced by auditors at various times of a year (Lopez and Peters, 2012). Reisch 
(2000) argues that there are potentially two major divisions of audit quality, there are 
those who believe a 'supply' of a quality audit is paramount in their requirements from 
an auditor, alternatively there are those individuals and organisations that 'demand' a 
quality audit as a result of (amongst other requirements) the fees that they are paying.  
To avoid the threat of familiarity (whereby the auditor and client become closer and as 
a result issues may not be reported to the relevant stakeholders of the organisation 
being audited) an organisations’ auditors change. Abbott and Parker (1999) are of the 
opinion that a change in auditor (normally as a result of mandatory auditor rotation or 
change in company management/ownership) constitutes a demand from the auditors 
to deliver a quality audit. From experience, a new audit appointment normally results 
in that auditor attempting to provide something new (more commonly referred to as 
'added value') in the attempt to justify the decision to appoint them as successor 
auditors. However, an argument exists that it could take a number of audits before the 
auditor understands its client in order to deliver a true quality audit, thus in essence 
only the latter audits of an auditor’s tenure could be described as ‘quality audits’.  
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 As noted by DeZoort et al (2002), external audit is a fundamental element of the 
corporate governance framework and as such is to some extent monitored by the Audit 
Committee (essentially a group of non-executive directors whom the larger listed 
companies employ to monitor not only the board of executive directors, but also the 
auditors). The audit committee have very little involvement with an actual audit until 
the audit is near to completion and any issues are discussed and resolved. The 
effectiveness of such a 'removed' approach and the effectiveness of the audit 
committee within this area is questioned by Turley and Zamman (2007). With the 
involvement of this committee being at the conclusion of the audit and thus reflecting 
back upon the organisations’ finance department and their head (usually the finance 
director), involving this committee prior to the commencement of the audit may ensure 
the finance department is fully prepared for their audit. As Smith (2003) notes, the 
audit committee (as per the Audit Committees Combined Code) should ensure that 
the external audit is prepared for, however this code lacks further detail as to how this 
should be achieved. 
For the purpose of this study it is essential to understand the differing perceptions of 
audit quality and the factors that contribute to/compromise the delivery of a UK 
financial statement audit including the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved 
in the audit process. In addition, during the literature review, the ‘audit expectations 
gap’ (Dewing and Russell, 2002) between the auditors and both the audit clients and 
the general public will be evaluated.  
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1.2 Aim and Objectives 
Reflecting on the lack of theoretical and practical debates on the importance of audit 
clients’ preparedness for their financial statements audit on overall audit quality, this 
study aims at exploring the importance of audit client commitment to comprehensive 
audit preparation to improve the quality of a UK financial statements audit. To support 
the main aim of this thesis, the following objectives were set: 
•  To provide a thorough critical literature review in order to identify and evaluate 
the concepts and factors impacting upon the improvement of the quality of the 
UK financial statements audit. 
 
• To undertake qualitative research through the use of semi structured interviews, 
with a range of UK auditor partners (the registered ultimate auditor with sole 
responsibility for the audit) and UK finance directors (the ultimate audited body 
senior official responsible for ensuring auditors are supplied with high quality 
information). 
 
• To develop a conceptual framework with links to professional practice for the 
contribution to enhance financial statements audit quality in the UK. 
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2.1 Literature Review 
"To know that we know what we know, and that we do not know what we do not know, that is 
true knowledge."  - Henry David Thoreau 
2.1.1 Introduction 
For the purpose of this thesis it is essential to understand the developments in the 
audit of financial statements and the pressures auditors face when time and budget 
pressures adversely affect the quality of the audit (Lopez and Peters, 2012).  
The following literature review will initially focus on the relationships between the 
clients and their auditors, the levels of audit fees and their effect on the time constraints 
upon auditors and the ultimate quality of the audit (Houston, Peters and Pratt, 2005). 
Continuing with the fees and time pressures, the impacts of internal budgets and 
targets have on the reputation of an auditing firm and how reputation is perceived to 
impact on a quality audit (DeAngelo,1981). Additionally, pressures on auditors to 
potentially complete substandard audit tasks and prematurely sign off the audit 
(Raghunathan, 1991) in the attempt to complete tasks within a pre-determined budget 
is also reviewed. Concluding this literature review, the effect that the level of 
preparedness audit clients has on the quality of the reporting period end financial 
statements audit is also discussed.  
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2.1.2 Audit quality 
 
There is no clear definition as to what constitutes a quality audit, “the problem of audit 
quality being in the ’eye of the beholder’ is reflected in the broad range of diverse, and 
sometimes divergent, definitions” (Knercel, et al, 2013, p4). Arens et al state that “Audit 
Quality is how well an audit process detects and reports material misstatements in the 
financial statements” (Arens, et al, 2011, p105). Garvin (1989) argues that the reliance 
on just one definition of quality could result in numerous issues and problems and the 
definition is not restricted to audits alone, but every product and service that is 
available in society today. 
However alternative opinions such as those of DeAngelo (1981) implying that 
reputation is a key determinant of audit quality, whereas audit firm size (Francis and 
Yu, 2009; Monroe and Tan, 1997; Francis, 1984; ACCA, 2016; Kilgore, et al, 2014; 
Martinov-Bennie and Kilgore, 2015) plays a role in the perception of the provision of a 
quality audit. 
Duff (2004) argues that audit quality can only be as good as the people delivering the 
audit. Duff bases such opinions on the levels of technical expertise, knowledge and 
interpersonal skills the auditors possess in the delivery of the best possible services 
to their clients.  
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2.1.3 Auditor Expertise / Engagement leader / Audit firm rotation and 
Audit Quality 
 
Size of the auditing organisation has been alluded to be a determinant of audit quality 
(Section 2.1.2 above), Rusmin (2010) endorses such a definition acknowledging that 
industry specialisation has a significant role to play when arriving at a quality audit. 
Additionally, it is reported that it is more likely to be that the larger suppliers of audits 
(the Big 4) with larger reputations that will have the resources to not only invest in 
developing their staff, but also to attract ‘better’ staff with the skills perceived 
necessary to provide audit quality (Rusmin, 2010; Krishnan, 2003). Balsam, Krishnan 
and Yang state that “Specialized contracts and industry specific accounting can lead 
to a greater demand for, and greater returns from investment in, auditor industry 
specialization” (Balsom, Krishnan and Yang, 2003, p93). Supporting such views, 
Hogan and Jeter (1999) note that auditing firms that are classified to have specialisms, 
increase market share over relatively short periods of time as opposed to non-audit 
specialism organisations. Continuing with this theme Knechel, Naiker and Pacheco 
found that “firms switching between Big 4 auditors experience significant positive 
abnormal returns when the successor auditor is an industry specialist, and they 
experience significant negative abnormal returns when the successor auditor is not a 
specialist” (Knechel, Naiker and Pacheco, 2007, p1). 
Audit partners are mandated to rotate from an audit client to either another partner 
within their own organisation, or to pass the client to another auditing provider every 
five years. Zerni is noted as finding that “both engagement partner industry 
specialization and specialization in large, public companies are viewed by financial 
statement users and/or by corporate insiders as differentiation strategies resulting in 
fee premiums within these engagements. Overall, the results of this study support the 
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view that client firms infer audit quality at least to some extent from the characteristics 
of the individual audit partner in charge” (Zerni, 2012, p36). However, Chi, et al noted 
that “investors perceive mandatory audit partner rotation as enhancing audit quality, 
which, we conjecture, is due to improved auditor independence in appearance. Since 
perceptions are very important for audit services due to difficulty in directly observing 
audit quality” (Chi, et al, 2009, p36). Interestingly, there is little evidence to support 
changing the audit partner within the same auditing firm has any effect on the overall 
audit quality of an assignment (Chen, Lin and Lin, 2008). Supporting such findings 
Sengers (2017) noted that as a result of their research there was minimal effect on the 
quality of an audit by changing the audit partner every five years and suggests that a 
maximum of nineteen years is the cut-off point at which a long tenure could start to 
impact on audit quality. Concurring with such views Myers, Myers and Otley (2003) 
are of the opinion that the auditors place greater constraints on the financial 
performance which is affected by management decisions where a longer audit tenure 
exists, as a result current mandatory rotations time limits could be questionable. 
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2.1.4 The relationship between audit fees and audit quality  
 
Historically there has been a socially accepted norm that the higher the price 
individuals pay for a product, brand or service, the greater the quality of that product, 
brand or service and a financial statements audit is not excluded from this hypothesis 
(Leavitt, 1954). The relationship between audit fees and quality (Teoh and Wong, 
1993) has been the focus of many studies, who have been keen to study such 
relationships but also time constraints and workloads have also been noted as 
impacting on quality.  
Gardner (1971) continues with the theme of price being a reflection of the quality of a 
product in a more 'general product' study, but interestingly expands the study to 
include the perception of brands also being a reflection of the quality of a product or 
service.  In support of this argument (Leavitt, 1954) adds that a higher price can indeed 
be seen to be an indicator of better quality than those cheaper products. However this 
raises another question of what the people within the sample tested deem to be 
expensive and cheap, and thus leads back to Garvin’s (1989) comments regarding the 
definitions of quality and interpretations thereof. An alternative study conducted by 
Lowensohn, et al (2007) interestingly found that although it was noted that specialist 
auditors increased market share as a result of perceived client satisfaction and audit 
quality, the level of fees was not an indicator of audit quality. 
However, when purchasing a product or a service, quality is usually recognisable from 
the ultimate results, with an audit the outcome is an audit opinion and many clients are 
unaware as to how this was derived and the work conducted in arriving at any 
conclusions drawn, and as Akerlof (1970) notes, it can be difficult in distinguishing 
between a good and inferior quality product. As such, purchasers of audit could be in 
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some cases ‘naive’ and have relative uncertainties in relation to the services they are 
purchasing, there could be incentives for auditors to over/under audit, and/or 
overcharge for the services provided and thus impact on the overall audit quality 
(Causholli and Knechel, 2012). 
In any professional role, individuals will face certain pressures during their career      
and auditors are not excluded from such pressures. Auditors are faced with various 
pressures throughout an individual audit both internal (predominately meeting targets 
and budgets set by their own superiors/internal benchmarks) and external (those 
deadlines set by audit clients, financial markets and regulators). The results of aiming 
to meet all targets and deadlines could have an impact on the overall quality of the 
audit being delivered. However, foregoing the ever-increasing pressure on the auditors 
themselves to complete audits within their own internal budgets, there is always the 
potential for compromises to the audit work conducted and the quality of the work 
undertaken impaired. In light of such concerns, Asthana and Boone (2012) concluded 
that there is a notable decline in quality when audit fees reduce from those charged in 
earlier years. However, they continue to note that where the stewards (i.e. the 
directors) of an organisation exert pressures in the form of strong bargaining power 
and thus negotiate lower audit fees, independence may become an issue if the 
auditors succumb to such pressures. To some extent Francis (2004) can be seen to 
agree with these findings and notes that by including a fee structure within the 
engagement letter (essentially the contract between the auditor and its clients) at the 
commencement of an audit could potentially compliment such a continuum.  
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Fees continue to be one of the main benchmarks on which auditors base their 
assessment of risk, the higher the potential risk, the higher the proposed audit fee 
(Houston, Peters and Pratt 2005). Auditors spend the majority of their work on areas 
which they deem to be the most likely to consist of an element of potential 
misstatement or error. However, the quality of the work that is actually undertaken in 
such areas is no higher than the work completed on less risky areas, just more of it.  
It has been noted that fees can be seen to reflect quality, Lopez and Peters (2012) 
argued that fees and recovery rates (the percentage of costs an auditor is challenged 
to recover from the overall audit fee) could adversely affect the quality, subsequent 
findings and outcomes at the conclusion of the audit work. Such time pressures could 
have an impact on the level and detail of work undertaken. One interesting paper by 
Otley and Pierce (1996) targeted (as was then) the 'Big Six' auditing firms and they 
concluded that the budgets in both financial terms and time spent were at impossible 
levels and also that significant consideration was given to the ‘importance of budget 
attainability’. They continue to report that "there is a need to recognise that audit quality 
may be increasingly threatened by behaviours which are motivated by the 
performance evaluation system" (Otley and Pierce, 1996, p55). 
As competition for audit assignments increases, the pressures on those auditors 
bidding for such assignments to propose an acceptable fee also increases. However, 
DeAngelo (1981) notes that some auditors will propose a significantly reduced fee, 
which is attractive to the decision makers within an organisation who appoint the 
auditors on the shareholder’s behalf without disclosing their potential hidden 
intentions. 'Low balling' is the term which refers to the practice of proposing a low level 
of audit fee with the intention of selling additional products (for example consultancy 
or taxation services) which carry premium charges once the audit appointment has 
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been secured (Humphrey, Moizer and Turley, 2006). However, Firth (1997) notes that 
the provision of lucrative non-audit services (i.e. consultancy), may have the impact of 
increasing the ‘economic bonding’ between the client and their auditor, and as a result 
such bonding could jeopardise the independence or the perceived appearance of 
independence of the auditors with their client’s financial statement audit. 
Krishnan, Krishnan and Song (2011) reported that within the USA, Auditing Standard 
Number Five (AS No5) was implemented during 2007, although not directly mandatory 
regarding audit fees, the main objective of the standard was to identify those 
organisations with weak internal control systems and as a result higher fees would be 
incurred. With improvements in subsequent years it was envisaged that revisions to 
internal controls (as weaknesses will have been reported during the audit) would result 
in reduced fees (i.e. less risky areas to be audited). However, in the UK the 
professional bodies that set auditing standards (The Auditing Practices Board (APB), 
which is part of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC)) do not have a standard directly 
representative of AS No5, but have the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 
number 210 (Agreeing the terms of auditing engagements). This standard highlight 
that within the terms of an audit engagement, the audit fee should form part of those 
terms and all parties should ensure that they adhere to those terms to avoid any 
ambiguity or disputes, as well as providing a basis upon which any unforeseen 
additional work outside of the control of the auditor may be charged. 
 
As there is an absence of any regulation surrounding the fees charged, Asthana and 
Boone's (2012) previous findings regarding the link between reduced fees can thus 
equate to reduced quality, which to some extent supports those arguments with regard 
to 'lowballing' as put forward by Humphrey, Moizer and Turley (2006).    
19 
 
2.1.5 Budgets and time pressures and audit quality 
It is common practice in the business world that to maintain a competitive advantage, 
organisations need to ensure that their products and services are competitively priced. 
Within the auditing organisations this is no exception, and with potentially reducing 
fees, the pressures to maintain a budget recovery rate (the internal target percentage 
rate at which the costs incurred by the audit firm must be recovered) increase. This 
recovery rate is also an unofficial key performance benchmark rendered on the audit 
staff on the assignment, at which the achievement of this recovery rate potentially 
results in rewards for those audit staff assigned to this client in terms of both financial 
remuneration or promotion within the organisation. The study conducted by Lopez and 
Peters (2012) focused on what is generally perceived to be the busiest three-month 
period of the audit profession. A large number of companies work to a financial 
reporting year to coincide with the calendar year (i.e. a 31 December year end date). 
With this in mind there are pressures to complete as many audit assignments as 
possible within the three-month period of January to March (commonly referred to as 
the 'busy season’ within the profession).  This is acknowledged in the report from the 
Cohen Commission, whereby time pressures on financial statements audits led to 
audits that were sub-standard (Cohen Commission, 1978). 
Indeed, DeAngelo (1981) noted that the quality of any audit cannot (under the majority 
of circumstances) be verified by those who use financial statements. Therefore, any 
deemed 'value' was thus based upon those reputations of the auditing firm. As noted 
above, time pressures may affect quality. In order to build a reputation an organisation 
needs to be perceived to deliver goods or services at an acceptable level of 'quality' 
and price. Lower fees are regarded as a potential issue due to auditors delivering their 
audits within ever decreasing timescales in the attempt to deter potential competitors 
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from gaining market share. Market share will increase as a result of the auditing firm 
building their reputations, albeit built on price or quality (Kreps and Wilson, 1982). 
Timescales are the time allocations (time budgets) that form the basis of the initial 
audit plan. All audits are conducted by an 'audit team' which consists of a number of 
accountants with varying levels of experience and qualifications, the hourly rates at 
which these individuals are charged to clients and form the basis for the calculation of 
the total audit fee. Those junior members of the audit team with the least experience 
and qualifications focus on the information gathering element of the audit; it is these 
junior members of staff who follow the work plans as directed by more senior members 
of the audit team (Willett and Page, 1996). Turley and Cooper (1991) observed that 
although junior staff members are deemed to do the more menial and less risky areas 
of an audit, it is indeed their work that provides the foundations to support the 
concluding audit opinion, should such work be substandard; this could lead to the 
resultant failure of the audit. 
Time pressures on the audit staff has continued to be a significant discussion within 
the audit profession, as a result, little attention has been paid to this element of the 
audit process by those within the profession, however it is an area that has resulted is 
several studies being undertaken. During the evidence collection phase of the audit 
each junior (once they are deemed to have collected sufficient evidence) is required 
to conclude on individual tasks which are then subsequently reviewed and signed off 
by a more senior member of the audit team. There has been a notable increase on 
the pressures faced by auditors predominantly due to the time pressures to meet 
budgets, Raghunathan (1991) suggests that there is potentially a relationship between 
the premature signing off (basically the auditor marks an area of work as being 
completed, when in reality insufficient work has been carried out and/or 
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documents/evidence collected) of an audit procedure (an audit test), and audit failure. 
Acknowledging the previous study conducted via the Cohen Commission in relation to 
substandard audits potentially affected by time pressures (Cohen Commission, 1978), 
Raghunathan notes that this previous study reported that 58% of respondents had at 
some time prematurely signed off an audit procedure, and of these four fifths were due 
to the fact that the auditor was satisfied that sufficient work had been completed. This 
appears to be a potentially flawed response, as any audit programme test has a 
sample computed and executed in accordance with International Standards on 
auditing (ISA 530 Audit Sampling), therefore it could be argued that the sample was 
incorrectly computed during the planning phase of the audit and therefore planned 
inaccurately as opposed to being signed off prematurely. 
 
As there is potentially an emerging link to audit quality and the premature signing off 
of audit working papers (the area within an auditors file whereby all tests and results 
are stored), and utilising and building upon the Cohen Commissions study, Alderman 
and Deitrick (1982) attempted to extend previous studies conducted by Rhode (the 
Rhode study: Rhode, 1978) by extending their questionnaire to cover the area of 
premature sign off of audit tests/procedures.  In this instance Raghunathan (1991) 
identifies that the findings of Alderman and Deitrick reported the perceptions of the 
individuals surveyed as opposed to their actual own behaviours. Raghunathan 
continues by noting that 85% of the sample selected was identified as having signed 
off an audit programme test prematurely either rarely or never at all. One matter 
identified during this study was that the respondents indicated that they were more 
likely to sign off an audit programme test prematurely during the initial planning phase 
of the audit (this is the period of time when the auditors prepare their audit plan and 
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identify any perceived key risk areas in which to focus their audit work prior to 
completing the actual year-end financial statements audit), as opposed to during the 
audit of the financial statements.  
 
It is quite a relevant point that was made during this survey that some 85% of the 
respondents indicated that it was unlikely that premature sign off occurred, with 
professionally qualified individuals taking part of the survey who are required by their 
professional bodies to act professionally and ethically. Using the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) as an example, it could be argued that 
by breaching the regulations and ethical codes set by such institutions, as a result of 
their membership and threat thereon, the respondents may not have been entirely 
truthful in their answers to the survey questions posed. Another potential issue with 
this approach is that the employers of these auditors within the survey will have 
developed their own 'in house' quality systems, processes and protocols. Although 
surveys are ‘allegedly’ conducted in an anonymous manner Morrel-Samuels (2002) 
has reported that there remains an element of caution when surveys on employees 
are conducted (Morrel-Samuels, 2002), as a result of these qualified auditors taking 
part in the surveys the findings should be interpreted with caution, as an element of 
bias towards answering how their professional body would expect them to answer may 
exist within the results.  
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Whilst considering the links between time pressures and the impact on audit quality, 
those findings by Raghunathan appear to be in some part contradictory to those of 
Willett and Page whose study focussed on the time pressures being greater during the 
actual final stages of the audit when time budgets start to run out. As a result, 
compromises appear to be required/made, thus leading towards 'irregular auditing' 
(those practices which are not conventional audit procedures and would not be 
approved as widespread practice). In the attempt to overcome such irregular practices, 
the ICAEW introduced guidelines whereby each member of staff who completes any 
form of audit work should have that work reviewed by a more senior member of the 
audit team with the intention being to improve quality. As observed by Willett and Page 
(1996) to some extent work should even be re-performed by the audit senior member 
in order to substantiate the conclusions drawn from testing and that sufficient evidence 
has been gathered in support of those conclusions. However due to pressures on each 
individual’s time this is not always the case. Reperformance has been incorporated 
into some auditing firms audit approach. However, there is no evidence to support that 
such a process has actually been completed, and is therefore open to potential 
manipulation and thus a premature sign off occurs. As noted by Raghunathan (1991), 
such practice is thus potentially exposing the audit firm to the risk of litigation, or 
forming an inappropriate audit opinion. 
 
As identified above, risks exist as a result of each individual auditor’s actions, within 
the research conducted by Willett and Page (2006) it is acknowledged that premature 
sign off and irregular auditing practices would indeed be a breach of regulations/ethical 
guidelines. As a result, the participants (to ensure they were not in breach of their 
employment contracts) may have taken the view that safeguarding their employment 
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took priority over providing their true attitudes and actions whilst completing the 
questionnaires. Unlike the questionnaires in Alderman and Deitrick's (1982) study 
which was targeted at all levels of auditing staff, Willett and Page targeted 
accountancy students (trainees), completing (or nearing) their final level professional 
accountancy examinations. Although within this study, such 'trainees' are deemed to 
have been a more suitable sample, as Turley and Cooper (1991) noted, these trainees 
do focus on the less risky areas of an audit and the results from Willett and Page 
(1996) suggest that there were some 88% of the sample answering that time 
pressures had increased over their training period. From this it could be concluded 
that reducing fees and targeted recovery rates increase these pressures. However, it 
cannot be overlooked that it may be that any irregular auditing practices undertaken 
by this 88% (who will have completed less risk focussed tests), would not have an 
adverse impact on the overall quality of the total audit work undertaken and 
subsequent reports issues. 
 
Auditing firms place an internal emphasis on the targeted recovery rates, as with any 
professional services organisation, fees are derived from the amount of time staff 
members spend on a client project. With audit being one of such projects, a time 
budget is arrived at by allocating the total hours envisaged to complete various tasks 
by audit staff at various levels of qualifications and expertise. The amount in financial 
terms that such individuals are charged to a client depends upon those levels of 
qualification and expertise. It is customary practice that once the original audit time 
budget has been prepared by one of the more junior members of staff, the audit partner 
who will take overall responsibility for the audit and subsequent sign off/approval of 
the audit report will then reduce the budget to an amount that they themselves are 
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monitored by the other partners within their auditing practice. The result from this 
exercise is an increased amount of pressure for the more junior members of the team, 
thus to some extent substantiating the claims of and verifying the target sample made 
by Willett and Page in their 1996 study in relation to less senior staff members. 
 
It is recognised by Emmanuel et al (1990) that targets form part of effective control 
systems for management. However, such targets need to be realistic and achievable. 
In reality, as opposed to unachievable and thus potentially un-motivational targets, 
staff realise that regardless of their efforts, the target may not be achieved and 
therefore little effort is made to meet the target, which in some way contradicts Tosi's 
argument that performance could improve when targets are set (Tosi, 1975). This 
gives rise to two potential issues, one being that the work may not be finished on time 
and deadlines missed, or more importantly, corners cut or time not recorded 
accurately.  
 
During the study conducted by Otley and Pierce, their investigation consisted of the 
following two hypotheses: "H1: As budget tightness increases, audit quality reduction 
behaviour by audit seniors will initially increase, reach a maximum point then fall. H2: 
As budget tightness increases, under reporting of time by audit seniors will initially 
increase, reach a maximum point and then fall" (Otley and Pierce, 1996, p37).  In 
contrast to the argument raised by Tosi (1975) whereby targets act as a motivator, 
Otley and Pierce pose a further hypothesis, "H3: As the perceived influence of clients 
over audit time budgets increases, the perceived attainability of those budgets will 
decrease" (Otley and Pierce, 1996, p37). This study also built on a previous study that 
had gathered empirical evidence to support the findings in relation to not only time 
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budgeted pressures but also the pressures faced by impending deadlines (Kermis and 
Mahaptra, 1985), in addition to taking into account the stresses faced by auditors in 
meeting such targets.  
 
As reported by Kelley and Seller (1982) stress is now considered to be embedded 
within the accounting profession and it is a well-known fact that the more senior a 
professional becomes within an organisation the higher the levels of stress. 
Considering this prior research, Otley and Pierce targeted the largest accounting firms 
within the auditing profession, focussing their questionnaires on audit seniors (similar 
target sample to that of Willett and Page). The difference between the two studies was 
that Otley and Pierce focussed their study specifically on Irish large auditing 
organisations as opposed to Willett and Page who drew their sample from a wide 
range of organisations selecting students from a professional body examination listing.  
 
Although these two studies have similarities in terms of target populations, the 
questions within the questionnaires (although the intention of both studies revolves 
around the ultimate quality of an audit as a result of the impact of budget and time 
pressures) are distinctly different. Interestingly, the response rate of 73% to the 
questionnaires sent by Otley and Pierce is not significantly dissimilar to the 61% of 
respondents from the large audit firms to Willett and Page's survey. This could 
potentially suggest that due to the size of these apparently 'dominant' organisations it 
would be expected that there would be more students available to complete the 
survey. 
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From an alternate perspective, it could also be interpreted that such organisations 
'sweat their assets' (work their employees hard) and as a result to such a demanding 
employer, students’ motives in responding to these surveys could be seen to be as 
anonymous venting of one's anger / frustrations in the attempt to publicise these heavy 
work load practices. 
 
Although as noted earlier, there could potentially be an element of bias within the 
respondents who are bound by their professional body rules and ethical requirements, 
Otley and Piece's study reported that 45% of respondents felt that time budgets were 
either practically unattainable or impossible to achieve. In comparison to Willett and 
Page who reported that in response to a similar question (albeit with the question 
presented as using irregular audit practices which is arguably the same question) 
approximately 33% of the respondents had either frequently or occasionally been 
engaged in irregular audit practices (for example speeding up an audit test in the 
attempt to save time on the budget). In an equivalent manner Raghunathan's (1991) 
results found that 55% of his respondents had engaged in premature sign off of audit 
programme steps/tests.   
 
These three studies found that there was a problem with time budgets and pressures 
having adverse effects on the actual auditing procedures being conducted by the more 
junior members of the audit team. Interestingly, the comparison between Otley and 
Pierce together with Willett and Page (whose studies were reported in 1996 although 
an 11% difference exists between their findings) there remains a notable reduction 
since the 1991 study conducted by Raghunathan. 
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Prior research (as in the studies referred to above) focussed on the larger auditing 
firms which can be attributed to the fact that they tend to be the auditors of the larger 
companies which are listed on the stock exchanges across the world and appear in 
the media, normally when a crisis or significant event happens and are therefore more 
likely to be familiar to society as a whole. Rhode (1978) is of the opinion that the 
auditors who are most likely to be guilty of signing off audit steps and procedures 
prematurely are more likely to be practices within smaller firms. As a result, in the 
event that the quality of the audit work within those smaller firms be subject to scrutiny, 
they would be unlikely to suffer any significant adverse publicity. 
 
As there appears to be evidence to suggest that there is a correlation between the 
audit fee, the budget derived from the audit fee and the potential short cuts, premature 
audit programme test sign offs and irregular audit practices that take place, audit 
quality would appear to be flawed.  Turley and Cooper (1991) found that junior staff 
members were predominantly tasked with completing work on what was deemed to 
be less risky audit areas and the studies by Willett and Page (1996) and Otley and 
Pierce (1996) suggests that these are the members of the audit team that are the most 
likely to avoid challenging tests and potentially conduct some form of irregular audit 
practice or premature sign off of procedure, thus exposing an auditing firm to potential 
litigation. In the attempt to avoid such malpractices, the ICAEW recommends that a 
senior member of the audit team reviews the work completed by juniors, Alderman 
and Deltrick (1982) proposed that for only those tests that were deemed to have been 
identified as a 'risky' or 'vulnerable' element of the audit, the audit supervisor (usually 
the auditor classed as an audit senior and either close to professional qualification or 
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recently qualified)  should make specific reference to ascertain if all the relevant 
information and audit work has been gathered and completed. 
 
However, Lightener, Adams and Lightener (1982) argue that during the review process 
it is actually the reviewer who has encouraged junior staff members to perform 
irregular audit practices or cut short audit tests and reviews of that junior’s work, thus 
undermining the whole review process and the quality enhancement that this 
exercise/control is there to provide.  
 
In such an event it could be argued that this part of the review process should be 
conducted by someone who is not a member of the actual audit team, but independent 
thereof. However, including such an experienced individual in this process will add 
additional resource, time and subsequent costs to the overall audit budget and could 
have the opposite effect of enhancing quality by being independent and inadvertently 
increasing the pressures on the original time and financial budgets could result in 
alternative irregular audit practices.  
 
In the attempt to enhance audit quality at the review stage, Waggoner and Cashell 
(1991) suggest that the reviewer could re-perform the audit tests (or an element of 
thereof) to ascertain if the test has been completed in accordance with the planned 
programme, or if premature sign off has occurred. From this suggestion, a number of 
issues arise as to the practicalities of such a task. Firstly, there are the additional costs 
incurred in carrying out the task, also clients may feel that having to locate once again 
source documents to verify a financial balance or disclosure, is a repeat of audit work 
already completed and impeding on their day to day tasks (audit clients predominantly 
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see auditors as a hindrance adding unnecessarily to their normal daily tasks). Audit 
documents should only need to be located once and as a result this should be reflected 
in less time being required on the audit, leading to a subsequent reduction in the audit 
fee, once again adding further time pressures to the auditors with a potential quality 
impact. 
   
2.1.6 Audit review - Effects on audit quality 
 
As Raghunathan (1991) suggests, there is an element of premature sign off that exists 
with the audit function. In an attempt to reduce the risks to such an occurrence, the 
auditing companies devise their own approaches on how to audit financial statements 
(ensuring any mandatory regulations are adhered to where applicable). In addition to 
these approaches and in the absence of mandatory regulations, these auditing 
companies are able to develop and adopt any form of review strategy that is deemed 
necessary to ensure that mandatory quality standards/regulations are met.  
Asare (1999) argues that with the introduction of technology within the auditing 
process, the review of the audit working papers (the records the auditors prepare to 
record the work undertaken, the evidence obtained and the conclusions drawn) is 
taking place remotely away from the audit team more often than when paper based 
audits took place.  Agoglia, Hatfield and Brazel (2009) noted that senior auditors when 
faced with impending deadlines would only perform a superficial review of work as 
opposed to adopting a review by interview style approach to review as suggested by 
Asare (1999). Tan and Shankar state that "both research and practice argue for the 
benefits that a reviewer, forming an opinion independent of the work paper preparer 
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(invariably the subordinate) brings to the audit" (Tan and Shankar, 2010, p252). 
However as noted by Rich, Solomon and Trotman (1997) and more recently by Rich 
(2002) with the increased technological advancements within the audit process, 
reviewers may already have formed an initial opinion based on the documentation and 
audit evidence gathered prior to that task being completed, as a result there could be 
the potential for that senior (who takes responsibility for the time budget and is 
subsequently evaluated upon this target) to prematurely sign off that procedure and 
thus save time.   
It could be argued that such premature audit testing working paper sign offs are not 
predominantly due to the saving of the time budget, but attributable to that individual 
senior auditor’s knowledge and experience (Gibbins and Newton, 1994). Again, this 
raises the issue that if the junior auditor was following the planned steps and a 
previously computed and justified testing sample, then the audit must not have been 
planned adequately during the planning phase of the audit, thus (to some extent) 
supporting those findings of Raghunathan (1991).  
With the time pressures faced by audit teams (in particular during the 'busy season') 
unexpected issues may arise out of testing that were not anticipated, Kunda (1990) 
suggests that individuals may arrive at the conclusions previously anticipated (at the 
commencement of a task).  
With a predetermined outcome anticipated, any sample selected from an audit test is 
open to manipulation should a selected item not meet the predetermined outcome, as 
a result such items may be replaced within a sample and as a result no issues would 
be noted. Although such acts question the integrity of the individual conducting the 
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test, the quality review mechanisms that are put in place to maximise audit quality 
would be unlikely to identify such individual practices.    
As overall audit quality could be derived at from the quality of the underlying 
techniques undertaken and evidence gathered, the quality of the review process is 
therefore subject to scrutiny. As identified, there could be underlying motives into the 
depth and quality of the review process, working papers can be prepared in a 
persuasive manner. During the study by Rich, Soloman and Trotman (1997) it was 
noted that prior research conducted by Roebuck and Trotman (1992) focussed on the 
review comments (notes made on an audit file as part of the review process whereby 
additional work/documentation is required) made by seniors. The limitations within this 
study was that the review was restricted to only one auditing firm and it is also 
extremely rare for any review comment to remain on an audit file as these are removed 
once the additional work has been completed and documented, internal quality control 
procedures should ensure all review comments are removed prior to the archive of an 
audit file. 
The decision to either mark an audit test as completed and reviewed to a satisfactory 
conclusion or if additional work is required is at the discretion/decision of the reviewer. 
Ricchiute (1999) alludes to the fact that seniors reviewing and signing off working 
papers do so in such a way as to potentially persuade an audit manager or partner's 
ultimate decision. One interesting matter noted by Asare and McDaniel (1996) related 
to that of familiarity between the preparer and the reviewer of the audit working papers.  
More instances of errors occurring were noted where an element of familiarity existed 
between the audit junior and the audit senior. 
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Libby and Trotman (1993) allude to the fact that potentially in such cases there are 
inconsistencies within the actual working papers and the concluding comments within 
those working papers, reviewers may receive a verbal (undocumented) explanation 
behind the rationale supporting the conclusions. However, the documentation within 
the working paper is not written, hence the review comment to amend the working 
paper accordingly. Should the reviewer (via familiarity) place undue reliance on the 
work documented the quality of the audit is therefore jeopardised.  To some extent 
these findings support the comments made by Lightener, Adams and Lightener 
(1982), whereby an independent reviewer could be a benefit in adding value to the 
review process to overcome such issues arising. In a similar sample selection as 
previous studies, the focus once again surrounds audit seniors (excludes audit 
partners and directors) who are either nearing professional qualification or newly 
qualified. 
The reviews of the audit work undertaken can be seen to be exposed to the inherent 
risks that lie within the integrity, motives and time pressures of the reviewer, but also 
the review of audit work relies upon the quality of the audit work documented. Audit 
files consist of the details of the evidence obtained by the junior members of the audit 
team. However, the recording of such documents within the audit files are dependent 
upon the individual audit companies audit approach and how the recording of audit 
evidence is retained. 
 Zuca (2015) identifies that International Standards on Auditing (ISA's) exist to define 
how appropriate and the level of quality of audit documentation should be. However, 
with the technology involved in modern auditing, the requirements to place actual 
copies of documents on the audit file no longer exist having been replaced by the 
recording of the identification numbers (for example sales invoice numbers) within the 
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samples tested. It is therefore possible for an auditor to merely select a sample from 
a listing and then document that the work has been completed in accordance with the 
required testing programme. Tan and Shankar (2010) question the reviewer's 
evaluation of subordinates’ work, the issue of an independent review could be raised 
once again by attempting to remove bias of judgement via familiarity as the reviewer 
may ask to see the documents recorded in the working paper as evidence that the 
testing has been carried out as planned thus removing the potential for an auditor to 
either just record the document without conducting the test or in extreme 
circumstances created fictitious document references. If the aim of the financial 
statements audit is to provide an 'Independent Audit Opinion', as O'Reilly et al (1998), 
and Yip-Ow and Tan (2000) infer, the review and subsequent opinion of the 
subordinate’s work should be made independently and perhaps where possible the 
review by interview (discussing directly with the auditor the work they have undertaken 
along with an element of re-performance of the work undertaken).  
 
2.1.7 Client Negotiations and Preparation for Audit 
As noted above, time pressures could be perceived to be as a result of auditors striving 
to meet their own internal targets in terms of recovering their costs via the fees charged 
to their clients. However, the fee setting process will ultimately involve an element of 
negotiation, not only in terms of a financial agreement, but also in relation to the audit 
work being performed, the result of which could be increased pressures and 
subsequent quality of audit work issues as auditors strive to meet internal targets. 
Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) note that during any negotiation process, including 
those involving clients and their auditors can encounter conflicts between both parties.  
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Gibbins, McCracken and Salterio, (2005) conducted interviews with the Chief Financial 
Officers (CFO’s) of a small number of organisations and also the auditor partners 
responsible for those audits, this study focused on those negotiations involved in the 
resolution of conflict. Although not directly relevant to the nature of the authors 
research, Gibbins, McCracken and Salterio (2005) highlight that issues do arise 
between the auditors and their clients and it could potentially be perceived that some 
of the issues that result in conflict may have been avoided if the roles and 
responsibilities of both parties had been agreed (and documented) from the outset. 
Brown and Johnstone (2007) support those findings by Gibbins, McCracken and 
Salterio (2005), and they continue with the notion that (as noted earlier) the level of 
risk that an auditor is prepared to accept has a direct impact on the outcomes of any 
negotiations between both parties. It could potentially therefore be argued that such 
negotiations may have taken place prior to the commencement of the audit at the 
determination once more of each party’s role and responsibility. Namely what each 
party is required to deliver/provide prior to, during and after the completion of the audit 
fieldwork (the gathering of financial statements supporting documentation and 
subsequent testing thereon) but before the financial statements are signed. 
Many auditors attempt to reduce their exposure to risk by ensuring they have collected 
as much supporting documentation as possible. However, this can be a time 
consuming and tedious task for the auditors themselves and is usually a task for the 
more junior members of the audit team to carry out. One method auditors use in the 
attempt to reduce the amount of time taken to collect as much audit evidence as is 
deemed necessary is to provide a ‘wish list’ of items and documents that their clients 
should have available for them on the first day of the actual audit fieldwork (often 
referred to as a deliverables list).  
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As mentioned previously, audit fees and the negotiations of those fees reflect an 
element of the perceived risk that the auditor is prepared to accept and are a key 
element of the acceptance of an audit client or the continuance of a current audit 
appointment (Johnstone, 2000). Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) continue with their 
study on conflict to note that there is a pre-negotiation phase and this could include 
the roles and responsibilities of both parties and incorporate the deliverables list. PwC 
(one of the large global auditing firms) make available to all clients (current and 
potential) and ‘Audit Readiness Essentials’ document (PwC, 2015), although a generic 
document, it acts as an aid in client preparation for an audit and it could be argued 
that better prepared clients for an audit could potentially benefit from the impact on the 
fee negotiation process. 
The majority of literature in relation to audit negotiations relate to the negotiation of the 
audit findings and the effects on financial statements audit report which is considered 
to be the vital and most important factor of both the directors and shareholders of 
organisations. Spathis, Doumpos and Zopounidis, (2003) argue that one of the most 
important performance measures of an audit is the actual audit opinion being reported. 
An unqualified audit opinion is the opinion that demonstrates to external users of the 
financial statements that those statements are a true and fair (true: materially accurate 
and in accordance with the facts, fair: in accordance with relevant accounting reporting 
standards and relevant laws/regulations) representation of an organisation for a period 
and at a particular point in time (normally a twelve-month year-end date). As a result, 
the directors of any organisation will attempt (via negotiation, if applicable) to ensure 
any adverse findings on an audit are minimised in the attempt to achieve an unqualified 
audit opinion.  
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Sanitioso, Kunda and Fong (1990) note that there will always be some form of 
justification for those conclusions that individuals wish to draw and that such 
conclusions will be as a result of a search for any information deemed relevant and 
that such a search will actually include an amount of bias as the required conclusions 
will be consistent with that information that has been gathered. Such findings are 
consistent with the comments by Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) in relation to an audit 
whereby audit clients have an interest only in maximising income and results as well 
as having an awareness of their auditors’ conservatism. 
 
2.1.8 Literature Review Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the auditors are recognised as being under extreme pressures to meet 
client expectations in terms of delivering a quality audit within the timescales that they 
require whilst striving to reduce the audit fees they are charged. In addition to these 
internal factors affecting the audit team, they are under increasing pressures to meet 
internal targets in terms of time and financial budgets whilst attempting to minimise the 
potential exposure to the risk of the audit firm providing an organisation with an 
incorrect audit opinion. Academic studies to date have acknowledged such issues; 
however, the majority of the focus of such studies appears to be on those auditors 
who are fluctuating around the nearly/newly professionally qualified level. 
An element of the literature focuses on the pressures to reduce the level of fees that 
the auditors are charging and acknowledge that these then result in cuts being made 
in time allowances for audit tasks to be completed. As a result, irregular practices and 
premature sign off of audit work is being highlighted at the more junior level, however 
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such studies are limited to this employee level and there appears to be a lack of studies 
involving the senior members of such auditing firms.  Research appears to recognise 
the links between fee pressures and budgeted time and targets which also leads to 
the implications upon an individual auditor's performance appraisal and subsequent 
career progression and financial remuneration. 
There are a range of potential irregular audit practices that have been reported via 
previous studies with an emphasis on the junior auditors, gaps exist within the 
research as to whether such practices take place at the more senior levels within 
auditing organisations. It could be argued that as members of audit staff become more 
senior within an organisation with increased responsibility they become more aware 
of the implications of such irregular practices and therefore condone such activities 
(although research does not identify if such individuals are aware of these 
irregularities).  
The implementation of varying degrees of the level of review of junior members of staff 
has been touched upon within current research and the issue of an independent 
reviewer has been raised. However, it is not apparent whether the potential to include 
such a practice and record this on the audit file has been addressed, in addition the 
potential for an auditor to fabricate audit evidence remains unless every auditor was 
to be reviewed by interview and their own work essentially tested (via means of re 
performance of audit tests and the production of the documents reviewed checked). 
Although more modern auditing techniques have been developed (i.e. clients 
uploading scanned documents onto a portal), it may remain to be researched to 
consider if the documents were actually reviewed and evidenced as such by an 
individual independent of the audit. 
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One further gap that remains from previous studies is that of the audit clients. Although 
the audit essentially belongs to the auditing firm and they are to remain independent 
(and safeguards must always be taken to ensure this is not jeopardised), client 
involvement within the review process has the potential to be explored. Current 
literature focuses on the process of the audit and the subsequent completion; however 
there are potential benefits by involving clients in the review process (whilst 
acknowledging that the clients have no involvement in the actual sample selection and 
subsequent preliminary conclusions drawn), if a client is involved in certain stages of 
the audit (not only the completion stage) by formally acknowledging that the 
documents recorded by the auditor and the conclusions from each test are reasonable, 
this involvement could enhance (and potentially provide additional comfort to the 
auditor) the overall quality of the audit.  
In addition, additional research has focused on the negotiation process between the 
auditors and their clients. Such research focuses on the reporting of findings at the 
conclusion of the audit in the attempt to minimise the subsequent impact on the 
financial statements audit opinion. However there appears to be a lack of research 
into the negotiation of the roles and responsibilities (involvement of auditors and 
clients) at the planning stage of an audit, (for example, prior to the evidence collection 
stage) and how this impacts upon the time budgeted for by the auditors to perform 
their duties and how this could influence the amount of audit fee being proposed as 
well as relieving some of the time pressures on the auditors in an attempt to enhance 
the overall quality of the audit work being performed, documented and subsequently 
reported. 
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Diagram 1 illustrates the factors identified in the literature influencing the quality of 
audit focussing on issues associated with the auditors and specific to the clients 
(auditee’s).   
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Diagram 1: Current framework for assessing the factors adversely 
impacting on audit quality (Auditor/ Client). 
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Gaps in the literature also exist in relation to the overall audit, as current literature 
focuses on the quality of an audit in terms of work and time pressures, internal 
pressures faced by auditors in terms of meeting deadlines and targets and all literature 
focuses predominantly on the auditor. However there appears to be a lack of research 
into the responsibility of the actual audit clients in order to provide all relevant 
documentation to the auditors in order for them to complete their work and how this 
performance is reported other than the overall audit opinion. 
Additionally, an understanding with subsequent analysis of how both the financial 
statement auditors at senior levels and also the senior members of client staff (finance 
managers and directors) would perceive such involvement in the audit (including any 
benefits or barriers) would provide rich data with a view to the appreciation of assisting 
and enhancing audit quality for both parties. 
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3.1 Research Methodology 
“If we knew what we were doing it would not be called research, would it?” (Albert 
Einstein 1879-1955) 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is intended to outline the philosophy and methodology which underpins 
this research and to appraise the research methods and research design deployed  
in order to meet the thesis aim and objectives. Whilst providing an evaluation of the 
alternatives, the chosen research methodology to support the adopted qualitative 
approach is explained. Seale (1999) notes that for any researcher, one of the most 
valuable mental resources is to have a “methodological awareness”, which requires 
appreciation of “the strategy or plan of action which lies behind the choice and use of 
particular methods “(Crotty, 1998, p3). 
 
As a result, methodology therefore is concerned with not only the collection method of 
the data but also it originates, for what reason was it collected, when was it collected 
(timeliness) and subsequently analysed.  Guba and Lincon provide the explanation 
that “methodology asks the question: how can the inquirer go about finding out 
whatever they believe can be known?” (Guba and Lincon, 1994, p108). Crotty 
indicates that there is a difference between methodology and methods, whereby 
“methods are the specific techniques and procedures used to collect and analyse data” 
(Crotty, 1998, p3). Qualitative or quantitative methods (or a combination of the two) 
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can be used as any part of the data collection and analysis of a project. Any paradigm 
(see below) could use both quantitative and qualitative data. As noted by Grix 
“research methods can be traced back, through methodology and epistemology, to an 
ontological position. It is impossible to engage in any form of research without 
committing (often implicitly) to ontological and epistemological positions. Researchers’ 
differing ontological and epistemological positions often lead to different research 
approaches towards the same phenomenon” (Grix, 2004, p64). It is anticipated that as 
the scientific, interpretive, and critical paradigms are explored this will become evident. 
 
An understanding of research paradigms including for example, constructivist, 
positivist and interpretivist ensures that equal awareness to such approaches cover 
matters including methodology, ontology and epistemology (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2008). 
 
Based on the orientation of this thesis (i.e., exploring the importance of audit client 
commitment to comprehensive audit preparation to improve the quality of a UK 
financial statements audit) and those issues that have historically faced both auditors 
and their clients, a critical realist research philosophy has been adopted through which 
the programme of work has been derived. To clarify the implications for this thesis of 
this philosophical perspective, an overview of the approach to the research is provided 
and its relevance to the auditing profession and their clients. 
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3.1.2 Research Philosophy 
 
Whilst employing a research methodology the researcher has to evaluate and 
appreciate their own philosophical approach, informed by researcher’s view on 
ontology and epistemology.  Saunders et al, state that ontology can be explained as 
a “branch of philosophy concerned with the assumption about the nature of reality of 
being” (Saunders et al, 2015, p722) and is further defined by Crotty as “the study of 
being” (Crotty, 1998, p10). This means that any researcher needs to take a stance as 
to how things actually work and how they are (ontological assumptions). Similarly 
important, is to appreciate various epistemological positions, which are referred to as 
“the study of the nature of knowledge and justification” (Dawson, 2009, p18) and more 
precisely are concerned with the nature and forms of knowledge (Cohen et al, 2007). 
Continuing with such themes it could be argued that epistemological assumptions are 
thus concerned with the creation of knowledge, how such knowledge has been 
acquired and subsequently communicated, basically translating into ‘what it means to 
know’.  One of the explanations that is offered by Guba and Lincon is that a question 
asked by epistemology as to the nature of the relationship between the would-be 
knower and what can be known? (Guba and Lincon, 1994). 
It is widely accepted that each paradigm has its’ own ontological and epistemological 
assumptions upon which such a paradigm is based. As stated by Scotland “Since all 
assumptions are conjecture, the philosophical underpinnings of each paradigm can 
never be empirically proven or disproven. Different paradigms inherently contain 
differing ontological and epistemological views; therefore, they have differing 
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assumptions of reality and knowledge which underpin their particular research 
approach. This is reflected in their methodology and methods” (Scotland, 2012, P9).  
Grix (2004) notes that from an ontological position, it would be possible to track back 
via epistemology and methodology to research methods. In fact (continuing with Grix), 
in the absence of any commitment to an epistemological and ontological position it 
could be regarded as ‘impossible’ to engage in research of any form (Grix, 2004). 
 
3.2 Research Methodology 
In this section the methodology used in this research thesis will become evident as the 
scientific, interpretive and critical paradigms are explored. Typically, positivism and 
interpretivism are located at opposite ends of a research methodology continuum, 
whilst a critical realist philosophy, in response to this polarisation, is based on the 
compatibility thesis of worldviews (Shannon-Baker, 2016). 
 
Positivism was proclaimed dead or at least unfashionable in the early 1980s and since 
then this particular doctrine has been perceived by social science scholars 
predominantly in pejorative terms, whilst the anti-positivist stance gained popularity in 
various academic circles (Cohen, 1980). A sceptic or cynic could ask that if replacing 
and discrediting one philosophy of science, which dominated physical and social 
sciences for some four hundred years (Guba and Lincoln 1994), by its alternative 
(interpretivist) has anything to do with fashion, as it could be claimed that social 
scientists tend to treat philosophical doctrines in a way which can be captured by the 
following statement "a doctrine that is unfashionable today is almost guaranteed to be 
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fashionable tomorrow" (Cohen, 1980, p141). Yet despite the above, the discussion on 
the most suitable approach for studying social science phenomena is still extremely 
prevalent in the academic literature (Denzin, 2005). More interestingly, this debate 
typically focuses on the shortcomings of one approach versus another, implying that 
various philosophical approaches need to be addressed as opposing rather than 
supplementing each other. Influenced by Burell and Morgan's (1979) position that the 
research approaches (at least in the field of organisational theory) are 
incommensurable due to their ontological and epistemological differences, the 
discussion on what is the "best way" of approaching social sciences research is 
consequently based on a mutual critique between positivist and interpretivist 
paradigms.  
Positivism has reference to a research school of thought that sees what is described 
as observable evidence being 'the only form of defensible scientific findings'. However, 
since the acknowledged founder of positivism (Auguste Compte) passed away in 1857 
he has continued to be published and is constantly cited as bequeathing the concept 
of 'positive knowledge' (Compte, 1975). Positivism sits within the empiricists view 
point, whereby an approach to empirical research is predominantly obtained by 
acquiring and accumulating knowledge. The search for knowledge was greatly 
influenced from the chemists and physicists approaches to experiments (the scientific 
approach) which were largely developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.   A scientific approach to acquiring knowledge is by gaining experience, this 
can be done using observation and experiments as techniques to acquire the evidence 
to support the methodology in order to explain relationships and thus identify the 
causes that may have some influence over the outcomes (Creswell, 2009). Popper 
suggested that any theory is derived from the use of the 'hypothetico-deductive model' 
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and that any theory or law about the world should come first and these should be used 
to generate expectations/hypotheses which can be falsified by observations and 
experiments (Popper,1959), bearing this in mind it does potentially call into question 
the results obtained from a positivists point of view and those conclusions drawn from 
that underlying research. 
 
However, the gathering of empirical evidence to support a hypothesis is 'controlled' by 
the researcher and hence the variables that are associated with the results of the 
experiments. Some of the key elements within an experiment are the controls over the 
variables (dependent, extraneous and Independent) as well as establishing cause and 
effect relationships. With this in mind the controlled variables need to be investigated 
and could contradict those arguments put forward in support of NHST (Null Hypothesis 
Statistical Tests) by Snyder and Lawson (1993) and those of Schmidt (1996b). 
Creswell continues to argue that even though the positivist has collected all their 
evidence and has also collated and analysed participant perspectives, a hypothesis 
from a post positivist’s point of view is not proved, but to put it in simpler terms, it is 
not rejected (Creswell, 2009).  
 
Epistemological assumptions underpinning a positivist paradigm are based on the 
conviction that what constitutes valid scientific knowledge has to be based on refuting 
untruths and replacing them with the theories that are less untrue (Cox and Hassard, 
2005). In this sense, the question if there is any relationship existing between what is 
to be known and the user of new knowledge (Guba and Lincon, 1994) is approached 
by positivism with the fundamental assumption that human beings are part of nature 
and consequently are subjected to its laws. Thus, social life can be perceived as rooted 
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in biology and not only does this mean that the generalisable laws can be 
discovered/researched but more importantly that using the approaches borrowed from 
the natural sciences offer valid explanations of (independent from the researcher) 
existing reality (Cox and Hassard, 2005). This epistemological assumption is in a stark 
contrast with the interpretive tradition which challenges the view that it is possible to 
construct knowledge upon an unbiased observation of the world. 
 
The Interpretivist approach treats knowledge as provisional and relative and science 
as negotiated but not absolute. What we learn about reality is thus filtered through the 
researcher's senses and valid knowledge is never absolute, but mind-constructed and 
the focus of the interpretive research is on describing not discovering aspects of the 
social world by providing accounts or interpretations of human experiences (King and 
Horrocks, 2010). If the positivist would claim that those accounts are purely 
speculative and not "real", for the interpretivist these stories, narratives and 
interpretation constitute scientific knowledge.  
 
Clearly both approaches of the positivist and interpretivist claim that they produce valid 
knowledge about the world, however whilst the positivist focuses on explaining the 
causal relationship between different factors/variables, for the interpretivist the 
importance of knowledge lies more in uncovering meanings and understandings 
(Snape and Spencer, 2003). This Weberian emphasis on understanding is considered 
as one of the intellectual precursors of the qualitative approach (Bryman, 2003) and 
underpins the key characteristic of the qualitative approach; its "commitment to 
viewing event, action, norms, values etc from the perspective of the people who are 
being studied" (Bryman, 2003, p61).  If following a positivist approach, the assumption 
50 
 
would be that the term is knowable and accepted, then multiple and frequently 
antagonistic accounts and interpretations can indeed be perceived as ’fiction not 
science’ (Denzin, 2005). Yet the same line of criticism could be raised in relation to the 
science generated by positivists.  
 
The intra-paradigm critique could be referred to as less fundamental as it does not 
challenge the philosophical underpinnings of positivism, instead it focuses on the 
following problems with quantitative approaches: context stripping, exclusion of 
meaning and purpose, disjunction of grand theories with local contexts, inapplicability 
of general data to individual cases and exclusion of the discovery dimension in inquiry 
(Guba and Lincoln, 1994). This long list of problems identified by the positivists 
themselves can be eliminated by the greater use of qualitative data. Thus, for some 
authors there is no need to apply an alternative paradigm (such as interpretivist), which 
involves completely different assumptions about scientific inquiry.  
 
Recognising the complexity of social phenomena still does not prevent some of the 
scientists from rejecting the positivist’s way of carrying out research and simply ends 
with the suggested combination of interpretivists methods (qualitative) with positivist 
analysis. This typically involves relying on the qualitative data being treated as 
observations (truly reflecting reality) which can be analysed in order to establish causal 
relationships (Lin, 1998). Proponents of this approach do not subscribe to the 
ontological underpinnings of qualitative research (associated with interpretivist 
paradigm) as they still believe that their research methods and data mirror reality 
(Ryan, 2006). 
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The interpretivist assumption of reality is based on the conviction that our realities are 
mediated by our senses and are individually constructed. In line with this assumption, 
the importance of language does not relate only to its role as a collection of signs, but 
more importantly its role is seen as constitutive shaping reality (Frowe, 2001). If 
different people construct their meanings differently and reality differs from person to 
person, then in the process of research, it is the researcher who decides (via data 
interpretation) what ‘reality’ is rather than the research participants (Rolfe, 2006). This 
issue of the illusionary voice of participants (as they provide data but not 
interpretations) can be problematic for researchers who see that form of scientific 
knowledge as distorted and the analysis of phenomena as incomplete (Danby and 
Farrell, 2004). 
 
Clearly, from the point of view of positivists, knowledge produced by qualitative 
researches can be seen as fictional interpretation (Denzin, 2005). From one side, this 
criticism only describes what qualitative researchers admit themselves, or more 
importantly, what they believe the research process shares with narrative fiction. 
Phillips puts it eloquently “On closer examination, we find that social scientists often 
do what writers do: they create rather than discover, they focus on the unique and 
individual, and they use illusion and rhetoric in an effort to make their case.” (Philips, 
1995, p626). Not only are there certain similarities between the research process and 
writing novels, but more importantly interpretivists tend to use techniques and forms 
of narrative fiction to produce knowledge. For various qualitative methods including 
ethnographic research the data could be presented in a format similar to the product 
of narrative fiction. Phillips (1995) goes even further stating that the boundaries 
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between narrative fiction and social science are confusing and the separation is based 
on social norms not practical considerations.  
If the term fiction is supposed to serve as an insult to qualitative researchers, it might 
be interesting to establish the actual meaning of this term to clarify why positivists use 
it to criticise interpretivists. Fiction (Oxford Dictionary) as a form of prose is typically 
associated with imaginary stories (events etc.), created by a writer thus by assuming 
that qualitative researchers write fiction, positivists imply that the knowledge created 
by interpretivists is fictional not scientific, imaginary not “real”. Yet if we follow Astley 
and Zamouto’s (1992) argument that ‘empirical research is essentially a form of story-
telling albeit, an esoteric variety of storytelling’ and that the empirical observation 
serves as an excuse for theoretical work, but the theory so produced is essentially 
fiction’ we could perceive all models, concepts and theories, including those developed 
by positivists themselves as products created by human minds (scientists). More 
importantly, organisational theory scholars reinstated the importance of the narrative 
mode of knowledge which relies on stories negotiated between the story teller and the 
listener, as this type of knowledge contrasted with the logo-scientific mode of knowing 
based on proofs of truth or falsity enriches our understanding of social phenomena 
(Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995). This led to (at least to some extent) blurring the borders 
between the literature and social science as researchers focus on collecting 
organisational stories, writing each in a story like format and approaching 
organisational life as story-making (Czarniawska-Joerges, 1995). Stories collected by 
qualitative researchers similarly to the “hard data” collected by quantitative 
researchers have to be re-presented and interpreted in order for the knowledge to be 
created.  
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This discussion has clear references to the ontological assumptions underlining 
different views on the validity of scientific knowledge and for interpretivists depending 
on constructivist ontology, which assumes that the social world is not given, the claim 
that they write fiction is not problematical, as interpretivists are not saying that they are 
reporting facts; instead they are reporting their interpretations of other people’s 
interpretations’ (Walsham, 1995). This recognition, based on the rejection of positivist 
realist ontology is rooted in a wider discussion in the philosophy of science, and more 
precisely in the issue of legitimacy of different types of research. Instead of focussing 
on criteria such as the objectivity of data, generalisability and reproducibility – all 
typically associated with empirical positivist research, a different set of criteria can be 
used. As Stahl (2014) noted that instead of asking whether the particular scientific 
account is true, it would be more helpful to ask whether this account enriches our 
understanding.  Applying different criteria of assessing the validity of knowledge 
generated by qualitative researches, emphasising reflexivity, criticality, emancipation 
and contribution to a better world might not only change the way research is evaluated 
by the proponents of positivistic since, but more importantly may lead to a different 
way of evaluating what constitutes useful research. This approach could potentially 
lead to the promotion of an interpretive social science as an instrument for reflexively 
transforming the conditions of one’s existence (McKernan, 2013) such as critical 
emancipatory action research. Instead of arguing which research approach   is ‘better’ 
or which approach should be adopted, we should be asking a different question; can 
the science we produce lead to qualitative improvements for societies, does it underlie 
urgent challenges or does it perpetuate the discrepancy between the projection and 
the actuality of modern society deepening the state of crisis? (Dahms, 2008). Social 
scientists should worry less about validating their knowledge to silence the positivistic 
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critics, instead they should focus on fulfilling the key responsibility of social science: to 
illuminate those dimensions of modern societies which prevent what constitutes 
human flourishing, or ‘the human good’ (Sayer, 2009).  
For the purpose of meeting the objectives of this thesis and in line with the researcher’s 
ontological beliefs based on an understanding of reality as "real", only imperfectly and 
thus probabilistically apprehendable (rather than simply seeing reality as "real") a 
critical realist philosophy was adopted.  This critical realism ontological  stance 
combined with a modified objectivist view on findings and applicable methods 
(epistemology) means that  the researcher does  not need to ask the question  "is this 
the truth?", but instead they can focus on  obtaining  an understanding of what 
constitutes valid science/ knowledge,  based on the conviction that truth is constructed 
via dialogue and emerges as conflicting interpretations (Ryan, 2006).  
 
Not as naïve as the positivist paradigm, a critical realist approach still retains an 
ontological realism but borrows from the interpretivist conviction that our 
understanding of this world is a construction from our perspectives (Maxwell, 2012). 
Consequently, critical realists assume that what constitutes scientific knowledge 
cannot be universal, “correct” and independent of researches viewpoints. This 
combination of ontological realism and epistemological constructivism can be seen as 
at least contradictory (Smith and Deemer, 2000), but at most it is rejected by 
constructivist qualitative researchers who “do not think that critical realism will keep 
the social science ship afloat” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p13). Yet despite this 
criticism, realism should not be approached as a paradigm directly linked to 
objectivism, thus it should not be understood as an approach which generates fully 
“objective” knowledge of the world (Maxwell, 2012). Accepting various alternative 
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scientific accounts of the same phenomenon as valid scientific knowledge positions 
the realist closer to the interpretivist than the positivist, however the fundamental 
ontological difference remains, dividing those approaches into two distinctive 
paradigms. 
In line with Stahl’s (2014) assertion that the purpose of the research should focus on 
enriching our understanding of the chosen phenomena, a critical realist approach can 
be aligned with the key objectives of this research, which were set at aiming at 
obtaining data on the audit client commitment and preparation from the UK audit 
partners and UK finance directors. As this research objective is based on the 
assumption that the reality can be considered independent to our awareness, but at 
the same time we interpret experiences differently and thus universal claims are of 
limited value, the critical realist philosophy offered the approach which concurs with 
the fundamental assumptions and objectives of this research. The importance of 
recognition of the underlying social structures is strongly emphasised by the critical 
realist philosophy. The view that we need to acknowledge these structures to 
understand the social world is of particular relevance for this research, as it aims at 
eliciting data from respondents representing views from potentially contrasting groups 
of interests. This is line with the assumption underpinning the critical realist philosophy 
(Krijnen, 2015) that social phenomena cannot be determined in terms of observable 
behaviours (as indicated by positivist approach) or in terms of discursive practices (as 
per social constructivism). 
As this research aimed on exploring the importance of audit client commitment to 
comprehensive audit preparation to improve the quality of a UK financial statements 
audit, the critical realist perspective was deemed the most appropriate for this thesis.  
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This research philosophy   influenced the subsequent research strategy and methods 
of data collection and analysis.  
3.2.1 Selection of the research strategy and method. 
 
Taking into consideration the comments in the previous section, this thesis has used 
the qualitative research methodology approach. As stated by Denzin and Lincoln “how 
social experience is created” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2008, p14) is a key aspect of a 
qualitative approach, from which the questioning of the adopted qualitative approach 
endeavours to understand. Continuing with this, the researcher has an extremely close 
relationship with the research topic, having a professional background in this research 
topic enables a pragmatic approach to the research philosophy (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2008). 
3.3 Methods 
The research strategy employed two sources of data collection: semi structured 
interviews with what might be termed to be opposing party’s in the audit process, the 
auditor and the audit client and were supplemented by complementary secondary data 
(including professional reports issued from the Financial Reporting Council [the FRC], 
professional accounting/auditing bodies and professional auditing organisations).  
Primary data was collected via a predetermined set of questions aimed at ascertaining 
each party’s perceptions of the levels of preparedness by audit clients on the first day 
of the audit of the financial statements commencing. As Mathison (1988) argues that 
data does not need to be generated from different methods to achieve triangulation, 
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but from various sources and in doing so may be considered to increase the validity 
and reliability of the research. 
The methods used in this research (the multi-methods approach), does contribute to 
the triangulation of the facts presented and perceptions thereof, as each participants 
response was compared and contrasted. 
The research used the semi-structured interviews as a key method of data collection 
as these are based on a list of questions covering specific topics, relevant for this 
research. Interviews allow researchers to capture stories and perspectives of 
informants instead of simply checking if the specific hypothesis of the research is 
shared by the sample (Arksey and Knight, 1999). This way of collecting data has 
numerous advantages in comparison with self-administered questionnaires, which can 
also provide information of attitudes and opinions, however do not allow for any 
flexibility in exploring additional themes or issues, which may be relevant for the 
respondents, but not necessarily included in the questionnaire. Flexibility of semi-
structured interviews helps the research to establish a dialogue with the informant 
allowing for some modifications and adaptations to be used in the process of data 
collection (Bryman and Bell, 2015). Additionally, semi-structured interviews are 
typically used for exploring data grounded within the informant’s experiences and thus 
allows the researcher to guide the participant in convening accounts of those 
experiences which are related to the subject of the research (Galletta, 2013).  
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3.3.1 Participants 
 
The choice of participants taking part in this research was informed by theoretical and 
practical considerations. Purposive sampling strategy is recommended in qualitative 
research as a technique for the identification and selection of individuals who are 
knowledgeable about the subject and have experience with a phenomenon of 
researcher’s interest (Palinkas, et al, 2015). Both factors were particularly relevant for 
the purpose of meeting the objectives of this research and the selection of participants 
was also influenced by the importance of their willingness to convey their experiences 
and opinions. Thus, the individuals were identified on the basis of their experiences 
and knowledge of the audit process in their capacity as finance directors of 
organisations regularly subjected to the financial statements audit and respectively as 
the audit engagement leaders who assume the overall responsibility for the audit 
opinion.  
The participants were approached either directly by the researcher or through a third-
party contact at each auditing company or audited organisation. Most of the 
participants were unknown to the researcher prior to the interviews commencing.  
Participants were distributed evenly (ten of each participant group, twenty in total) 
between the engagement leaders of auditing practices (audit partners or directors 
responsible for the quality and signing off of the audit and subsequent audit opinion 
within the financial statements) and ten finance directors who were responsible for the 
preparation of the financial statements and the provision of audit required information 
through the whole audit process. 
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Participants were assured of the confidentiality and anonymity (see appendices six 
and seven below for consent and ethical considerations) of the proceedings. Due to 
the sensitive nature of the subject, participants were reassured that their individual 
responses would not be identifiable and their personal data (positions/experience etc) 
would not be revealed in the thesis. The necessity to ensure the confidentiality and 
anonymity can cause a conflict for the researcher who attempts to convey detailed 
accounts of the investigated phenomenon but is obliged to protect the identities of the 
respondents who participated in the research (Kaiser, 2009).  Due to the above 
restrictions, only limited information on the interviewees can be provided, as illustrated 
in table 1 below. 
Table 1 – Interviewee classification. 
Auditors responsible for the audit Clients responsible for the 
preparation of the financial 
statements 
Auditor 
Level 
Type of 
organisation 
Number 
interviewed 
Client 
Level 
Type of 
organisation 
Number 
interviewed 
 
Partner 
 
Auditing 
Practice 
 
7 
 
Finance 
Director 
 
Public Sector 
 
3 
 
Director 
 
Auditing 
Practice 
 
3 
 
Finance 
Director 
 
Commercial 
 
7 
 
Total 
  
10 
   
10 
 
3.3.2 Semi-Structured Interviews 
As mentioned above a total of twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted. 
Each interview lasted between sixty and ninety minutes. Interviews took place either 
at the interviewees’ premises or via the telephone, all interviews were in private offices. 
At the commencement and conclusion of the interviews, participants were assured 
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and re-assured of both the confidentiality and anonymity of the data recorded, 
collected and subsequently analysed. Additionally, all participants agreed to having 
the interviews recorded, transcribed and analysed. Although the interviewer took notes 
to supplement the recordings these were incidental to the recordings and to ensure 
the validity of the data and avoid any bias, these notes were not used in the data 
transcribed and subsequent analysis. Lillis (1999) is of the opinion that there is bias in 
an interview situation and subsequent analysis of the transcripts of those interviews, 
as theoretical constructs could be attributed to the interpretations of the transcripts 
and associated codes thereon. To overcome such bias the researcher transcribed the 
interview recordings with the assistance of an academic colleague with no prior 
knowledge of research or the sectors in which it was conducted. The data from these 
interviews was subsequently analysed and emerging patterns were analysed. 
Thematic analysis was used as a method of analysing data for “identifying, analysing 
and reporting patterns (themes) within data. It minimally organises and describes a 
data set in (rich) detail. However, frequently it goes further than this, and interprets 
various aspects of the research topic” (Braun and Clarke, 2006, p.79). Thematic 
analysis involves numerous stages which lead the researcher from the process of 
becoming familiar with the data, generating initial codes, searching for themes 
followed by reviewing and defining themes in order to produce the report. All the listed 
stages were followed, and data was analysed with the key themes identified via a 
repetitious process (Bryman and Bell, 2015) consisting of level one coding, second 
level coding and consolidated final level coding, as illustrated in appendices 3-7 
inclusive.   
61 
 
Secondary data in the form of regulatory reports were obtained from the regulatory 
bodies and used to compliment the responses from the interviewees and support the 
findings, conclusions and recommendations within this thesis. 
3.4   Reliability, Validity and Triangulation 
3.4.1 Reliability 
As Smith states “reliability establishes the consistency of a research instrument in that 
the results it achieves should be similar in similar circumstances. Thus, the same 
survey subjects (participants) using the same instrument should generate the same 
results under identical conditions” (Smith, 2017. p38). It should be noted that although 
the interview questions remain unchanged an actual participant could potentially 
provide a different response as it would be virtually impossible to replicate identical 
conditions to those existing during the initial interview. As a result, there could be 
different responses to the original questions asked at a different point in time, 
acknowledging that it could be difficult to guarantee reliability in this way. In the attempt 
to overcome this, once the interviews had been transcribed by himself the researcher 
received the input of another person (academic) who then listened to the recorded 
interviews whilst reading the transcriptions. This was undertaken to ensure any bias 
or interpretation that could be deemed to exist from the researcher was ultimately 
minimised. 
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3.4.2 Validity 
This research design was underpinned from those concepts arising out of the quality 
of financial statements theories. The rigor of the data collection and subsequent 
analysis increased the validity of the findings, conclusions and recommendations. 
This study achieved validity in the following ways: 
➢ The secondary data provided by the professional organisations and regulatory 
bodies (i.e. the ACCA / ICAEW / PwC / Deloittes / FRC) was both reliable and 
accurate. 
➢ The methods of data collection were consistent throughout the process with 
all participants. 
➢ The auditing firms and the audited organisations selected were all 
representative of the sector despite varying in size and complexity. 
➢ The study could be replicated using a different selection of auditing firms and 
audited organisations and comparable results would be comparable. 
➢ The participants within each organisation and auditing firm were all equally 
qualified and experienced. 
➢ Bias was at the forefront of the researcher’s mind and constant effort was 
made to minimise bias as much as possible. 
➢ All data was collected using the same media and subsequent transcription 
methods. 
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3.4.3 Triangulation 
As Flick states “triangulation of data combines data drawn from different sources and 
at different times, in different places or from different people” (Flick, 2004, p178). 
Triangulation has been achieved through the use of multiple interviewees 
(respondents) who were either an auditor or an audit client. One of the key factors in 
achieving triangulation was to seek different views from essentially, ‘both sides’ in the 
audit process. In doing so it has been possible to identify any consistencies or indeed 
opposing / conflicting responses to the interview questions. The consistence and any 
convergence of responses received from these respondents (as per 3.2.1, that are 
employed in a wide range of organisations in both terms of size and complexity) has 
added great value in terms of strengthening the interpretation of the findings and which 
has thus resulted in the increased confidence in both the validity and reliability of the 
data. 
3.5 Ethical considerations 
This research has been conducted in accordance with the University of Central 
Lancashire’s ethical code of practice. Ethical approval was granted by the research 
ethics committee prior to the research commencing which was a pre-requisite as per 
the University regulations. Participation in the research was purely voluntary and all 
participants were fully briefed prior to the commencement of the research, during the 
data collection period and upon completion of the data collection. Each participant 
signed a consent form and they acknowledged that their anonymity would be 
guaranteed, and any findings would remain confidential in that they were not divulging 
their origins. The interview recordings are being held in a safe secure manner in line 
with the stipulations of the University ethical approval that was granted. 
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4.1 Findings and Analysis 
4.1.1 Introduction 
The research questions aimed at obtaining the different views from both the auditors 
and their clients. The questions were formulated with the help of audit partners at large 
auditing practices in the UK. The findings and analysis section below commences with 
an initial comparison of the answers received from both audit engagement leaders and 
audit client finance directors. From these answers, a subsequent ‘consolidated’ 
thematic analysis brings together those views of both parties and this is presented in 
the sections below. 
The purpose of these sections is to illuminate how the quality of a financial statements 
audit could be affected by the various levels of preparedness on the first day of the 
audit field work commencing. Specifically, focus centres on the pressures auditors 
face when their clients are not prepared for them and the potential implications for a 
‘quality audit’ as outlined in Chapter 2. Interestingly auditors and finance directors were 
asked to describe their perceptions of levels of preparedness and whether anything 
could be improved upon from either ‘side’ (auditor or client) in an open-ended series 
of questions. In addition, the extent to which current attitudes may change if levels of 
said preparedness were both incentivised and mandatorily reported to external parties. 
As such, with the information acquired on what the interviewees viewed to be 
particularly important to them, these sections therefore describe the most crucial 
identified issues which were implicated across all interviewee accounts.   
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4.1.2  Analysis of the Auditors responses on their client’s 
preparedness for audit. 
  
The perception of how well a client is prepared for their audit on the first day will always 
differ between the auditors and their clients. There are many factors that need to be 
taken into consideration which include (but are not limited to) size of the company, 
reporting requirements/deadlines, attitude to audit as well as the size and strength of 
the finance team. Auditors normally plan their audits in advance of a company’s year 
end, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) issues mandatory International Standards 
on Auditing (ISA) and ISA 300 ‘Planning an audit of financial statements’. The FRC 
state that “the objective of the auditor is to plan the audit so that it will be performed in 
an effective manner” (ifac.org, ISA 300, p2). 
ISA 300 also states that “the auditor may decide to discuss elements of planning with 
the entity’s management to facilitate the conduct and management of the audit 
engagement (for example, to coordinate some of the planned audit procedures with 
the work of the entity’s personnel). Although these discussions often occur, the overall 
audit strategy and the audit plan remain the auditor’s responsibility” (ifac.org, ISA 300, 
p3).  
As the auditors are required to perform their audits in an ‘efficient manner’ proper 
planning needs to have taken place, in fact the planning phase (unless a new audit 
client of the firm) should commence once the financial statements of the previous year 
have been signed and filed at Companies’ House. Despite all the planning that the 
auditors who were interviewed are required to complete as part of the audit process, 
one partner from a smaller auditing firm was noted as saying: 
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“We do more planning than we used to, we used to pay lip service in what 
I would call the old days, but increasingly we do have a proper planning 
meeting” (A7). 
In a comparable manner partner A4 supports this statement as they stated: 
 “I used to enjoy audit, but not anymore, it is all the things you have to do in 
planning. It is like taking a sledgehammer to crack a nut, there are far too 
many regulations to comply with, if the numbers and disclosures are right 
then what’s the point in asking about the companies’ competitors, fraud 
awareness etc. The owner managed company directors are there every day 
and they know what’s going on, so what’s the point in asking and then 
documenting it all. Possibly that would be OK for large listed companies but 
not smaller owner managed companies”. 
Significantly while the regulations are specific requirements, the adherence to, and 
taken to comply, have an adverse impact (as per Chapter 2) on the budgeted time 
auditors allocate to their clients. In a competitive market, the additional costs incurred 
with increased planning of an audit are difficult to pass on to clients in terms of 
increased audit fees.  
When planning the audits, to assist their clients it is widespread practice to ask clients 
to have certain items ready for them when they arrive at the clients’ site on the first 
day of the audit. However, a considerable number of partners interviewed did not feel 
that their clients were actually ready for them when they arrived. 
“The nature of our clients means they are not prepared for the audit, they 
do not have the staff or the expertise to be ready for an audit” (A1). 
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Interviewee A9 adds: 
“I would say variable, and the reason I say that is because generally when 
you take over a new client they are not really ready, but do improve over a 
period of time and that level of preparedness increases as the finance team 
get better at knowing what you want. Having said that there are 
organisations that are never ready”. 
However, there are some auditors who felt that some of their clients were ready for 
them when they arrived at their client’s businesses, A7 notes that: 
“It varies, as I have some clients who are incredibly ready and everything 
is set out ready for us on day one, and I have other clients where they are 
at the opposite end of the spectrum and it is extremely challenging to get 
information which has a knock-on effect in terms of time and pressures on 
audit quality”. 
Similar comments were noted from the other interviewees with there being no 
benchmark as to how well prepared their audit clients were. It could be worrying if (as 
noted by A7) the audit quality was potentially threatened by the lack of preparedness 
of a client and the pressures and stresses on the audit team increase. If such 
pressures resulted in the reputation of the auditing firm suffering an impairment, as 
was noted by DeAngelo (1981) the financial statements of or organisation are only as 
good as the reputation of their auditors.  
Notably, preparing and planning for the audit is predominately the responsibility of the 
auditor, it is also a statutory requirement for companies meeting the audit criteria to 
have their financial statements audited. In the attempt to facilitate and ensure a shared 
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responsibility of preparing for the audit is embodied by the auditor and their clients, the 
auditor provides a ‘wish list’ of items they want to receive on the first day of the audit.  
“Other than the deliverables list we provide for them they are not ready, 
some items from the list they want to discuss” (A1).  
“It’s really about trying to agree what they ought to have, but you don’t want 
to give away too much about what you want to look at because if you do 
that you lose the ability to be unpredictable and you give them the 
opportunity to (if they were to be manipulating the result) prepare that 
manipulation rather than have that risk about it being mitigated because 
you have looked at things real time. One thing I should flag up is that we 
have an online portal and we agree with them what is going to be uploaded 
and when we are going to need it. This gives them the ability to upload it 
onto that portal and the benefit is that it means remotely if they are putting 
things on there before day one of the audit starting we can get ahead by 
putting things in the format we require. It also gives the benefit that it tracks 
what we are waiting for from them and also what they are waiting for from 
us, it is a two-way process to make it as effective as we can” (A4). 
As evidenced by these quotes, the auditors are attempting to encourage their clients 
to be as prepared as they can be in advance of the audit commencing so as to 
minimise the amount of time auditors spend using client time obtaining supporting 
audit documentation. 
Extending this point A4 revealed that there is communication between both the 
auditors and their clients in determining the items to be posted onto these portals. 
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“We agree what we want from our side and from theirs and also agree the 
date it will be posted onto the portal, that is really helpful as people are goal 
orientated in the fact that is crystal clear and that everyone can see it to 
drive people to be a lot better prepared than they would have been in the 
past. However, I invariably find that for the clients I work on in …………… 
sector they are only 50% to 60% ready for the audit.” (A4). 
This dialogue/continuous communication between the clients and their auditors is a 
recurrent theme which arose several times during the interviews of both auditors and 
finance directors.  The comment that A4 makes in relation to the agreement of required 
documents and dates is somewhat confusing when only 50% to 60% of his clients in 
a particular sector are deemed to be ready. This appears to contradict the comments 
regarding the agreement of documents and dates, as noted in Chapter 2 Emmanuel 
et al (1990) whereby targets form an effective part of control, should those targets be 
unrealistic they are thus not motivational and as a result there is no ‘buy in’ from staff. 
The result of this would be the additional time the auditors would need to obtain the 
‘missing’ documentation. 
“Nothing we prepare everything for them” (A3). “………..clients send us 
information throughout the accounts preparation process [A2 prepare the 
accounts] so this information we tend to keep from the account preparation 
process as it can be used later on as well as ensuring the accounts are 
prepared in a relatively correct form or status before we start the audit so 
we are actually starting with a trial balance and that starts the work of the 
accounts into statutory format” (A2). 
70 
 
It is fascinating to note that all the other auditors other than the two quoted above, all 
stated categorically that it is very rare that they would ever receive a set of financial 
statements to audit when they arrive on day one of the audit. Rather a fundamental 
point as the whole purpose of a financial statements audit, is to audit the financial 
statements. Only those where the same firm of accountants and auditors prepared 
them were the financial statements ready for the first day of the audit. However, 
although auditors must remain independent from the companies, it could be 
questionable if the same firm of accountants, irrespective of ‘Chinese walls’ between 
accounts preparation and audit existing within such firms should be allowed to audit 
accounts prepared by their company. 
Other than the lack of financial statements to audit, another element contributing to a 
‘failing to be prepared’ concerns the time dedicated to preparation and the availability 
of key client personnel. One auditing partner described how in one of his business 
sectors the cutting down on internal finance resource was an issue and client staff are 
stretched performing their normal duties. 
“I don’t think they don’t give it enough time regrettably, because everyone has a 
full day job and because for example the……..[a specific sector] have taken out 
all of their surplus capacity in their finance and other teams the reality is that as 
time progresses they are busy preparing the information they need internally and 
there just isn’t a long enough lead time or enough resources available for them to 
then say let’s spend a week getting ready for the audit. So, I think their biggest 
issue is that they don’t have the capacity to do it, so frequently we find that financial 
statements will be half complete with the numbers they know aren’t going to move 
from the start, so we have to take the approach of auditing the trial balance that’s 
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available on day one - making it very clear that there is no point giving us trial 
balance 2, trial balance 3 etc” (A4). 
With such a lack of preparation it is apparent that the auditors (as noted in Chapter 2) 
are faced with attempting to manage their audit risk by spending additional time by 
collecting as much supporting documentation themselves. The above statement 
implies that this auditor is not prepared to accept subsequent changes to already 
provided documentation until the final stages of their audit work. This course of action 
appears to enable the audit team to essentially audit any changes (i.e. adjustments) 
at the end of the audit without constantly restating balances and then using time 
computing and testing revises samples and populations. 
 
“Not being prepared, the sales ledger may not reconcile and it may not 
appear until later in the audit. Statutory accounts are never received on the 
first day of the audit. There is more willingness for our staff to push back 
and tell clients that the information received is not acceptable, working 
overtime for junior staff is no longer acceptable by them” (A5) 
“At the other end of the scale you have those clients that have been 
provided with a set of deliverables and then say that they did not know that 
you wanted this and that. You generally tend to find that some of those are 
under resourced and/or ill prepared as they are busy doing other things” 
(A6). 
When clients do not appear to ‘buy in’ to the process the pressure is also felt by clients 
and not only the auditing teams. There is a balancing act for those organisations that 
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are ‘lean’ on finance staff or under resources as they have conflicting deadlines of both 
their daily duties and providing information to the auditors and this is further 
demonstrated by the comments from another audit partner. 
“……….despite us getting things in terms of deliverables to clients early 
they don’t always deliver as there may be conflicting things that they need 
to do, i.e. there could be transactions that they are dealing with that take 
priority over our audit. Clients prioritise things operational above the audit” 
(A8).  
Despite the auditors attempting to plan their work to meet the required reporting 
deadlines, one common theme evident from the auditors’ interviews relates to the 
availability of key staff during the period of audit. Two audit partners described the 
importance that having access to client staff throughout the audit fieldwork is a key 
element in helping them to understand and complete their audit work on time. 
“More catastrophic comes to people not being available when we are in and 
we really need to speak with them as they are key to some elements of our 
work” (A8). 
“Maybe staff availability? they assume that they have provided information 
and basically say there it is, they don’t understand in all cases that it is not 
just the documentation we need but it is seeing people, they underestimate 
that there is quite a bit in terms of face to face time needed” (A10). 
Considering this, auditors question whether their clients are seeing their work as a 
priority as it only happens once per year (the audit of the reporting period end financial 
statements). Within most companies a financial timetable is followed to meet monthly 
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and annual (half yearly for a listed company) reporting requirements, an annual audit 
could be assumed to be built into such timetables. 
Both A2 and A3 referred to clients as seeing the audit as “a necessary evil” or “an 
additional overhead” and therefore do not regard preparing for it as a priority as, in 
their opinion, it is not adding any value to their business. 
“No, they don’t prioritise, often clients leave writing the OFR [Operating 
Financial Review], the corporate review or the corporate governance 
papers through the audit process, whereas I struggle to understand why 
these documents which are talking about the whole financial year have not 
been prepared in advance of an audit because the year is already 
complete” (notes A4). 
This statement concurs with those previous comments whereby the accounts are 
rarely ready for the first day of the audit commencing. Auditor A6 notes with some of 
their clients: 
“……… others where key staff may be off on holiday which is bad planning 
on their side as we are only here for 2 or 3 weeks, so there is an element 
of bad preparation, about planned preparedness and planned approach to 
the audit. Those clients that are engaged and you have senior buy in, things 
happen and they happen quickly. Those clients that are a bit distracted or 
the audit is lower down the priority list it is a harder process”. 
This comment supports those of auditors A8 and A10, if the clients are allowing staff 
to be absent during the audit it could be deemed to be doubtful that they therefore see 
the audit as a priority within their finance operations. Without having the buy in from 
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an organisation, the pressures are predominately resting with the auditors. As noted 
in Chapter 2 with auditors being under budgeted time and target recovery rates, if they 
have additional work to do in obtaining audit evidence, or indeed having ‘idle time’ due 
to clients only producing this evidence when asked for directly to the auditor, it could 
result in less detailed review by audit and/or add to the pressure to meet a deadline. 
The impact of such actions could potentially have an adverse effect on the quality of 
the audit work performed, and ultimately contribute to an inappropriate audit opinion 
within the financial statements. 
It is however recognised that preparedness is not an issue in every organisation, as 
auditors A8 highlighted that: 
“I have one client who loves an audit and likes the challenge of being 
audited, it gives him an excuse to get into the books, listed clients tend to 
make it a priority…….” 
Notably, whilst this comment is echoed by many other auditors, it is interesting to note 
that they (A8) continue by saying that: 
“…….. smaller companies see it as a compliance task and they perceived 
a good audit as an efficient audit, less concerned about quality but want to 
get us in and get us out”.  
Whilst there is an apparent disparity between organisations’ attitude to audit (some 
‘love’ audit, whilst others want audit ‘in and out’), one important issue is all clients 
attitude to fees (which is discussed in detail later in this section). Fees as noted in 
Chapter 2 are computed based on the amount of time an auditor will spend working at 
a client’s (chargeable time), and also incorporate an element of perceived risk. If the 
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auditors are not going to complete the audit within the budgeted time an ‘overrun’ 
(additional time incurred to complete the audit) will occur and this additional cost is 
passed onto the clients. 
“My guys don’t have the time to go digging out invoices whereas other firms 
may, so some clients just leave it to us. Overruns that clients pay for as a 
result of us doing lots of digging around soon learn and get better prepared 
next time to reduce overruns and costs. If time costs escalate because I 
can see what time and date information is loaded onto our portals and 
when, so that acts as a good tool to enable overrun costs to be recovered 
from clients as I can evidence when things were not delivered on time” (A5). 
In a comparable way A10 notes that: 
“As long as we have made it clear to them and of the timetables and 
deadlines…………… from the other side if they know they will get additional 
billing then that focusses their minds” (A10). 
Although overruns and the basis for charging these back to clients is usually outlined 
in the annual engagement letter, proving that the delays were client related and 
outside of the auditors’ control can occasionally be difficult to prove. 
Not only has it been identified that some clients are not perceived to make the audit 
period a priority during the year-end close-down of the accounts. But also, some 
auditors feel that whilst they are on client sites carrying out their audit procedures 
clients are not dedicating sufficient time in helping them complete those procedures. 
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“The other thing that they are never prepared and this is a great frustration 
for us, is that they fail to coordinate the accounting team with the wider 
communications such as legal teams, so you frequently turn up and don’t 
get the annual report in the financial statements until incredibly late in the 
audit process, because the other people that sit outside of finance don’t 
realise the importance of it and more often than not clients don’t invest 
enough time to get ready” (A4). 
Interesting point is that the auditors are becoming frustrated with clients when 
assistance is not always readily available, frustration can also add to pressure which 
then potentially impacts on quality. 
“………often clients leave writing the OFR, the corporate review or the 
corporate governance papers through the audit process, whereas I struggle 
to understand why these documents which are talking about the whole 
financial year have not been prepared in advance of an audit because the 
year is already complete” (A4 continued). 
“….. if there is no incentive then there is little effort put in by some, not all, 
clients. However, for those that are not ready or willing to assist and as a 
result auditors have to get information themselves or make information up. 
But clients are getting better and those getting better are financial, i.e. 
financial penalties” (A5). 
The two points above appear to insinuate that not only do clients have little or no 
motivation to assist them with their tasks, possibly as a result of the audit work 
interfering with their daily tasks and the conflicting deadlines that could have. However, 
the comments made by auditor A5 do give rise to an element of concern. If the auditor 
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is ‘making up’ audit evidence and then concluding on those results, this would mean 
that the whole quality of the audit is threatened. If this fabricated work led to the 
incorrect conclusion on an account balance or financial statement disclosure this could 
lead to an inappropriate audit opinion being made, one upon which investment 
decisions could be made. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Raghunathan (1991) highlighted the issues surrounding the 
premature sign off (basically, the review) of working papers in relation to audit quality. 
The comments made by auditor A5 allude to the fact that working papers that were 
‘made up’ because of time pressure faced by auditors. If this fabricated audit 
documentation and test conclusions pass through the audit review process (due to 
time pressures caused by client delays), the overall quality of the audit is potentially a 
significant issue regarding the risks surrounding forming an inappropriate audit 
opinion. 
As noted earlier in this section, the auditors prepare (on most occasions) a set of 
deliverables that they require on the first day of the audit, in addition to this it has also 
been highlighted that access to client staff is also an issue, not just as a result of daily 
duties being completed by clients but also with clients taking annual leave or business 
trips whilst the auditors are on site. A crucial point is raised by Auditor A9 below: 
“Most of them do [make time for auditors], but there are the odd one or two 
where you have an extremely short reporting deadline and the frustrating 
thing is that there are one or two people that we need to speak to on an ad 
hoc basis. Questions arise during the audit every now and then and they 
want us to book time in diaries etc in advance of the audit commencing, an 
audit needs to be an ongoing process where queries arise and there are 
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questions etc coming out of the audit, where finance teams are very rigid in 
how the audit is carried out is very unhelpful” (A9). 
Indeed, many auditors would agree with these statements as client staff absence 
appears to be a common occurrence. Taking into consideration the earlier comments 
related to clients running their businesses as a priority over the audit, for those who 
do not need to be away from the office auditors should query if client staff absence 
should be permitted. 
In support of this auditor A2 notes that: 
“………… one of our clients will not allow holidays for administration staff 
during the audit” (A2). 
Although the auditor is independent and there to form an opinion on the truth and 
fairness of financial statements, clients could potentially be more sympathetic towards 
the auditors completing their work. For those clients who wish to have allotted time 
booked in a diary in advance, the audit work in those areas may need revisiting to 
ensure that it could be completed in advance of those meetings. In the case of the 
work over running, where client related delays result in the meetings needing to be 
rescheduled, this would need to be brought to the attention of management early in 
addition to indicating that there could be fee issue implications.  
It was alluded to earlier that the audit opinion does reflect on the reputation of the firm 
auditing those financial statements upon which said opinion is based. However, this 
opinion relates to the truth and fairness of the financial figures and related disclosures, 
it does not reflect on the management of that company or how they were prepared for 
the audit or assisted during the audit period. After all the audit is a part of not only the 
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finance function but as per the Companies Act 2006, the directors’ responsibility in the 
preparation of the financial statements. 
Considering this (the audit opinion), including some reference to the levels of 
preparedness and/or disclosures in relation to fees and overruns was considered to 
be something all auditors were in favour of. 
“……….. anything whereby an opinion that would have an adverse comment 
in the audit report would mean that clients would take action on their part. 
All of our clients are conscious of having an adverse opinion, they will 
basically do anything they need to avoid having an adverse opinion” (A2). 
“………. I am a firm believer in if it gets measured it gets actioned upon, if 
it were something in the public domain it would get actioned upon, from a 
personal perspective of that finance director he would not want to be known 
as someone who isn’t prepared for an audit” (A6). 
“…….. if it were mandatory to disclose this and clients knew about it up front 
they would go all out to avoid anything adverse going in the audit report” 
(A7). 
Taking these comments from these three audit partners from different auditing 
practices, they appear to state that they genuinely feel that by amending the audit 
opinion, clients would place greater importance on the preparation and timeliness of 
information for audit. Two comments in relation to charities that require an audit gave 
rise to some interesting points: 
“I think it would…… [disclosing something in the audit opinion], and I say it 
would for 2 reasons. Firstly, on some of our reports and particularly charities 
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and those for the last 12 months we have a little section at the front that lets 
us tell the trustees how ready the client was for our audit, it is in some of 
the charity ISA’s and what we have found is that if the client hasn’t got three 
green blobs, one of them is quality of the papers, another is preparedness 
and the third one is the quality of the annual report and financial statements 
and it looks like a traffic light. And if they have not got 3 straight greens you 
find that when you come back the subsequent year they have made a 
marked improvement so they end up with 3 green lights” (A4). 
Notably, while this point was echoed by auditor A10 below, it is interesting to note that 
this individual (A4) felt that a level of ownership in relation to the preparation of 
documents in terms of both timeliness and quality as well as having a good quality 
annual report and accounts ready (something that clients appear to be lacking so far), 
is needed to be taken by the management of the Charity being audited.  
”……….in the reports to audit committees we report on a traffic light basis 
on how well prepared the clients were for us and the quality of the audit 
papers and this draws attention to the director of finance and yes it would 
[be beneficial to disclose something in the audit opinion of commercial 
organisations], as this would become more public which would put more 
pressure on the FD to manage the team better, regulators and readers 
would definitely have a view as to how well / how good that finance team 
and director is” (A9).  
This auditor (A9), although supporting the views of auditor A4 suggests that the audit 
committee benefit from such disclosures being made to them and not its’ widespread 
availability to the general public as a whole. They also appear extremely confident in 
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that introducing such a modification to the audit opinion would influence finance 
departments in prioritising their audit preparation. 
In further support of such modifications to the audit opinion was auditor A8: 
“I think it probably would [modifying the audit opinion to refer to client levels 
of preparedness], I think clients tend to be quite sensitive as to what goes 
into the audit opinion so anything that would be published that could be 
potentially adverse for them or their interest would encourage them” (A8). 
One potential disclosure that could either support the modified audit opinion (either by 
disclosure within the audit opinion or become a mandatory cost disclosure note 
supporting the figures in the financial statements) that was raised by several of the 
auditors was the variation to the original fees.  
 
“…….. if clients were to report on variations they had to pay to the auditors 
because that is probably a greater indicator as to whether they have not 
been ready or not delivered what they were supposed to deliver because 
that sends a message to the world that they agreed a commercial fee for 
the audit but they have had to pay more due to the auditors doing more 
work due to the quality of the information provided or the time in which it 
was prepared” (A4). 
“But it could be a motivating factor to clients to be ready as money is 
important to them” (A10). 
From the perspective of the auditors it could potentially be beneficial to investors to 
understand how organised an organisation is and the timeliness of reporting, if a fee 
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variation is disclosed with some narrative that outlines why they incurred a fee more 
than the original fee that the auditors quoted. Although it should be acknowledged that 
in providing such disclosures within an audit opinion or in a cost note to the accounts, 
may not sit too well with those organisations who fall foul of such negative 
modifications. 
 
“If we want to be transparent I think there is value in bringing the fee being 
disclosed in the audit opinion, maybe in a box at the bottom detailing 
variations as that is a greater indicator as to the preparedness of the clients. 
We are constantly concerned with the auditors delivering other things to 
avoid impairing our independence, the box could show the audit fee, audit 
fee variation, other fees charged by the auditors in the provision of other 
work. If it is important to be transparent then let’s be transparent and show 
everything” (A4). 
 
“……however, in the auditor remuneration box splitting out the audit fee 
and overrun costs due to audit ineffectiveness then that could be beneficial” 
(A5). 
 
In providing examples (from the quotations above) of the levels of preparedness of 
organisations for their audits, it is apparent that the auditors feel that this needs 
recognising in the financial statements. Either positive or negative comments could 
help a user of the financial statements in their understanding of the organisation in 
both financial terms and also the strength of the management team, in particular with 
how they view the importance of their financial reporting. Although it is recognised that 
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including such disclosures would need careful consideration, it is deemed to be a 
positive step forward in the field of auditing by the auditors. 
In relation to the added value of other stakeholders and not limited to the equity 
investors, the benefits of such disclosures were mixed amongst the auditors 
interviewed. Although it is recognised by the auditors that they would benefit as clients 
could be driven to avoid any negative commentary in their audit report and disclosure 
notes, wider audiences may not take any additional value.  
Issues could arise however with those companies that have some form of negative 
preparedness, as auditor A2 notes: 
“……….it may have a negative impact on the client and it may raise some 
issues with HMRC as they would require that information is available and if 
the report said the information was not available that may be interpreted 
that the client’s records are not up to standard that would be expected” (A2) 
If such an issue were to arise and a subsequent inspection from HMRC arose, then 
such reporting could potentially be a positive step forward. Upon implementation, the 
improvement of maintaining accounting records could be higher on an organisation’s 
agenda to ensure future audits or indeed other inspections ran smoothly due to 
improved systems and documentation filing and storage. Organisation who received 
poor reports as a result of their levels of preparedness and perhaps incur additional 
overrun costs, could use this to improve and not only benefit from clean reports in the 
future, but also as a tool to enable them to reduce costs, therefore reinvesting the 
savings for company growth. 
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It is apparent from discussions with the auditors that they are united in forming and 
reporting the clients’ attitude to audit, after all this is a part of the annual process and 
disclosed within the annual report is a review of the year of the reporting company and 
a look ahead to the following year, that could mean there is scope for mandatory 
disclosure of the audit performance as it forms a part of the companies processes and 
costs. 
However, with such potential negative comments within an annual report, for those 
companies that elect to have a voluntary audit as they do not meet the relevant audit 
thresholds, they may rethink the process. 
“I think that for those clients who have a voluntary audit as opposed to a 
mandatory audit they would think again. In my opinion audit requirements 
are overkill, complete and utter overkill and as a result I am trying to 
persuade some clients who have a voluntary audit not to bother as the 
planning etc is overkill” (A3). 
Should voluntary audits reduce as clients do not want anything adverse appearing in 
their financial statements, there could be reduction of fee income to those auditing 
companies that complete a voluntary audit of a client. However, such clients are 
unlikely to be significant unless the auditing company is small, and the removal of 
voluntary audit fees does not adversely impact on total practice income upon which 
individual audit client independence rules are based. 
“It is getting to the stage now where I feel audits should just be for listed 
companies I just don’t see the point for smaller owner managed businesses. 
By the time you have taken to do the audit and do these stupid 80 pages of 
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planning notes and god knows what you give the client much more value 
for their money than messing around with stupid audit requirements” (A3). 
 “I don’t think financial statements tell a great deal as they are now too 
complex” (A1). 
As shown by these two points, the financial statements are becoming more complex 
and it is felt that other than a user of these statements taking a look at the financial 
results, dividends and earnings per share, they take little value from anything else 
within them. It could therefore be argued that with such additional disclosures and 
audit requirements from regulatory bodies that there is no doubt that clients will 
continue to suffer in terms of preparedness for audit. As mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, it is extremely rare that auditors find a full set of financial statements ready 
for them on the first day of the audit fieldwork commencing and taking that into 
consideration reporting this as a failing may fall outside of a client’s control if the audit 
is scheduled too close to the reporting period end.  
Pointing to clients being better prepared, there is evidence (as per Chapter 2) to 
suggest that as time elapses and deadlines approach, pressure increases and that 
could have an adverse effect on the quality of an audit. However, audit pressure and 
quality is not necessarily at the forefront of the client’s minds when the audit is taking 
place. 
“……it depends how the clients view the audit, if they just want a cheap fee or are they 
looking for real value out of it, if they were happy to set aside an amount of time for 
the audit then the compliance element would add more value to the client. They may 
not want that, they may just want you to do your compliance audit and get out of there. 
That’s where I think most of our clients probably are” (A1). 
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This is an isolated comment from auditor A1 as the remaining auditors interviewed 
had different views. The comment from A1 indicates that for some clients the audit is 
in some way unimportant to them, however this supports the comments made earlier 
in this chapter relating to ‘get them in and out as quickly as possible’ in addition to 
being cost (audit fee) sensitive. 
The impact on increasing the quality of the audit was a key response to clients being 
better prepared. 
Audit A4 notes that “as time pressures could affect the amount of time spent 
obtaining and analysing audit evidence”. 
In support of A4’s comment similar comments were noted which include: 
“Yes, I think it would enhance the quality of the documentation on the audit 
file and not necessarily what we do. Documentation could always be 
improved and I am sure this would add to enhancing the overall quality of 
the audit conducted” (A5). 
“…….. you go into the mess and spend so long sorting the mess out you 
actually probably although subconsciously lower your bar of expectation 
and are happy to just get through the audit whereas if clients are better 
prepared and you do the job properly and more efficiently and focus on the 
stuff you need to focus on, so yes the audit will be more efficient and better 
quality, no doubt about that” (A7). 
“I think it could in terms of documenting things more thoroughly and as 
mentioned earlier for those more judgemental areas if we get our clients on 
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side and things are ready the work on the more judgemental things could 
be better” (A8). 
As demonstrated by the auditors above they are of the genuine opinion that the quality 
of their work could be improved. This could relieve unnecessary pressures on the 
auditors in terms of ensuring their audit was recorded in the working papers and audit 
files to a high standard. But also, the time saved could also be reinvested in a more 
quality review process which would enable (as mentioned earlier) any fabricated audit 
evidence to be picked up prior to a conclusion and subsequent audit opinion being 
formed.  
 
Additional effort could be focussed on those areas that auditors have identified as 
being risky (susceptible to being misstated or disclosed), alternatively adding value to 
the audit by completing a review of a client identified issue, as Auditor A6 identifies:  
“……….there is a direct linkage in terms of where you are spending your 
audit effort, for some clients it may be reinvestment of that time elsewhere, 
could you spend time looking at XYZ thus adding value or a reduction in 
fees” (A6). 
It was noted earlier that amending the audit opinion was a favourable option for the 
auditors, it could be used as a tool to motivate their clients to be better prepared for 
them when they commence their audit. One of the modifications identified could have 
been identifying and reporting in the financial statements the variations to fees due to 
overrunning on budgeted time, as auditor A9 notes: 
“…….this [clients being better prepared for them] would help avoid arguing 
about overruns for example, I think the more we move towards a digital 
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audit so certain aspects erm they would have to have that level of 
preparedness” (A9). 
 
The point regarding a digital audit is an interesting point, there would be a significant 
amount of investment required in the initial purchase of such software for the smaller 
auditing firms and ongoing additional costs in terms of licenses and maintenance. 
Should the world of auditing move towards digitalisation the costs may outweigh the 
benefit as the smaller firms would no longer be able to afford the potential levels of 
investments required. Moreover, if the smaller firms were unable to audit their clients, 
it would be the larger more expensive auditing firms that would benefit. However, in 
doing so the price of an audit from a larger auditing firm would usually be more than 
the fees charged by the existing smaller auditing practices. Another issue could be 
that as these smaller clients may not be able to afford increased audit costs due to 
digitalisation and hypothetically, cheaper less quality auditing organisations could 
enter the market place.    
 
Those larger auditing firms, due to their reputation do have some authority when their 
demands are not met as noted by A10: 
 
“It is definitely a challenge if I am not happy with the quality of information 
or there is a major delay I will not be forced to sign anything until I am 100% 
happy with the information etc, I would go back to clients and tell them if 
there were to be any delays, it is their issue, if there are information delays 
I won’t be pushed into accepting anything of lower quality” (A10). 
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From a support staff (junior auditors) perspective, the weight of an audit partner with 
a good reputation and the support of a large firm behind them is a comfort in ensuring 
audit supporting documentation is of the highest quality delivered in a timely manner. 
However, that is down purely to the strength of the audit partner concerned. Similar 
partners no doubt exist in smaller practices, however the resources to support such 
decisions and of course levels of audit fees are crucial factors. 
Reflecting on previous audit engagements and the issues that have been 
encountered, although having acknowledged the costs involved when implementing 
any form of change, it is apparent automation is something clients need to be 
considering. In doing so, a good solid accounting and record keeping system would 
be of a great benefit to any audit. Not only would it make the audit more efficient, but 
as mentioned above, it could have a positive impact on improving audit quality and 
audit test recording. 
Auditors remain concerned that some clients are somewhat naive when it comes to 
the audit, there continues to exist an audit expectations gap (the difference between 
what the general perception of what auditors do and what they actually do and are 
attempting to achieve). 
“I would say the vast majority of clients are not aware of how an audit works, 
they see it in many cases as checking rather than confirming. There is 
scope for us to do more there however clients just want us to get on with it” 
(A2). 
This view of an expectations gap has been investigated in numerous previous studies, 
this suggests that to overcome this issue an amount of investment in terms of the 
auditor’s time could yield benefits by educating them on the audit process. 
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“Invest time in clients to get them to do things sooner rather than later. We 
work hard at having this all year round audit which means if a client has an 
unusual transaction or something that’s going to feature in the year end 
audit we try and encourage them to share information as they go so that 
firstly we can agree the treatment that should be taken in the accounts as 
there is nothing worse than an auditor at the year-end stating you can’t 
record a transaction like that  as it is contrary to an IFRS or something 
similar so we try and do that and bring things forwards, but sometimes 
clients are reluctant to do things sooner” (A4) 
It is apparent that this auditor (A4) encourages its’ clients to communicate throughout 
the year, in doing so it would avoid any issues that could have been discussed and 
resolved prior to the year-end free up valuable time when the year-end audit 
commences. In a similar theme auditors A9 and A10 stated that: 
“…….. knowing about any major transactions or changes and discussed 
early…..” (A9). 
“Combination of communication as to what we are going to do and when 
we are going to do it so both sides know what the goal is, communication 
both ways. If you agree to a timetable then stick to it and if you agree on it 
you agree to deliver to it” (A10). 
Communication is a regular theme, auditors have noted earlier that the audit is a year-
round process with the start of one year’s audit commencing once the previous year’s 
audit has been signed off. Although communication is a fundamental part of any 
business, communication with the auditors could be deemed to be less of a priority for 
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clients, after all, as some auditors mentioned earlier, clients’ focus is on running their 
core business with audit being a necessary evil and overhead cost. 
In addition to increased communication being something the auditors would like to see 
improved, so too is the automation of the audit process. It was mentioned earlier that 
automation is something that is developing as technology advances. Introducing more 
automation into the process could contribute to removing some of the time pressures 
on auditors. An interesting viewpoint is raised by auditor A5: 
“More automation, the less time spent shuffling papers would reduce time 
and costs to us which could potentially be passed onto clients. If automated 
samples may disappear and 100% checks could be possible. Clients would 
just give access to systems and we can then access those systems and 
essentially interrogate the data, we can’t automate those balances that 
require an element of judgement, by pushing the boundaries of automation 
that must surely enhance overall audit quality and the clients therefore 
needs to be less prepared and thus focus on those judgemental balances” 
(A5). 
The point raised above is something alluded to by auditor A9: 
“……with changes in how we sample now as it is more automated…..”(A9) 
Audit is based on a test basis and only samples from a population (an account 
balance) is tested by the auditor. The automation point raised by different auditors 
insinuates that with implementing more automated auditing techniques larger 
samples, if not 100% could be tested thus adding value to the audit opinion as 
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detection risk (the risk that an error may not be included in the auditor’s sample and 
thus go undetected) is virtually removed/reduced to zero. 
Thus far it is apparent that very few clients are prepared for their auditors, differing 
reasons have been noted as to why they were not prepared have arisen and thus the 
auditors feel additional pressures when information is provided late. The auditors have 
also stated that where overruns are incurred additional costs are passed onto their 
clients resulting in a higher than anticipated fee being charged to clients thus adversely 
affecting their financial results. A number of auditors note that incentivising clients 
could be a method by which those clients could be motivated to prioritise the audit and 
provide timely quality information and staff availability. As auditor A10 notes: 
“….most clients are financially motivated and therefore any savings are 
always an incentive” (A10). 
This statement is also supported by auditors A2 and A4 below: 
“Although we try to add value our clients don’t really see vast amounts of 
added value and would be keen to reduce any costs” (A2). 
“……at the end of the day all audit fees should be calculated based on the 
risk, time and materials in delivering the work. In some years, I had clients 
who I have had to change the fee as they have not delivered but I have also 
had to change fees for those clients who have become more efficient and 
as a result as we have not incurred as much cost we have agreed to amend 
our fees in light of that…………,[auditor A4 continues]…. Where the clients 
have not delivered the price should go up, but when the audit becomes 
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simplified because of the level of preparation and quality of what we deliver 
we should share that saving with them” (A4). 
 As suggested by these quotations, clients could prioritise preparing for the audit if 
there is a financial benefit for them. There could however be a number of 
considerations to be taken into account by clients to essentially measure the benefit 
(the financial incentive) against the cost (additional costs incurred in preparing for the 
audit, additional staff, opportunity costs etc). Only if it made good commercial sense 
to clients could it be worth investing in these increased efforts of preparedness. 
However, if the incentive were to be in addition to a potential adverse comment (as 
suggested earlier) in the audit opinion, it could become a more attractive proposition 
to clients. 
“…….. I think audits are very cost sensitive, not necessarily loss making but 
I think some of the bigger firms use the audit as a foot in the door for 
additional services. It is a competitive market and you need to be aware 
that fees can go down as well as up. Yes, I think clients would respond to 
that, I definitely do!” (A7). 
With this statement, the auditor is making the point that within the auditing industry it 
is common practice for the audit to be viewed as a loss leader (a product that is sold 
at a loss with the intention that a client/customer will then purchase higher priced/more 
profitable other goods or services from the same supplier).  
“……..we quote a fee on the assumption everything will be prepared on 
time, so whether a reduction is an incentive or a penalty I think there is 
pricing differential already for those clients who are ready, we have 
discussed with some clients about what they can do to reduce the fee and 
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being ready on time is one of the things that crops up time after time as well 
as having information ready that is in a format that is understandable if it 
saves us time we can pass that saving onto clients” (A8). 
 A number of significant points are made in this one statement, it is evident that the 
levels of preparedness for different clients are taken into consideration when the initial 
audit fee is agreed prior to the commencement of the audit. The second point is that 
this auditor advises clients that savings are to be made if they could be better prepared 
(however the comments in the previous paragraph in relation to cost versus benefit 
are worthy of note). The third point raises the matter of the quality of the audit 
supporting documents provided by clients to their auditors, although having all the 
items on the deliverables listing the auditors provide, there could be ambiguity or 
misunderstanding as to what is required. If the client is of the opinion that they have 
provided the information required in a timely manner, but the auditors deems this client 
to have failed (in meeting the preparedness target) as documentation is of poor quality, 
issues could arise in relation to (not only the preparedness disclosure in the opinion) 
the financial incentive a client was under the impression they were receiving. 
As conveyed in this analysis above, it could be interpreted that the misunderstandings 
of what is perceived to be prepared, or the documents that are required could be 
overcome by (as raised in the previous paragraphs) increased meetings and 
discussions between the auditors and their clients. As auditor, A1 and A9 state: 
Other than meeting them with a list of pre-prepared deliverables there isn’t 
a massive amount that they would know what you are going to be looking 
at as an auditor” (A1). 
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“Clients need to talk us through the working papers or spreadsheets instead 
of leaving the team to fathom things out. There is no standard template for 
clients to present information” (A9). 
As is suggested here, increasing the amount of communication prior to the audit 
commencing and with the possibility of including all key members of client and audit 
personnel, the requirements in terms of the items on the deliverables listing can be 
discussed. In doing so the auditors have the opportunity to tailor the deliverables to be 
specific as opposed to generic to the client being audited, this then enables the clients 
to indicate if the items on such a listing are obtainable and also the formats in which 
they will be received.  
“Definitely a case of educating clients, it is the be all and end all, how can 
we do it better, I mean we have independence and rotation but I don’t 
subscribe to it, we get better at our job the more we do it, the more we do it 
the better we get, the better we get we know where to look and then design 
tests accordingly to press the right buttons. I think there is a lot to be said 
for not being rotated, if we rotate staff the fee stays the same but clients 
have to educate our staff and that can impact on our recovery, not the 
clients fault” (A7). 
The role of the auditor is to remain independent, the FRC state that “Audit engagement 
partners can only serve for five years before rotation is required” (FRC, 2017 p8.) 
(noted in section 2.1.3). The objective of this is to avoid ‘familiarity threat’ (the risk that 
the auditor and their clients become too ‘friendly’ and as a result the auditor may not 
be as thorough as would be deemed usual), however in light of the comment above 
from auditor A7 mandatory rotating from clients is not considered to be beneficial. It 
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can take a number of years’ audits before an auditor gets to know the inner workings 
of a client and where the risk areas are, however this knowledge is then apparently 
discarded in favour of a new auditor. Potentially this may not be a significant issue in 
larger auditing firms whereby such information should be documented on the client’s 
audit files, and of course that new partner has the luxury of liaising with the previous 
partner and audit team. With smaller auditing firms where rotation means conceding 
a client to another firm, this then becomes a larger issue. 
From a client perspective, this then essentially puts them back to ‘square one’ as they 
then have to educate the new auditors as to their systems and processes, but a 
disadvantage could be that a different expected level of preparedness may be required 
with a subsequent adverse audit preparedness opinion and/or overrun disclosure. As 
this is potentially outside of the clients’ control moving from one audit firm reporting no 
overruns and good levels of preparedness to a new firm with adverse opinions it would 
appear the client has taken a step backwards in terms of preparedness. 
In addition to this, re-education of the auditors every 5 years means that valuable time 
is taken from performing their daily tasks, something which has already been raised 
as an issue. Although it is argued that in changing the auditors ensures that clients are 
‘challenged’ in regard to their control systems and financial reports and this leads to 
continuous improvements, the loss of valuable information about an organisation by 
an auditor is questionable. 
As noted previously, and echoed by auditor A4, advancement in automating processes 
is more mainstream and affordable. With the move towards computerised automated 
auditing techniques it could be said that: 
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“One thing would be if organisations could invest in IT so they had an 
integrated ledger system which produced management accounts and 
financial statements because to me whenever you have got financial 
statements that are having to be produced in spreadsheets or word 
documents which have to go through an iteration of amendments because 
the finance system doesn’t reflect the way the business works or there is 
not an integrated system so you have to do lots of reconciliations  to prove 
everything, then to me that would be the best, to have all organisations that 
have seamless accounting systems which were then producing financial 
statements because, then you could perform an audit by checking the 
technology and the logic and the removal of human intervention reduces 
risk of error and also the risk of manipulation and fraud so to me that would 
be the ultimate solution” (A4).  
This auditor expands on this matter and continues: 
“……if there was a bit more preparedness in what we want to do and how 
will we want to do it before you did it, there could be benefits and savings 
because if human beings are not having to post journals or intercede into a 
system then that improves the integrity and quality of the system and it 
means anything that is done manually becomes more obvious and that’s 
where you can have either error or fraud” (A4). 
The role and impact computers and automation are having on business practices in 
current times is increasing. With more automation, the earlier comments by essentially 
‘plugging in’ the auditor’s computer and following the debits and credits (transactions) 
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through the ledgers to the correct disclosure in the financial statements appear to be 
somewhat valid. 
Not all audits are computerised or automated, and for those that are this is only a 
minor process in the whole audit testing programme and a considerable number 
remain manual. The time pressures on audit have been noted to increase due to client 
related delays, those (as previously mentioned) are in respect of poor preparation or 
poor-quality information. In order to provide a quality audit, it is imperative that the 
supporting documentation produced/supplied by clients is of sufficient quality to enable 
tests to be completed and correct conclusions drawn that will feed into the final audit 
opinion on the financial statements. 
The role of an audit client is to provide all documentation and explanations that an 
auditor requires in order for them to complete their work. Poor quality information and 
staff availability has previously been noted as adding to audit time pressures as does 
the quality of information supplied. Should insufficient information be supplied, this 
adds not only to the auditors’ time (and pressures) in completing a test, but also takes 
a client away from performing their daily tasks. In order to ensure that management 
take ownership of their audit information if prepared in advance, it could be reviewed 
to ensure it is not only the correct documents as requested in the deliverables list, but 
(as a result of the increased number of meetings between clients and auditors) of the 
correct quality. 
“Some of our better clients do, however some don’t, one I am working on 
now which is exceptional, have reconciliations and there is an error on 
every single one so it is evident management don’t review those, they can’t 
have done” (A8). 
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“…….more judgemental areas will have been reviewed by senior 
managers, however draft financial statements no, why are they giving me 
something to review they have not reviewed themselves, very frustrating” 
(A10). 
“…….it is the basics that come up time and time again, it tends to be low 
level management review as it is obvious the CEO has not reviewed the 
draft accounts” (A9). 
As suggested here, the auditors are being furnished with sub-standard documentation. 
An interesting theme is that the draft accounts (which are not always received on the 
first day of the audit) are not apparently reviewed, this seems alarming as this is the 
document that is going to be publicly available once the audit is complete and alludes 
to the directors’ performance in managing the organisation on behalf of the 
shareholders/members) clients appear to be leaving it to the auditors to review and 
make a judgement on the information provided as to its adequacy, however this is not 
always the case as demonstrated below: 
“[information received is reviewed by management] Yes and no, but it is 
rare that we get anything that is wrong as management information Is 
normally reviewed by managers in part of running their business” (A5). 
“Most of this [documentation review] may have been done as part of normal 
month end procedures but more judgemental areas may need greater 
management review” (A6). 
The role and impact management have on the review process appears to link to 
the preparedness of the audit. Where review has taken place the better quality the 
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documentation provided for audit, where little or no review is undertaken, the 
greater the risk of incorrect information being received or potentially an inadequate 
conclusion being drawn from an audit test upon which that documentation featured. 
Recognising the different attitudes to audit, auditor A3 stated that “[for other clients] 
the information is left up to me to obtain”.  In the case of third party documentation 
that is largely to be expected, however for client prepared schedules and 
reconciliations the ownership of those documents should lie with the client. Should 
the auditors attempt to reconcile an account in the absence of client assistance this 
could lead to (due to a lack of accurate knowledge) this document being incorrectly 
reconciled or, if time pressured and discussed previously, fabricated. Again, in 
doing so there is the potential to form an inappropriate audit opinion if there were 
any inaccuracies in such documents. 
Recognising that the motivation behind client staff is to ultimately receive a clean 
unmodified audit opinion, it would appear to be a little odd that clients would not 
prioritise the audit more than is apparent from the comments raised above. However 
not every client is focussed on receiving a clean audit report, for smaller owner 
managed businesses it could be argued that unless their intention was to raise finance 
based on a clean audit within the financial statements, as noted previously, the audit 
is a ‘necessary evil’. 
“A clean report is obviously important …….[directors of] owner managed 
businesses are often working in the business day to day so we are reporting 
to the shareholders on themselves. If they work in that business day to day 
there is a good chance they understand everything that is going on. So, I 
think the value of an audit is only where the directors and shareholders are 
different people who do not work in an organisation which they have a 
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shareholding in and there is more scope for fraud or error…. there is little 
value in the audit unless they have bank or other borrowings and want a 
clean audit report, I don’t think our clients place any value on it whatsoever, 
it is an overhead, and in the unlikely event it was not a clean overhead 
report there are very few consequences to that owner managed business 
unless they want to borrow money, suppliers and customers will still use 
them. It is not in the public interest” (A1) 
With an apparent disregard of the audit process for owner managed businesses it is 
not surprising that there is little incentive to prepare for the auditors, it may also be 
doubtful that such clients have any concern over the quality of their audit. 
In support of these comments as auditor A6 continues: 
“………some clients are not interested how we go about our audit, you need 
to do your audit and provide a clean audit opinion and then get on” (A6). 
A large number of the auditors feel that price is a key element of the clients’ thinking 
when it comes to the audit tendering process, although it is recognised that quality is 
also a factor that clients consider. 
“…….they want a quality audit for a commercial rate and with an 
organisation such as ours quality is always associated with us” (A4). 
“Clients would obviously like it to be a quality audit and hate it to be a poor-
quality audit and see value for money. Quality is important as inferior quality 
may result in press and bank issues if it hit the media” (A2). 
“……price is important throughout, but the sector I work in quality is 
important in terms of financial statements and audit, smaller clients I would 
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say price is the main factor and we are seen as doing compliance work and 
they want us in and out” (A8). 
A theme that is apparent in not just the interview extracts above but also throughout 
the interviews with the auditors was that they were keen to improve quality, not just 
maintain it. It is recognised that fees are always going to be an issue for clients and 
those need to reflect a level of quality but that needs to be from both sides and not just 
the auditors. 
Price could be considered to drive what clients require from their auditors, as 
previously mentioned the audit could be seen as a loss leader to sell other services to 
clients yielding higher profit margins. The tendering process is not always (from a client 
perspective) driven by the price the audit will cost, but also the other services auditors 
are able to offer.  
“……it is more the overall package and that we have people here with very 
good tax knowledge as the audit is just something that just needs to be 
done and is a necessary overhead. Our clients want the added value of 
other services the audit is just routine that needs to be done” (A3). 
As this auditor demonstrates, in support of the previous paragraph other services are 
attractive to clients. In order for an audit firm to offer such services they must have 
built a reputation to enable them to grow, and it could be assumed that reputation 
stems from providing good quality services. 
The additional services viewpoint is shared by auditor A5 who stated: 
“……some clients see value in different things, one client we retendered for 
we won as were better equipped to help them with non-audit issues as 
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opposed to fees basically additional added value, others see the cost as an 
overhead they have to bear” (A5). 
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4.1.3 Analysis of the Finance Director responses and their perceived 
preparedness for audit. 
 
In a similar way that the auditors prepare for their audits, planning and adhering to 
relevant International Standards on Auditing, the finance team of the client should also 
plan and prepare for the audit of their reporting period end financial statements. 
However, the perception of how well a client is prepared for their audit on the first day 
will always differ between the clients and their auditors. There are many factors that 
need to be taken into consideration which include (but are not limited to) size of the 
company, group structure, consolidated financial statements, reporting requirements / 
deadlines, attitude to audit as well as the size and strength of the finance team. In 
addition to this the finance team will face other challenges in the preparation of the 
financial statements as they need to place reliance on information from non-finance 
departments that they will require to both populate the financial statements and also 
support for any disclosures within those financial statements. 
“We are extremely well prepared because we receive a checklist from the 
auditors with a full detailed list of all the paperwork and evidence which they 
require” (FD1). 
“…..95% audit file prepared by me, accounts done, all back up for the 
balance sheet is in the audit file so essentially when they come I hand them 
an audit file…… as I used to prepare my audit file when I was an auditor” 
(FD2). 
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“…….. we are quite well prepared we try to have everything to hand in 
particular with having a number of years’ experience we have a plan in 
place for what the auditors need and what they will ask” (FD3). 
“……. we probably have around 95% of the things they have asked for 
ready for them at the beginning of the audit on the first day” (FD7). 
“We are normally quite well prepared and I used to be an auditor so I know 
what the auditors are looking for” (FD10). 
From the comments above a theme is emerging that the finance directors feel that 
they are quite well prepared for their auditors on day one of the audit of the financial 
statements commencing. Similar responses were received from the other interviewees 
of audit clients. Significantly, of the comments by the finance directors, they felt the 
need to stress that they used to be an auditor, this prior knowledge of the audit process 
enables them to prepare for their audit. Be that as it may, the auditing profession along 
with the associated regulations and changes in the audit work/audit testing 
environment is likely to have evolved since these individuals worked within an audit 
capacity. Although it is evident they are attempting to assist the auditor in what they 
believe to be required by audit, the actual documents / other evidence may differ from 
that prepared in their ‘audit files’. As a potential result the views of preparedness may 
differ between the auditor and their clients. In such circumstances differing opinions 
could put a strain on the auditor / client relationship as well as adding to the pressures 
auditors may face in meeting reporting deadlines. 
Not all clients felt they had time to prepare for their auditors, it was noted in Chapter 2 
that the time/reporting deadlines can have an adverse effect on the quality of the audit 
and potentially impact on the audit opinion.  
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Preparing for the audit could occasionally be outside of the control of the finance 
department / finance team.  
“Generally [we are prepared for the auditors] as well as can be expected 
given the timeframe, the timeframes are quite tight” (FD4). 
Significantly, this view was corroborated by another finance director FD 6, who added: 
“We don’t really have enough time from finishing the draft accounts and 
then having their prepared by client list complete…………. it is difficult, very 
time pressured” (FD6). 
Providing a complete set of financial statements is required by the auditors to enable 
them to complete their work whilst on the client’s site during the allocated time. 
Financial statements contain a significant amount of information that is not restricted 
to financial information and as mentioned above, may be sourced from other 
departments within an organisation. As finance director FD3 notes “ draft accounts are 
ready”, adding to this theme  FD10 is also quoted as saying that “we have draft 
accounts ready for them [the auditors].” 
Interestingly, such themes are not shared by other finance directors who do not have 
the financial statements fully ready for the start of the audit. 
“…..draft stats are done with the exception of the directors narrative bits, 
numbers are OK due to our detailed management accounts” (FD4). 
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“Having a draft set of accounts ready for the auditors is an area which is a 
problem for us and has been for a number of years. The previous auditors 
used to prepare our accounts and our big 4 auditors in particular have a 
strict interpretation of what they can and cannot do here, and that change 
within the first couple of years was quite difficult for us and we continued to 
get the old auditors to prepare the accounts. It was impossible for them to 
get them ready for the start of the audit last year we changed it and got 
someone internally to type the accounts so they were ready sooner by week 
2 of the audit, but not for the first week or day of the audit. From a client 
point of view where it is possible for a firm of auditors to do that it is very 
helpful” (FD7). 
“……we have version one of the accounts ready for them but there tends 
to be different versions throughout [the audit], when they start we are in a 
pretty good place and make sure the auditors have enough to get them 
started. Worst case is if there is no draft they have a good set of working 
papers in advance and we certainly don’t want them sitting around doing 
nothing” (FD9). 
Although there appears to be different perceived levels of preparedness of the 
financial statements between clients, it is noted that clients do have some difficulty in 
having the fully completed set of financial statements ready for the start of the audit. 
As FD4 suggests, the narrative bits are not complete, that could indicate a lack of 
support from a department responsible for completing those elements of the financial 
statements. In delaying this element, although potentially not seen as an important 
part of the audit, it does add to the time pressures on the auditors as they have to 
ensure that everything disclosed (not purely the primary financial disclosures) is 
108 
 
consistent with their work undertaken and their understanding of the business and the 
reporting period just ended. 
The matter raised by the finance director (FD7) is an interesting point, it would appear 
that although there is a finance team in place, there does not appear to be the 
necessary skill levels in preparing their own financial statements within that 
organisation. The additional admission that their current big 4 auditors will not prepare 
the financial statements appears to contrast with their previous auditor that did prepare 
the financial statements. As was noted in the section above (auditor analysis), it is not 
uncommon for auditors to prepare and audit the financial statements of an 
organisation. However, if the large auditing companies refuse to do this task, it raises 
the issue of consistency between auditing firms and it should be normal practice that 
financial statements cannot be prepared by the firm auditing them. 
In terms of the financial statements being ready, FD9 appears to be constantly 
revisiting the initial draft financial statements throughout the audit. As auditors have 
mentioned above, if the financial figures are not fixed then there is little point in starting 
the audit. One auditor did indicate that they would audit the first draft of the financial 
statements and then any amendments to those as a separate exercise at the final 
stages of the audit. As draft financial statements are amended a ‘moving balance’ is 
almost impossible to audit, auditors compute tests based on a sample of a population, 
if the auditors were not as strict as that auditor who will only audit changes at the end 
the result could be revising and documenting tests on a continual basis. If such an 
approach was adopted the effect would be to impact on not only the constant revisions 
to audit test recording but also adding to those pressures faced by auditors who should 
be focussing on more judgemental areas.  
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In order to prepare for their audit, it was noted in the previous section that clients 
receive a prepared ‘wish list’ (deliverables) outlining certain types of information 
required at the start of the audit, draft financial statements being the first item on this 
list. It was acknowledged by the finance directors that they receive some form of 
deliverables listing, either on a portal which they have access to or in some other 
format (usually an excel spreadsheet). 
“They [the auditors] have an electronic platform with things that they have 
asked for and my team work their way through the things we have been 
asked to provide onto that portal in advance. There is a degree of tailoring 
of this listing that has evolved over the time of 3 years and this has 
developed over that time. Where it falls down though is where things have 
changed during the year and that is where you do not necessarily get to the 
requests that you need to prepare as there may be part of the business that 
has changed or you have a new contract, it evolves over the year” (FD7). 
“We get a full deliverables list on Excel and a lot of it is tailored as the 
auditors have gotten to know us over the years and have excluded things 
that are not applicable to us. We assign staff members to each area of the 
deliverables and then they upload the information onto the auditors’ portal 
and we can put all the information for them there before and during the audit 
so they can do their work either on site on remotely” (FD8).  
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Providing an effective way, the clients can upload documentation via a portal which 
outlines what documents are required and can be monitored by both the clients and 
the auditors does initially appear to be a positive advancement. It was noted in the 
previous section that these portals are only available to the auditing firms that have 
the resources to invest, in terms of both financial investment and time investment in 
terms of training both audit and client staff. Where there could potentially be a failing 
is that although the documents could be loaded by a client in advance of the audit 
commencing, if the auditor does not monitor the quality of these documents in a timely 
manner (possibly due to time pressures on other audit clients as per Chapter 2) the 
client is not aware until the first day of the audit, thus putting additional pressure on 
them. In addition to this, the auditor or the client are not receiving a return on the 
investment of the portal as they are essentially starting once more from the beginning, 
this could have an adverse effect on the relationship between the client and auditor, 
in particular when it comes to taking the responsibility for monitoring any overruns.  
Common across all finance directors was the acknowledgement that the auditors are 
attempting to help them by providing a deliverables list of information required on day 
of their audit. The interesting points are those within the quotes above in relation to 
tailoring, it was noted in the earlier section that the auditors ‘tailor’ to some extent these 
deliverables listings and this supports the comments of the auditors made earlier. If 
the auditors tailor these lists over time, based on mandatory rotation of auditors every 
five years (as discussed earlier) by the time the auditor has familiarised themselves 
with the client and its business this knowledge is lost as they must rotate off this client 
and this important auditor knowledge is lost. In doing so the client then has to invest 
time with the new auditors educating them on their systems and processes, although 
this is ‘keeping them on their toes’ as new auditors investigate new clients’ systems in 
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more detail in the early years of the relationship. Potentially not a bad approach to 
avoid the familiarity threat, but perhaps the auditors focus more on understanding the 
systems than the key ‘risk’ areas that only knowledge and experience of a client may 
yield. 
Reflecting on their ability to be prepared for audit, the finance directors recognise that 
there are some areas which they themselves (along with their teams) could improve 
upon. 
“Thinking about the past its waiting for figures to go in the accounts, 
accruals or SWAPS but that is very rare……… Once this [not having all the 
information available for auditors] has caused problems with the auditors 
as they have staff booked, but as we have several group company’s they 
could start on one company whilst we wait information that is outstanding 
from others” (FD2). 
Rather than taking into consideration the timescales the auditors have to work through, 
this finance director acknowledges that audit staff bookings is an issue (as per Chapter 
2 staff allocation and budgeting pressures), staff and rescheduling is potentially an 
issue whilst appearing to have a disregard for any pressures this may have on them. 
It is apparent some of the group companies are available, however it could be argued 
that those easier companies would be the first to complete and those more complex 
companies/transactions would be available towards the end of the allocated audit time. 
In leaving such complex items to the end of the audit the pressures could increase as 
these would be deemed to require more in-depth levels of inquiry and supporting 
documentation required. As noted in Chapter 2, where time becomes short and 
pressured auditors could prematurely sign off the work in such areas in order to meet 
112 
 
their budgeted recovery targets, and as a result there is the possibility an inappropriate 
audit opinion was signed. 
In support of these comments FD6 is noted as stating: 
Sometimes guidance comes out late so we are still adjusting the day before 
the accounts are signed. Audit are time pressured too but they understand” 
(FD6). 
 Importantly, the point raised here, is that with the previous issue (raised by FD2) 
whereby the company could be better prepared by having the whole group ready for 
audit, FD6 has an issue that is outside of their control in relation to late technical 
guidance. 
Technical guidance is a recurring theme, not always highlighted in the same way as 
FD6 raised the issue above, the finance director FD10 raised a similar issue: 
“……providing the disclosures or the more technical accounting treatments 
of transactions I think it would be those types of things [that we can be better 
prepared with], mainly because we don’t know what the auditors are 
wanting, we are not as up to date as the auditors so we could do with 
knowing and doing more on that basis” (FD10). 
With an apparent dependency on the auditors to assist in preparing financial 
statements with full current technical support on disclosures within the financial 
statements (as alluded to by FD10 above), these views could be seen to be a 
justification as to why not all clients have their financial statements fully prepared on 
the first day of the audit. Additionally, the earlier comments whereby a client would 
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prefer the auditors to prepare their financial statements for them, appear to be 
supported with these points raised here.  
Preparation for the auditors is not always high on the agenda for finance directors, 
however depending upon the clients and the types of organisations they are in, their 
attitudes towards prioritising their audits differ. 
“Day to day job will always come first and audit second” (FD2). 
“We are not always deeming them to be a priority as perhaps we should” 
(FD3). 
 
“……..things that don’t get operationally managed are the disclosure style 
notes, some of those elements are not part of the day to day functions of 
finance  so getting the relevant departments to deliver for the audit can be 
quite tricky and time consuming, if it is outside of our control we have 
problems with that as it is not part of those departments day to day tasks 
and time consuming for us to chase them up” (FD4). 
 
“We would prioritise ermmm…… make sure we deliver but take into 
consideration that there are day to day operations that must be done” 
(FD5). 
Whilst speaking with the finance directors was undoubtedly important, this reinforces 
those similar comments and issues raised by the auditors. Running their businesses 
is the main function of any finance director’s employment and must always come first 
and understanding this should be incorporated into the auditors planning and work 
around this where possible. Those comments from FD3 though do indeed recognise 
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that there is an issue with recognising that the audit is actually a key element of their 
annual role and whilst other FDs are stating they prioritise their business it could be 
argued that this ‘may’ be used as an acceptable excuse to vindicate clients and their 
staff when any overrun charges are incurred.  
In contrast, whilst it was felt that audit is not a priority, this was not always the case. 
“fortunately, the financial year-end coincides with it being a quiet time for us so it 
sits where we can make it a priority so it doesn’t really impact on the day to day 
activities of staff” (FD1). 
“Fundamentally we are ready for the audit, by virtue of the day to day 
operations we are ready for audit” (FD4). 
“We never put it on the back burner it helps no one, we want them in and 
out as we don’t want them here any longer than need be. It’s about being 
prepared and don’t wind the auditor up, I would rather be far more prepared 
than not” (FD5). 
“We are starting to look at our audit timetable approx. 3 months before the 
year end and we have to submit 2 months later and preparing for audit is 
built into our normal timetable” (FD6). 
“ It’s about timing the audit right to fit it in between all those other 
commitments” (FD8). 
“………100%, we want the audit to go quickly smoothly and delivered on 
time and we pride ourselves on having a clean audit. We are a professional 
team and we like to do whatever we can to prioritise the audit” (FD9). 
115 
 
Worthy of note is the fact that all of these are positive statements regarding preparing 
for audit and essentially putting their day to day activities aside. The earlier comments 
from those finance directors who needed to run their organisation appear to contradict 
these comments from finance directors who also have organisations to run (of varying 
sizes). It is interesting that preparing for the audit can be done whilst running an 
organisation provided plans are in place. FD1 notes it is a quiet time for them, 
suggesting that their organisation may be seasonal and thus timing the audit to fall 
into this quiet time where they can prioritise work to prepare for and assist the auditors, 
this ‘timing’ is echoed by FD8.  
Although on a tight external reporting schedule, FD6 is recognising that in order to fulfil 
their obligations to external parties in a timely manner, they need to plan and prepare 
for their audit well in advance of the reporting period end. They have identified the 
need to plan for this some three months prior to the reporting period end suggesting 
that this is not a small organisation and a significant amount of planning is involved. 
With such a high level of ‘buy in’ to the audit process this in some way contradicts 
those earlier comments from the finance directors neglecting audit in favour of running 
their businesses (although it is noted that there is no mention of a time pressured 
reporting period end). 
Another interesting point that FD9 and FD5 raise is in relation to pride and speed of 
audit.  Taking pride in receiving a clean audit (where the auditors have not discovered 
any material/significant reporting matters) is a target that these clients set for 
themselves and feel motivated in achieving that goal. The added benefit is that by 
having prepared sufficiently the audit will go smoothly and quickly and has been 
mentioned on several occasions in the sections above, the auditors have ‘got in and 
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got out’ as quickly as possible thus minimising disruption to the clients during their 
fieldwork. 
Reflecting on their levels of preparedness the finance directors recognise that this is 
rarely (if at all) communicated to a wider/external audience and there are no 
performance measures in which to benchmark themselves. It could be argued that 
organisations benchmark themselves against their competitors in terms of for example 
turnover, profitability, market share etc, public sector bodies are benchmarked against 
other public-sector bodies however an integral part of the whole reporting process – 
the audit is not reported. Within the audit opinion or elsewhere in the financial 
statements such disclosures could highlight how well an organisation has performed 
and this could potentially be valuable information for interested parties. One of the 
finance directors made the following interesting point: 
“definitely [including in the financial statements audit opinion a disclosure 
on the preparedness of clients], well it would because [our organisation] 
takes a great deal of pride in having a clean audit report when it is presented 
to the board and the audit committee as [we – the directors and the finance 
team] are accountable to them. And also, a clean audit report does not 
currently reflect on the senior management team as it only shows 
essentially a true and fair view of the accounts so it would be impossible to 
tell one well prepared company from an ill prepared company” (FD1). 
This positive comment was also shared by FD2 who states: 
“Yes [including the level of preparedness for audit being included in the 
audit opinion] most definitely so, our accounts are used by banks, investors, 
shareholders that would alert a bad process internally and wouldn’t be 
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welcomed by anyone in my team and would give a bad impression of the 
company so it would undoubtedly change (FD2). 
FD2 raises the issue of ‘change’, they are alluding to the fact that if the finance team 
were aware that their efficiency and preparedness was being reported externally, not 
only would that reflect on them (the team) within their current organisation in terms of 
individual annual appraisals (albeit the audit opinion is reporting on the finance team 
as a whole and not an individual), but also can be used for career development and 
enhancement within current/potential organisations.  
For those organisations that are not as well prepared as they perhaps could be, 
disclosing their preparedness could be motivational, as FD3 demonstrates: 
“I think it would be a good idea [disclosure within the audit opinion on the 
level of preparedness], however as a member of the finance team we may 
not like it but from an external user viewpoint it is good. And this could 
indicate underlying issues and the importance of the audit report, it will also 
get the team to see how important the audit was and in particular for listed 
companies and why it happens. Even getting things from other departments 
and focussing those departments minds on the importance of the audit” 
(FD3). 
The final part of this quote is interesting because it was mentioned previously that a 
complete set of financial statements are not always available (rarely) on the first day 
of the audit. It was noted earlier that some of this is due to the finance team being 
delayed due to non-finance supplying the information to them, with anything adverse 
being reported to a wider external audience this revised audit opinion or other 
disclosure could act as a motivator to those departments who could then be held 
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accountable for delaying the auditors and subsequent organisations adverse financial 
statements audit opinion. 
 “………[including levels of preparedness in the audit opinion]….. as 
shareholders may want to know as its good comparison of company to 
company and if the company got a clean audit report by the skin of its teeth 
(FD5).  
Not all finance directors are as enthusiastic, although noted that they were not averse 
regarding having their team’s levels of preparedness reported to externally to a wider 
audience. 
 “From the outside, it is not evident how well the management team were, 
however I think some disclosure would be very useful but the wording would 
need to be carefully selected but ensuring you are monitored on only those 
things that are within our control” (FD6). 
"I think yes [having levels of preparedness disclosed in the audit opinion], 
as a finance team if you were not already prioritising it [audit] you may 
prioritise it. However, you would need to define what ‘how well prepared’ 
was to avoid conflict between auditor and clients as in ‘did we supply that 
document and was it any good’ and it could be adversarial between the 
client and the auditor to agree all that” (FD7). 
“I think they possibly would [having levels of preparedness disclosed in the 
audit opinion], yes if it is overtly mentioned, having just been to a meeting 
with a company we are amalgamating with the readiness for the audit was 
discussed there……..Internal audit give us [in their annual internal audit 
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report] a green, amber, red and it is something that we like to present to our 
exec team to show that we have a team in place and is doing the necessary 
work in advance. It would be a stick to make it work like that [in relation to 
having staff prepare for external audit knowing that their performance would 
feature in an external report]……… Some people will work to excel as they 
will not fall foul of getting a negative opinion, others will use it to drive them 
forward to be prepared. It depends on the personalities involved” (FD8). 
“I am not sure [if having levels of preparedness disclosed in the audit 
opinion], but initially it is a good idea, for me we get the management letter 
and that feeds back to the board and for that that is the place for that to be, 
for me the statement [audit opinion] should be about the accounts and if 
they are true and fair could be confusing if we added anything into it” (FD9). 
“It potentially could [having levels of preparedness disclosed in the audit 
opinion], but depends on the relationship you have with your auditors at the 
year-end I mean letting people know you were not prepared is not ideal is 
it” (FD10). 
Reflecting on these comments above, it is noted that each finance director does 
propose that something could be made public to external parties via a disclosure in 
their annual financial statements. Such disclosure could reflect on the management 
teams, in times where less positive financial results have occurred which could be 
outside of management control, positive commentary within the audit opinion could in 
some way negate such opposing information. 
Concerns were raised in regard to the exact wording of any disclosures, however it 
should be noted that although the audit opinion does feature some standard and 
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mandatory disclosures there is scope for auditors to insert their own wording to 
emphasise or provide more detail into any matters raised in an audit opinion. Indeed, 
all audit opinions are discussed with clients prior to signing as part of the audit process, 
as in the event of the auditors qualifying their audit opinion (providing an adverse 
statement) the directors must have the opportunity to disclose a response. 
The traffic light system as noted by FD8 is reported by their internal auditors, it is noted 
that not all organisations require an internal audit, however this comment supports 
similar comments made by the auditors who may consider such a disclosure within 
annual financial statements audit opinions. 
Motivation is a theme that appears throughout the finance director’s reflections, as 
noted by FD9, they appear to seek recognition from the executive board for their 
performance and achievements, at present this is only generally recognised when a 
clean audit opinion is received. With an additional disclosure within the financial 
statements a formal recognition as to the levels of preparedness a team and the effort 
that has required will be evident. As noted earlier by FD5, a benchmark could be if a 
competitor received a clean audit opinion by the ‘skin of its teeth’, at present this is not 
evident.  
Management are not always keen to share anything negative, as FD9 notes, a 
management letter (the internal report from the auditors to the management on any 
findings, weaknesses, delays and fee / time overruns) is where such comments should 
be made. Although it could be argued that this point is somewhat valid, as alluded to 
earlier, if there were any negative comments and these were being communicated 
externally, this could act as a motivating tool in order for management to improve in 
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the attempt to ensure such failings no longer occurred as improvements were 
implemented. 
Disclosing such failings, or as FD10 notes “letting people know you were not prepared, 
is not ideal” is a contentious point, as an argument for including such could be that a 
qualified audit opinion (an adverse, un-clean/modified audit opinion) ‘is not ideal’. In 
addition, a fall in turnover or profits may also not be considered to be ideal, after all, 
the financial statements’ main aim is to provide a true and fair view and a reflection of 
an organisation’s activities over the past reporting period. 
As well as including a modified audit opinion the value of such additional disclosures 
again, once again a varying number of concerns were shared as the impact on the 
financial statements could be called into question. 
“It would however give value to an investor as it gives an insight into the 
strength of the management team, figures don’t tell processes or strength 
of management or organisation of management so it would definitely add 
value, third parties would want it as it gives them more knowledge, however 
I think a lot of management would not want it” (FD2).  
A conflict exists between the management and the investors here, it would appear that 
the management team would prefer to minimise the risk of anything negative being 
provided to their investors as it could have an adverse impact on their position. 
Although stating that such inclusion could inform the investor as to the strength of the 
management team, it could be assumed that a strong management team would want 
the investors to be informed and weaker team not.  
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Interesting how FD6 supports the inclusion as they state that: 
 “Yes [users of financial statements would take additional value from having 
additional disclosures regarding the levels of preparedness for audit within 
the audit opinion] very much so for investors to see how the management 
team are performing” (FD6).  
 
In supporting the modification to an audit opinion this finance director alludes to the 
fact that although the financial statements report to a user (predominantly an investor 
or provider of finance) the results for a period. If the financial statements report for a 
commercial profit-making organisation a positive profitability or other financial 
increase, or a not for profit public sector organisation reports a break even use of 
resources position, management are deemed to have performed well. However, with 
current accounting practices the financial statements show a financial result, which 
may not be reflective of the strength of the finance team (as previously mentioned), 
finance director FD4 calls into question the actual disclosers (a concern raised above) 
and also that of smaller entities. 
 
“Depends on the exact disclosure, maybe not (including in the audit opinion 
a modification on the preparedness for audit an organisation was) for a 
close company but possibly for large companies and public-sector 
organisations. Additional information on managements level of cooperation 
with auditors within the opinion could be helpful” (FD4). 
 
The latter part of FD4’s quote refers more towards owner managed businesses 
whereby the actual audit opinion (as raised by one of the audit partners in the section 
123 
 
above) does not realistically go outside of the organisation as the investors are the 
directors and thus running the business, as a result an audit may not be considered to 
be adding any value to those types of businesses (unless relying on other external 
non-equity finance). 
The measurement of how well an organisation is prepared is a contentious issue, it 
could be extremely subjective and it potentially could be argued as being in favour of 
the auditor’s judgement and subsequent assessment.   
“If there was a clear matrix set out with exactly what was required and 
wording for an audit opinion was essentially mandated and pre-determined 
it would gee up clients to be more-ready. However, we need to be careful 
as if the auditor did not get on with the client there could be an incentive 
rightly or wrongly to make reference in the opinion to their level of 
preparedness. The deliverables could be standard and if all delivered 
regardless as to accuracy you know what wording is in the opinion and if 
not, this is the wording you get. However, it needs to be clear that getting a 
load of garbage is not going to be acceptable if just delivering to tick the 
box and get the ‘clean’ opinion, you would get the adverse opinion” (F5).  
 
To overcome the ambiguity as to the level of preparedness it needs to be transparent 
as to what is required, in what format and when it is required. The client deliverables 
listing is an attempt to address this, however there would need to be increased 
discussion and communication between the clients and their auditors to agree on 
these requirements. Indeed, this is not the first occasion increased communication and 
agreement of requirements on the first day of the audit has been raised. Chapter 2 
noted that time pressures on the auditors did arise due to the quality and timeliness of 
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information being provided to the audit team, on occasion this resulted in working 
papers being prematurely signed off, the acknowledgement here by the finance 
director indicates that the concerns raised in Chapter 2 appear valid. 
 
On a similar theme and in support of these comments FD10 notes: 
 
“It could be subjective [the levels of preparedness] depending on the audit 
partner as to whether they were prepared or not. i.e. if there is not a full set 
of accounts with full disclosures then are you not ready. It would need to be 
agreed up front” (FD10). 
 
Audit fees have been a theme throughout the audit process, finance directors have 
alluded to the audit fee being set purposely low in the attempt to sell additional higher 
priced services from the auditing firm (low balling). Additionally, in Chapter 2 such low-
balling techniques also added additional pressures on the auditors as they are 
internally assessed on achieving their targeted recovery rates which has an impact on 
their performance review, progression and financial rewards, in doing so a time 
pressured audit could suffer from premature sign off and subsequent adverse audit 
quality. With additional disclosures and measurable preparedness levels the finance 
directors felt this could have fee implications. 
 
“Anything being reported may add to the fee as auditors would have to 
assess more information and report” (FD5). 
“……..an efficient audit…. That [assessing the levels of client 
preparedness] should be built into the audit fee” (FD7). 
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Interestingly, it was mentioned previously that the auditors can track via their online 
portals when documents were uploaded and as a result there would be minimal time 
incurred by undertaking this exercise. For audit firms that do not have this automated 
software they do all use computerised individual audit staff time recording and this 
should be discussed at an audit closure meeting where any delays were incurred (this 
is common practice).  Highlighting their concerns, the same finance director 
continued………. 
 
“Even having the overrun costs identified, explained and evidenced, then 
that disclosure due to a lack of preparedness could be an option. But it 
would have to be agreed the overrun was the clients fault” (FD5). 
 
“Overrun costs disclosure in the costs note for additional fees being 
charged could be OK but you would get into all kind of explanations as to 
why and could lead to possible confusion in the accounts. It would need 
some thought as to the disclosures” (FD9). 
Indicating that although they had an issue with an adverse opinion as well as concerns 
over how to gauge the levels of preparedness, these finance directors are not averse 
to including additional costs for overruns in the audit opinion. This is an interesting 
revelation as this supports this as being a potential option which, as in the previous 
section, some of the auditors were also in favour of disclosing. 
Indicating how such levels of preparedness are currently reported the auditors have a 
process where they provide a letter of weakness/management letter/ISA260 report to 
their clients, this reports objective is to report all audit findings as well as a review of 
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the audit process. Included in such a report is a specific reference to how well prepared 
the client and their staff were before and during the audit. 
“…it [level of preparedness] could be reported but perhaps not in the audit 
opinion but it is in the ISA 260 report but that is not seen by the outside 
world” (FD4). 
“There is the ISA 260 where audit make comment on the preparedness of 
the client and quality of working papers etc, however that is not in the public 
domain” (FD6). 
“With the readiness for the audit was discussed via the ISA 260 report and 
it is discussed in our audit clearing meetings” (FD8). 
“Recommendations which includes this [level of preparedness] is in the 
management letter in feedback and notes if we had not done a good job” 
(FD9). 
FD9 continues: 
“……we get the management letter and that feeds back to the board and 
for that that is the place for that to be, for me the statement should be about 
the accounts and if they are true and fair it could be confusing if we added 
anything into it, I am happy with the management letter which in our section 
is available [level of preparedness] elsewhere and that is enough for me” 
(FD9). 
 Acknowledging that their performance is reported to management the finance 
directors appear to be satisfied that this (not in all cases, as alluded to previously in 
this section) is where the levels of preparedness should be reported. Interestingly, this 
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document is an internal document and when discussed with management it is usually 
the finance director and members of his team that attend / have sight of the report and 
it would be rare that the report was seen outside of this group. For larger clients who 
have the benefit of an audit committee, again the finance director generally responds 
to any matters within the management letter (ISA260 report) direct to the audit 
committee members, it is rare that anyone outside of these groups would have access 
to or sight of the management letter.  
Recognising that preparedness is always going to be an issue there are areas in which 
generally clients could improve on their levels of preparedness for auditors, or indeed 
clients feel that their auditors could improve by assisting them to prepare for audit, 
each finance director agrees that clients need to improve. 
“The problem we have each year is that a new team of auditors, many of 
which don’t understand our business sector, therefore a lot of time is spent 
explaining how our processes work and it takes a lot of time explaining 
internal processes and how certain things are accounted for” (FD1). 
“it feels like a bit of a waste at times as new auditors don’t really know what 
they are doing whereas an experienced auditor knows what they want and 
the additional time could add value” (FD3). 
Indeed, it is recognised that the auditors will change, as with any organisation staff 
turnover is usually outside of the control of any organisation. However, the frustrations 
are felt by clients where there appears to be no initial planning meeting and the junior 
staff that are involved in the detailed substantive testing element of the audit (basically 
finding invoices and other similar documents) are new to them. Experienced auditors 
who know the client from previous visits will know how the systems and processes 
128 
 
operate, they will know how and where to look for information, who to ask and when 
convenient use of staff time is available for questioning. Alternatively, an auditor who 
is experienced in a certain sector is allocated to a sector in which they have no 
experience, as an example the processes any systems of a Hospital are significantly 
different to that of a commercial manufacturing company. 
This frustration is shared by the more senior members of the audit team as it is 
appreciated that clients feel as though each year they are continually training audit 
junior staff.  
Although frustrating, it could be argued that inexperience increases the risk that a 
balance or a process has not been tested adequately, alternatively inadequate 
explanations have been obtained from key client staff. The consequences of such 
actions could result in poor quality audit work, time pressure on the auditor as 
additional explanations/other documents are required where the review process has 
revealed insufficient audit work as being completed / documented and ultimately (due 
to time / budget pressures) and, as mentioned in Chapter 2, premature audit sign off.   
The better prepared clients can be, the smoother the audit process should be, as a 
result there could be minimal disruption on client staff.  
“[the auditors should be asking] key questions about what’s not there or test 
their understanding of what is not there that saves time for everybody 
including the audit and that focuses the attention in getting through the audit 
quicker” (FD2). 
“……. more time can always help” (FD4). 
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“If I am better prepared then, the less stressful it is. As they are asking for 
loads and loads of information up front do they really need to come. They 
can audit in 5 minutes as they have everything loaded on their portals, 
looking at the operations of an organisation is an added benefit when they 
do come” (FD10). 
In recognition of preparing for the auditors, the finance directors with the comments 
above understand that the auditors will have a smoother audit if they have information 
readily available. Although as more time is always going to help with preparing for the 
auditors that is not always going to be seen as a positive step. Alluded to is that the 
auditors can effectively audit from a room as everything is ready for them and this 
reduces the pressures on not only clients but also the auditors. Interestingly, FD2 
would actually prefer the auditors to be questioning what they perceive to be missing 
(if anything) and the intrusion is not an issue.  
Being extremely well prepared is not always considered to be beneficial to the audit, 
as FD5 notes:  
“From an auditor’s point of view, you are always looking for something to 
report, at the end of the day you need something to report. If we were 1 
million percent prepared and the auditors found nothing I am not sure they 
would be comfortable with that. From an audit side, you always want a client 
well prepared, therefore have a clean report with a clear management 
report, others less well prepared have a larger number of reporting matters. 
Auditors don’t want us to be too well prepared as they may have nothing to 
report. But yes, more time will obviously ease the pressure on auditors” 
(FD5). 
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This could be perceived to be a somewhat naïve view on the auditor’s role and 
responsibility adding fuel to the argument that an expectations gap exists between 
auditors and their clients, and the view that the auditor is a bloodhound. In fact, it is 
apparent from the previous section that auditors would prefer less pressure and a 
clean audit than a time pressured audit with errors that require significant investigation 
utilising staff time and adding to overall audit pressures.  
A two-way interaction with auditors was highlighted as an area where the auditors felt 
they could invest time with improving with their clients, indeed the benefits of such 
interactions throughout the year have been identified as being beneficial to clients 
throughout the audit process.     
“we try and be open and transparent with our auditors throughout the year 
so we can get issues resolved prior to the year end, we like a good working 
relationship that is easy to manage we can’t be a partnership as they have 
to be independent however a working relationship based on a sound footing 
is better to manage and is always good and audit have to, audit won’t let us 
get away with anything as they have rules etc but working with us resolves 
late issues etc” (FD6). 
 
“We do audit planning with our auditors, they do a planning visit and do 
some of the pre-testing analytical review to get a feel as to the material and 
risk areas and that helps as we get some information in advance and 
therefore they only have to validate the last few months of the year. 
Anything that could help clients and auditors be better prepared the 
uploading of information staggered over the year will help reduce pressures 
and avoid deadlines that could be tight” (FD8).  
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“if the auditors get good information up front, its clean and clear and they 
can work through it without any confusion without a doubt the audit would 
be better, we do that to avoid duplication and escalation of audit questions. 
Here we spoon feed the auditors which is different to the day when I was in 
audit when they had to work harder to get to the end” (FD9). 
 
It appears to be evident that with such statements the client companies feel that 
continuous communication throughout a reporting period, whereby the auditors are 
kept informed of key transactions or potential issues they can be prepared at the 
reporting period end. Potentially the issues may have been resolved within continuous 
dialogue between the client and the auditor, alternatively the auditors may have asked 
for certain information on such areas to enable the audit to run smoother, in doing so 
the auditor is better prepared (as is the client) and the time pressures as a result should 
be reduced.  
Extending on the theme that time is a key contributory factor in the overall quality of 
an audit as mentioned in the section above, this is not always something that either 
the auditor or the client can control. Reporting to parent companies or to some other 
regulatory deadline (i.e. the NHS) may have a direct impact on the preparedness for 
audit of clients, in addition the amount of time an auditor has to complete the audit 
may also be adversely affected. 
“If there was no audit to prepare for we would still be busy so ultimately, we 
are never prepared, if the board understood the importance of the audit we 
could get more time as the audit is seen as an afterthought in most cases” 
(FD3). 
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“……..we have a fixed timetable due to reporting deadlines including 
publication of glossy accounts and the AGM, audit committee and 
clearance meeting etc. It works but not much slack is in there, if the audit 
slipped a few weeks we would have problems with board meetings etc that 
are essentially fixed” (FD7). 
“As said the timetables are outside of our control” (FD4). 
Unsurprisingly there appears to be a potential lack of acknowledgement from the 
boards that the audit is an important feature in the annual mandatory requirements of 
their organisations. FD3 alludes to the fact that their board tends to focus on the 
running of their ‘busy’ organisation, whereas FD7 notes that they have a board 
meeting scheduled and they have a large number of tasks that must be completed to 
meet that ‘fixed board meeting date. In both cases the boards appear to be slightly 
inflexible and ignorant as to the tasks the finance team is required to undertake to 
meet their statutory obligations. FD4 has no control over their reporting requirements 
and as a result this may affect the level of preparedness in readiness for their auditors 
as deadlines may be tight. 
Acknowledging that having sufficient time to prepare for the audit is an issue, there 
are certain aspects of this which result in areas not being ready for audit. An issue that 
has been raised on various occasions has been in relation to the financial statements. 
 “In our industry, not really we could do with more time in particular to review 
the draft accounts and have fuller disclosures ready. It’s the end of the audit 
that suffers in terms of the timescales as we rely on auditor’s technical 
people reviewing notes etc. Annual report is pulled together by corporate 
and is generally on time getting other information ready” (FD5). 
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“Last year was tough with the accounting for FRS102 and implementing 
that, so pressure is on when there is a change in accounting standards or 
regulatory changes” (FD1). 
It was previously noted that the financial statements and annual reports are rarely fully 
compiled and reviewed ready for the audit fieldwork commencing. The statement from 
FD5 supports this as being an issue for them, not only would more time enable a full 
review of the financial statements to be completed (reviewed financial statements 
usually results in fewer audit matters being raised), but also any technical updates can 
be incorporated into the draft financial statements (per FD1) which could be complete 
as all departments (including those external to finance) should have provided all 
relevant information and disclosures.  
As well as identifying that additional time would be beneficial, that was not always 
noted as being the case as FD5 continues: 
“Giving more time may just mean people sit on things for longer they work 
on their parts last minute to meet any revised deadlines” (FD5). 
In support of such a statement, FD10 adds: 
“There is never enough time as it is about timescales getting things to the 
Board and the AGM so even having more time would just mean we took 
longer getting there” (FD10). 
As shown by these two statements, it is acknowledged that people will work to a 
deadline, no matter when the deadline is people generally work towards meeting such 
timescales and plan and prioritise their work accordingly.  
134 
 
“We could always do with more time and more staff to do things better, the 
team work extremely hard around year-end to do things better. Areas where 
we could do better are where we have other deadlines and need other 
information from other sources” (FD9). 
Highlighting the time constraints being an issue, as has been noted in this section 
conflicting deadlines is an apparent issue for some clients, thus demonstrating that the 
day to day running of their organisations will always take priority over the financial 
statements audit. However, depending on the size, type and available resources may 
impact on the levels of preparedness irrespective of conflicting deadlines. 
“There is enough time [to prepare for the auditors] as they come in 2 months 
later [after the reporting period end] which leaves us 1 month when we are 
less busy and so we make getting ready for the [1 week] audit a priority” 
(FD1). 
“It is extremely tight [preparing for the auditors] as we have to report within 
2 months of the year-end, so no not really [we do not have sufficient time 
after the year-end to prepare for the auditors]” (FD6). 
These two cases have similar reporting periods although FD1 has their audit two 
months after the reporting period whereas FD6 reports their audited results by the end 
of month two. Notably though, FD1 alludes to a period after the year-end when they 
are ‘less busy’ suggesting there is an element of seasonality within this organisation, 
whereas FD6 does not appear to have a quiet period. In addition, there is no evidence 
as to the size and available resource in preparing for audit, however as raised earlier, 
having the ‘buy in’ of other departments in supplier information for the financial 
statements assists with timeliness and increased levels of preparedness. If indeed 
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FD1 has a business that is less busy for all departments, the result could be that all 
departments supply information in a timely manner to ensure full financial statements 
are prepared prior to audit. The opposite could be said for the business of FD6 who 
appears to have a similar time-frame post reporting period end, but due to the reporting 
deadline being ‘extremely tight’ it is suggested that all departments are busy all year 
round and may not allocate sufficient time in preparing for the audit. 
As an organisation that meets the criteria for an audit, a client may be assumed to 
understand the requirements that the FRC (Financial Reporting Council) places on 
their auditors.  In performance of their duties, doing certain aspects of the audit is 
sometimes misunderstood by clients and auditors could be deemed to be ignorant to 
the fact that clients are dubious as to what and why they ask for certain documents 
and explanations, even though the approach is required by the FRC. The approach is 
occasionally confusing to clients.   
“No, and the auditors don’t explain anything about this [the FRC 
professional sceptic approach] and don’t look at what I would deem to be 
significant” (FD1). 
“Yes [I understand the FRC professional sceptic approach], but that is only 
because I have worked in audit before, and so understand the process” 
(FD2). 
“I understand it [the FRC professional sceptic approach] to a point but not 
the underlying reasons behind it” (FD3). 
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“No I don’t [understand the FRC professional sceptic approach], I 
understand why they do some tests and ask certain challenging questions” 
(FD10). 
Interestingly, only the finance director who has worked in audit understood what the 
FRC require of their auditors. FD1 appears to have a different understanding as to 
what is deemed to be significant (assuming that they allude to an account balance) 
and FD3 is unsure why auditors take a sceptical approach. FD10 notes that although 
they are unaware as to the FRC requirements in regard to professional scepticism 
they expect certain tests to be completed as well as the auditors to be challenging in 
order for them to ascertain if the financial statements are true and fairly presented.  
“…they [the auditors] are there to give an objective view which is done via 
an objective test. The auditors can be a little too intrusive. Auditors need to 
be objective and our staff need to appreciate that, we train our staff that 
auditors are not being disbelieving, they are merely doing what is required. 
The FRC are right to develop a level of scepticism but they need to ensure 
that is defined in the right way” (FD4). 
Internally FD4 appears to be educating their staff to be open and transparent with the 
auditors, this is an extremely rare occurrence in the audit of financial statements as it 
is common for client staff to feel as though they are having their work ‘checked’ which 
is not the purpose of an audit. It could be considered to be admirable that this finance 
director encourages their staff to assist audit and they support the FRC in the sceptical 
approach auditors are required to adopt, although notably what the ‘right way’ may be, 
could be subject to interpretation. 
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“……. I don’t expect the auditors to swallow everything I give them, but I 
don’t expect auditors to come to me who have not got a clue about your 
business, not the juniors as everyone has to learn, more the manager level 
and above. Some are sceptical not always for the right reasons not because 
they are being sceptical but more so because they just don’t have a clue” 
(FD5). 
In a similar vein to FD4, this finance director recognises the sceptical approach that 
the auditors need to adopt. However, interestingly they also reiterate a similar point 
that was raised in this section in relation to the lack of auditor sector knowledge. This 
theme appears to be common throughout finance director’s comments, although it is 
evident that this finance director directs this lack of knowledge at more senior 
members of the audit team, whereas previously junior members featured as being 
inadequately briefed regarding the client and their business sector. Surprisingly this 
finance director’s experience of the sceptical approach has been interpreted as ‘not 
having a clue’. In the absence of an interview with the senior auditors involved, it could 
be argued that pressures arising from other client audits (as per Chapter 2) may have 
resulted in these senior auditors being less prepared than would deem to be ideal and 
as a result less informed ‘challenging’ questions/tests may be asked or preformed. 
Once again, with auditors being pressured with other client work and thus 
compounding onto and impacting upon other client audits the quality of the audit may 
be called into question.    
“Our audit partner at the clearance meeting [meeting where auditors explain 
to management the audit findings and audit progress at the end of the 
allotted audit fieldwork time] was talking that the auditors should be 
challenging more, we want to be working more together but be challenging 
138 
 
more without being confrontational, they have to be challenging in the right 
way and not aggressive then it won’t result in a good relationship and look 
for new auditors I do worry about the current challenging approach” (FD9). 
When confrontation arises as a result of challenging questions any relationship may 
be adversely affected. FD9 raises an interesting point, if the auditors are too 
challenging and this sours the relationship, they may elect to find an alternative audit 
supplier. It needs to be highlighted, that the auditors, although independent and 
adhering to strict independence rules and regulations, are the providers of a 
remunerated service to their clients, losing any client will result in a financial penalty 
(loss of audit fee income) to any auditing organisation. 
Adopting a challenging and sceptical approach should be at the forefront of the audit 
process. In adopting such an approach, clients should expect any explanation or 
document provided to auditor to be questioned, not in a disbelieving way or to doubt 
a client, but to provide the auditor that the conclusions they draw are sufficient to 
enable them to form the correct audit opinion on the financial statements. As FD5 
previously stated: 
“…….. I don’t expect the auditors to swallow everything I give them” (FD5) 
“Whatever your audit clients tell you assume it is a lie, and then be prepared 
to be proved wrong when supporting documents have been provided” 
(FD6). 
“………its guilty until proved innocent isn’t it, may not be the right way to 
put it but audit have to take a prudent approach to make sure the figures 
are true and fair” (FD8). 
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These two statements from FD6 and FD8 are interesting as the sceptical approach is 
deemed to insinuate that the auditors assume that they have been provided with 
inaccurate information. This view is in contrast to the view of FD4 who educates their 
staff from the feeling that they are being ‘checked’ by the auditors to the view that the 
auditors are verifying and clarifying.  
If the auditors are assumed by their clients in regard to their evidence and explanations 
being, as FD6 states “a lie”, in an attempt to alleviate such views, the auditors do 
provide the deliverables lists as detailed previously. However, the value of these 
listings is not always seen as adding any value where clients attempt to prepare for 
their audit. 
“Even though they send this client request list beforehand what they don’t 
do is have a follow up before they turn up to say yes we have everything 
that we needed so when they turn up on day one” (FD1). 
“The list of deliverables I find is a standard list of deliverables and some of 
the deliverables are not really associated with your company so it’s not 
really tailored to your company so in terms of that can work against an 
auditor because those deliverables are not relevant for your company” 
(FD2).  
In short, compiling a tailored deliverable listing that is specific to their client’s 
organisation and business sector is not always adhered to by auditors. 
Clients may follow the listing as it is assumed that the auditors have asked 
for the items in order to complete their audit tasks. Without following up on 
the listing prior to arriving on site to conduct the audit clients may not feel 
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supported, and as a result have little motivation in providing any requested 
documentation. However, as FD1 and FD2 continue: 
 “….. so when they [the auditors] turn up on day one we think we have sent 
or prepared everything that they have asked for they are then asking for 
information that had they included in their request we could have got that 
prepared ready for them before they started which does go back to us 
potentially having some input into the checklist during their planning stage” 
(FD1).  
“……that [not having a tailored set of deliverables] can work against an 
auditor because those deliverables are not relevant for your company. So, 
deliverables have got to be back up for nominal ledger to your P&L and 
balance sheet and notes in the accounts – now if you don’t understand that, 
an auditor is not going to understand it” (FD2). 
As conveyed in these quotations, the requests from auditors may not always work in 
their favour in terms of attempting to make the audit run smoother and thus relieve 
them of any time pressures. Both finance directors place a certain degree of faith the 
auditors knowing what they will need and thus provide that in advance (at the auditor’s 
request) for them. However, without any communication prior to audit the auditor is 
unaware if the clients have any issues with their requests, as FD2 notes, some of the 
information is not relevant to their company, and FD2 indicates that had they been 
able to discuss in detail the types of reports they actually produce, audit could have 
asked for these in advance and not during the audit, which inevitably could have saved 
them time.  
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Adding to this, FD2 alludes to auditors asking for what could be interpreted to be non-
standard items which they appear to prepare but do not really understand what they 
are providing. As they note they may not understand it, as a result they may have 
difficulty in providing relevant explanations to audit. Once again, a potential time-
consuming exercise that could adversely affect time that could be spent focussing 
audit work on material / judgemental / higher risk areas.   
Building on these comments, FD7 adds: 
“Some form of format pre-approval so that things we have not been asked 
for in advance can be prepared in a format that is understandable, maybe 
some pre-planned dates when things would be required for, so as a client 
we can prepare things on day one and then for day 3 or 5 etc but the audit 
team need to provide a schedule of work to help coordinate the planning on 
both sides” (FD7). 
As suggested here, clients recognise that auditors will not be able to look at everything 
they have asked for on the first day of the audit via their deliverables listing. An ‘add 
on’ to the deliverables listing that would be beneficial could be a schedule of audit work 
so that clients can essentially continue to work on preparing items during the audit in 
preparation for the scheduled audit area start date. One consideration that could be of 
benefit in adopting such an approach is that client staff (that auditors have noted 
availability is occasionally an issue) can ensure they are available.  
Furthermore, a ‘pre-approval’ supports similar comments made by FD1 (following up), 
if the audit opinion were to report on preparedness, ensuring that clients have the 
opportunity to provide what is required, on time and in the format requested prior to 
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audit would add support for any additional disclosures within the audit opinion / provide 
additional evidence to substantiate any additional overrun costs. 
The role of the auditor being independent and adopting a sceptical approach was 
further reinforced by finance director FD3: 
“As an auditor if they disclosed everything they were going to do and 
wanted, for some companies they could exploit that so the auditors need to 
ensure they hold something back in order to request / ask for something we 
are not ready for that keeps us on our toes, but next year we will have the 
documents / explanations ready for that new test or question” (FD3). 
In recognition that the auditors need to ‘keep clients on their toes’, the provision of a 
full detailed list of everything the auditor requires is not deemed appropriate. Indeed, 
it could be argued that given enough time between the reporting period end and the 
audit commencing, as well as having a detailed listing of audit requirements, could 
provide an opportunity for a less than honest organisation to prepare and disguise 
transactions. This could be in the attempt for such unscrupulous organisations to 
manipulate the financial statements and disclosures and mislead the auditors.  
However, it is customary practice for auditors to update their audit procedures to 
include a level of ‘unpredictability’ (a test/question that may never have been 
performed / asked previously on an account balance or disclosure that may not be 
deemed significant by the audit client) into their testing each year to alleviate such 
concerns. Arguably, in relation to the points raised in regarding concerns over changes 
in junior audit staff constantly asking ‘uninformed’ questions, this ‘naive’ approach 
could in some way address this finance director’s concerns as demonstrated by 
FD10’s comments below.  
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“……I understand that they [the auditors] have to send juniors but industry 
knowledge would help. As long as the manager and partner have industry 
knowledge that’s OK but every year we are telling juniors the same thing 
but that’s fine I like passing on my knowledge but they have to learn 
somewhere, it is what it is” (FD10). 
As conveyed earlier and also in the previous section, modification to the audit 
opinion/fee disclosure were favoured to reflect the levels of preparedness for audit. 
Issues have been noted in delivering poor quality documents on time in order to ‘meet’ 
a desired level of preparedness. To avoid inferior quality evidence being provided to 
the auditors it is an important process to ensure a level of client review is in place to 
ensure management are aware of the documentation their junior staff members are 
providing to the auditors. Should poor quality documents be rejected by the auditors 
the result impacts on both client and auditors time, as per Chapter 2, time delays have 
an adverse effect on the pressures on auditors and subsequent quality of the audit as 
a whole.  
The majority of the finance directors will look at the significant / judgemental areas and 
supporting documentation may be reviewed/prepared by them, more day to day 
documents i.e. supplier invoices will not be reviewed and delegated to junior staff 
members. 
“……the only thing I expect the staff to give are back-up invoices or in our 
case property related information, leases to back up turnover or 
management agreements to back up management agreements income and 
that will be sourced direct from the staff but I will be comfortable that all that 
is available” (FD2). 
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 Where the more judgemental balances are concerned: 
“……where there are any judgemental areas I would do that work myself 
rather than let anyone in the team do that” (FD7). 
“Provisions etc are done at higher levels and thus reviewed as well as write 
offs, impairments, there is the vehicle to review, information depends on 
what is needed” (FD8). 
The focus appears to be on the items which the finance directors perceive audit will 
focus on and potentially where any issues may arise and wish to be personally 
comfortable as to the rational for inclusion in the financial statements. This is not an 
unusual approach as it is the finance director who is usually regarded to be the most 
knowledgeable in respect of an organisations’ financial position, in addition it is they 
who assume the ultimate responsibility for the preparation of the annual financial 
statements. 
Notably, not all organisations have the ‘luxury’ of having information reviewed prior to 
receipt by audit, this may be as a result of tight reporting timescales/resources 
available. 
“…they [the auditors] get what’s there, we don’t have time to review 
everything that they get” (FD5). 
“….there isn’t time to allow for that independent review, auditors make 
comment on this but we just don’t have the time or resource” (FD6). 
“….we have the draft accounts and do provide information to senior 
members of the organisation but it is rare that we get comments, but at least 
we have tried” (FD10). 
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The final comment by FD10 is an interesting point and reinforces previous issues in 
relation to the senior management team ‘buying into the audit process’. If the finance 
team are preparing information and providing it to senior management prior to passing 
to audit for review, it would be expected that some form of feedback would be received. 
The final comment “but at least we have tried” indicates the frustration this finance 
director feels as noted in the previous section by the auditors, why should audit review 
something senior management have not reviewed. 
Providing information to auditors early can ease the pressure on not only the auditors 
during the reporting period end audit but also for clients where a tight reporting 
deadline needs to be adhered to. Communication throughout the period to discuss 
potential contentious / judgemental areas may help in having a smooth audit and also 
reduce the risk of any issues arising once such an area is audited. 
“……we would like to think that anything contentious could be discussed 
with the auditors during the year and policies have been made available for 
the auditors” (FD9).  
 As suggested here, optimising the auditors throughout the year for the benefit of the 
client in bringing to their attention and discussing the treatment of certain items that 
will impact on the financial statements early, could result in these essentially being 
audited (as the auditors have provided advice and guidance) prior to the period end. 
Should clients be prepared for their audit, it is felt that not only should this be 
recognised in the audit report, but they should also be rewarded in some form by their 
auditors due to high levels of preparedness and assistance. 
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“Fee reduction would be very nice yes, they could do additional non-audit 
work for free or information benchmarking with similar clients to assist us” 
(FD1). 
“….an enhanced audit should feed through to some form of reduction in tax 
fee for instance you should get some form of credit for it or additional 
services” (FD2). 
 
“…..on the whole a fee reduction is always a good incentive” (FD3). 
 
“so incentives would be good for them [audit clients]” (FD6). 
 
“If you can put some more resource into getting ready for the audit then it 
would be good to see that you were getting something back for that effort” 
(FD7). 
“Fee reduction would be nice, I think the auditors’ price on the fact we are 
well prepared, however this needs to be ensured that they are not over 
pricing but it would look good for us and have some benefits” (FD9). 
As suggested here, provided the auditors did not essentially over price (as FD9 notes) 
some form of incentive to be prepared would act as a motivator to prepare for audit, 
the auditors as a result could benefit from being able to increase the quality of their 
work in terms of documenting within their audit files and reduce the risk of (as per 
Chapter 2) premature sign off due to reduced time pressures and thus a thorough 
review could be conducted.  
147 
 
Preparedness levels are not seen by all clients as an issue, as previously noted and 
further suggested by FD8: 
“…however, audit is the loss leader for the auditors to get in and sell other 
services such as tax and the audit is an easy way to get a foot in the door, 
fee reduction may be good for a small organisation but for a larger 
organisation fee reduction may not be significant” (FD8). 
The loss leader is a common perception of the audit, this finance director recognises 
that the level of incentive needs to be scalable to the organisation in question and thus 
an actual incentive.  However, FD8 appears to address this issue: 
“Additional work could be useful similar to an internal auditor, if they could 
do some of that work it may reduce internal audit fees. Most companies see 
audit as a necessary evil get in get out” (FD8).  
Where an incentive in terms of a reduction in fee may not be deemed appropriate, the 
benefit of additional services is seen to be more appealing and this supports the views 
of FD1 and FD2 above. Interestingly FD8 once again reiterates that the audit is a 
necessary evil, a comment that has been raised several times previously, which 
reinforces the potential adverse opinions and value of the audit and audit process. 
This focus on incentives for clients, be it a fee reduction or a cost to the auditor of 
providing additional services, questions whether the auditors tend to focus on the price 
of the audit or the quality of the audit provided.  
Reputations are built on providing a quality product, as the finance directors recognise, 
however it is also notable that an auditing company is a commercial enterprise that 
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exists to make a profit for the investors and provide continuous employment for its’ 
employees. 
“I think auditors want to make a profit as I don’t think they would do an audit 
at a loss so I think that if they were in that situation the quality would go 
down unless the fee went up so I think fee over quality” (FD2).   
“I think it is quality [that is important to auditors] they have an incentive to 
maximise fees but as an auditor to do your job you must focus on delivering 
quality. That kind of mindset tends towards quality as opposed to price” 
(FD3). 
 
“They are focussed on a quality audit in our case. It does however feel very 
expensive from our side but we are a small client using a very large firm” 
(FD7). 
 
This focus by the auditors on providing a quality audit is seen as being important to 
their clients, not only in terms of reputation but it must also be borne in mind that 
auditors are heavily regulated and can be subject to quality inspections from their 
professional body and the FRC. The large auditing providers are renowned for their 
reputations as delivering products (including audit) to a high standard, however, as 
noted by FD7 above, this can attract a premium price having to be borne by their 
clients. Echoing this, FD6 notes that:  
 
“The big boys (big 4 auditing firms] are there to make profit, if they lose 
reputation then they will go, so they have to maintain high quality or else 
they will go. The big boys want the business but they must maintain the 
149 
 
quality I doubt during our tender there was much between them [the 
auditing firms invited to tender] in terms of price hence why we use a big 4 
company only as they are top notch internationally recognised quality 
organisations. Big companies know that reputation is what keeps them in 
the market place” (FD6). 
 
Interestingly the focus on audit quality is recognised by all finance directors, however 
the issue of ‘low balling’ is raised once more when considering what an auditor may 
focus on in terms of fees or quality. 
 
“I think once they have sold us the audit it is an opportunity to be in with an 
organisation and then provide the opportunity to provide the more lucrative 
sexier side of things such as VAT health checks and reclaims and 
contingent fees where we get a refund and they get a percentage” (FD8). 
 
Providing an insight into how this finance director views the auditors pricing 
techniques, they could be considered to appear to be somewhat cautious as to the 
intentions of the auditor. Possibly a risky strategy on behalf of the auditor anticipating 
that the client would consider purchasing services from them in order to offset the ‘low’ 
audit fee. Consideration as to the quality of their audit if purely based on the levels of 
fees charged would no doubt have been a consideration of the client during the 
tendering process. 
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A further consideration in light of the size of an auditing firm in respect of providing a 
quality audit is the amount of resources available to them to invest in maintaining that 
audit quality. As a result, there could be an argument that to maintain a profitable 
business a smaller auditing organisation could potentially focus more on price than 
ensuring the audit is of a high standard. As noted in the previous section, a small 
auditing practice stated that they felt that there was too much regulation and too much 
planning to complete and that the amounts of regulations and planning was indeed 
increasing. As such, this could be interpreted that the focus is on minimising the work 
in these areas, potentially impacting on the quality of the audit as the additional time 
and costs involved in completing these tasks cannot be passed on to their clients in 
terms of increased fees, in some way this is corroborated by the following comments 
from FD4: 
  
“I do think there are a few lines that can be drawn, there is a minimum that 
audit will do, but different organisations draw lines at different points and 
that can cause a fee disparity. I think they focus on 80% of the fee being on 
quality and the rest on costs - get in get it done, they do focus on quality 
and the delivery of the audit is of a certain standard” (FD4). 
 
Significantly, FD4 appears to insinuate that the auditors, although maintaining a 
certain level of quality, focus on their costs and wish to complete the audit as soon as 
they can to maximise their recovery rates. Reinforcing this comment FD1 somewhat 
appears to share this view: 
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“I do think that sometimes the team is not big enough as there are some 
days when they don’t turn up at all or leave for the afternoon as they have 
to go off to do something else and you question if they put enough resource 
into it.  There have been issues when audit staff have not turned up and the 
audit was done remotely some 3 weeks after it was scheduled to end and 
there was too much outstanding” (FD1). 
Chapter 2 discussed the pressures auditors faced whilst completing audits and also 
moving between several clients whilst being committed to a client timetable. The 
quotation from FD4 demonstrates that auditors could be pressurised to ‘balance’ 
several clients at any point in time, not an ideal situation as there will inevitably be the 
constant need to refresh where one client was left and then picked up several days 
later. With the audit being completed remotely and a client potentially being prepared 
having delivered to an auditor prepared schedule, it would seem inappropriate not to 
report on this client’s levels of preparedness favourably (unless the auditor moved 
between clients whilst waiting for this particular client to deliver information not 
available at the time of audit). In cases where auditors are balancing clients and 
constantly ‘picking up and putting down’ an audit, the quality of the audit could be 
called into question, in such audits the increased risk for premature signing off of the 
audit work and subsequent audit could be said to be inevitable. 
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4.1.4 Consolidated analysis of auditor and their client’s 
preparedness for audit.  
 
4.1.4.1 Introduction 
 
Reflecting on the specific aims and objectives of this thesis (Chapter 1), the primary 
focus of this section describes both the theoretical and practical implications relating 
to how the varying levels of preparedness for a financial statements audit can affect 
the pressures faced by not only auditors and their clients, but also the overall quality 
of the audit and subsequent audit opinion.  From the themes that have evolved from 
the interviews, these have been coded and these final themes (per Appendix 7) are 
discussed in the sections below.  
Additionally, with the challenges faced by both auditors and their clients when planning 
and preparing for the start of the audit, the findings point to a significant difference in 
opinion on the perceived levels of preparedness. It is noted that in order to conduct 
the audit of the financial statements, the auditors must be provided with a complete 
set of financial statements when they arrive at their client’s premises to conduct the 
audit of those statements. Auditors noted that it is exceptionally rare that a full set of 
financial statements would be ready for them when they arrive, this contradicts finance 
directors who stated that (in their opinion) they have the financial statements prepared 
and ready for audit. In the absence of a fully prepared set of financial statements it 
appears that the auditors may already have an issue as to the time limits/budgets 
allocated to conducting an audit.  Incurring time delays at the start of an audit (whilst 
awaiting the draft financial statements), as noted by Willett and Page (1996), adversely 
affects the time pressure to complete the audit which subsequently increases towards 
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the end of the audit fieldwork. Additionally, there are issues with clients providing 
timely supporting documents of suitable quality despite efforts from the auditors 
supporting their clients with this exercise. Indeed, PwC (2015) make available to 
clients an ‘Audit Essentials’ document in the attempt to assist clients preparing for 
audit. Such issues were noted by Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) who argue that roles 
and responsibilities (i.e. including the financial statements being available) should be 
incorporated into the initial ‘fee’ negotiation phase of the audit tenure process. In 
Chapter 2 it was noted that there has been little academic research in the area of client 
preparedness for audit and such issues (not purely restricted to client preparedness 
levels) are explored below. 
 
4.1.4.2 Availability of Financial Statements 
 
The financial statements are not always available prior to an audit commencing. It has 
been suggested by the finance directors that ‘draft 1’ may be available, however 
without a full set of disclosure notes (alternatively, without the completed key primary 
financial statement balances) and subsequent drafts will be presented to the auditors 
throughout the audit. 
As one finance director notably stated; “if there is no draft they have a good set of 
working papers in advance, we certainly don’t want them sitting around doing nothing”. 
Such attitude to preparing for audit may not be ideal, in the absence of a financial 
statement the auditor is essentially conducting their work on a ‘number’ (financial 
statement / disclosure balance) in the hope that this is the ‘number’ that will appear in 
the final completed set of financial statements upon which the audit opinion will be 
signed. 
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Whether or not this ‘number’ eventually features in the financial statements is to some 
extent irrelevant, as there is additional work in which the auditor will need to perform 
in tracing this ‘number’ from their working papers to the financial statements. By adding 
to the tasks the auditor is required to do would not have been reflected in the original 
budgeted audit time and fee, as Otley and Pierce (1996) note, when budget tightness 
increases, there is a reduction in audit quality. 
It was highlighted that some of the audited clients had little or no experience in 
preparing financial statements. Indeed, interviews revealed that finance directors 
occasionally found preparing the financial statements problematic, as it as a task they 
had never previously had to undertake. In such circumstances previous auditors would 
have prepared the financial statements on their client’s behalf. Corroborating this 
approach, a number of the smaller auditing firms (partners interviewed in this 
research) also indicated that they prepared the financial statements for their audited 
clients and subsequently audited the financial statements they had prepared. Although 
these auditors were not ‘generating’ the financial data within the financial statements 
(it was noted that one auditor also did the book keeping including accounting 
adjustments for auditor generated estimates), they deem themselves to be purely 
‘putting numbers in boxes’, there is a potential conflict of interest. As Doumpos and 
Zopoundis (2003) argue, one of the most important performance measures of the audit 
is the actual audit opinion being reported, if this is considered to be a measure it would 
appear that the auditor is unlikely to provide an adverse opinion on themselves. 
In such circumstances, these ‘smaller’ auditing firms that both prepare and audit their 
client’s financial statements could potentially be perceived as having lower levels of 
quality control. Sanitoso, Kunda and Fong (1990) noted that firms (not restricted to the 
small auditing firms) will always justify the conclusions they draw as a result of the 
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information they deemed necessary and such conclusions may include an element of 
bias. With a ‘self-audit’ approach it could be argued that such bias will always exist, 
additionally the quality in terms of the amount of time spent to arrive at such 
conclusions may also be questionable.  
Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) note, audit clients have an interest in maximising 
income, potentially a similar approach could be considered to be that of the 
commercial auditing practice, as they have prepared the financial statements, it is 
unlikely they will interrogate those reported figures and disclosures with the same rigor 
as those externally prepared.  
The FRC (2016) introduced the International Standard on Auditing (UK) 300 [Revised 
June 2016] (Planning an Audit of Financial Statements). This is a mandatory auditing 
standard that any financial statements auditor must adhere to, and document in their 
audit working paper files (in addition to other relevant auditing standards) prior to 
commencing an audit. Consideration of this standard was a significant issue raised by 
a number of the audit partners, notably A3 stating that “planning etc is overkill” and 
supported by A7 “We certainly do far more planning than we used to do”. With the 
smaller auditing firms with limited resource following the same regulations as larger 
auditing firms consideration may need to be given to the size and nature of the clients 
audited. Arguably, auditors performing an audit on the financial statements they / their 
organisation has produced may not be as thorough / planned as an audit where they 
have not inputted into the production of the financial statements. This could be aligned 
to the arguments posed by Brown and Johnstone (2007) in that with such a notion, 
the level of risk the auditor may be willing to accept may be reduced / impaired. 
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Adding to the issue in relation to the availability of the financial statements, it was 
alluded to that some auditors prepare financial statements on behalf of their clients. 
With the increased levels of disclosures within financial statements clients are required 
to prepare and report additional information, and auditors are required to opine on 
these disclosures. The complexities of providing increased/enhanced disclosures 
appears to be proving problematic for clients, a significant consideration is that 
mandatory full disclosure sets of financial statements are only produced once per year 
by organisations and thus not a routine task. As FD10 states; “if they [the auditors] 
provided pro forma draft accounts, we could populate them to avoid formatting 
comments [in the ISA260 report], that would help”, with increased complexities the 
auditors are calling into question the value of the financial statements upon which they 
must form an opinion. As Auditor A3 states; “I don’t think they [users of financial 
statements] read the accounts other than the dividend disclosure”, similarly A4 notes; 
“there is a significant risk that your average lay reader can no longer interpret a set of 
financial statements and the more complex they become…….. also, complexities 
make the accounts less user friendly……. the financial statements are at such a level 
of complexity that most of the readers don’t use them…. begs the question as to the 
value of the annual report, financial statements and the audit that is associated with 
it”. Reflecting on these comments Daske, and Gebhardt (2006) question the quality of 
financial statements which have been prepared using International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), particularly with reference to adverse reporting 
incentives and weak enforcement mechanisms. 
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With increased regulations with the planning of an audit, plus the additional disclosures 
that clients have to include within their financial statements and annual reports, it could 
be argued that there are increased pressures on auditors to complete audits and little 
incentives (due to their limited updated knowledge) for clients to prepare financial 
statements and related disclosures. 
Tosi (1975) argued that targets (completing the audit or having financial statements 
ready) should act as a motivator, however as Kermis and Mahaptra (1985) add, 
stresses could be incurred in meeting any such target. Without a motivation, other than 
clients having an adverse comment in their ISA260 report (as they did not prepare full 
financial statements), the stresses could be deemed to pass purely to the auditor, it 
may therefore be argued that there is too much audit and financial reporting 
regulations. 
4.1.4.3 Availability of Audit Evidence 
 
Bame-Aldred and Kida (2007) noted that there can occasionally be conflict between 
auditors and their clients during negotiations, not only could this relate to fee 
negotiations but also transcend to the roles and responsibilities of both parties in terms 
of the availability of information. 
There exists a gap in the perceptions of how prepared clients are, there is a consensus 
with the auditors that although levels of preparedness varied from client to client, 
overall preparation was lacking. In contrast, a considerable number of finance 
directors thought they were well prepared, with the acknowledgement by a small 
number of others who thought they were ill prepared, if prepared at all. It is apparent 
that for the larger auditing firms that have no input in the preparation of the financial 
statements, they aid clients in the items they would need at the start of the audit. 
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However, this was largely irrelevant to those smaller auditing firms who audited the 
financial statements that either they, or a department within their firm, had prepared.  
A crucial element of the audit is to maintain the highest level of quality possible, in 
achieving quality, audit pressures could have an adverse impact. As noted in Chapter 
2, auditors are appraised internally on a recovery rate (a target) an audit yields. In 
order to maximise, or exceed these targets, the higher the level of preparedness a 
client has, the increased chance a target may be met.  
The Cohen Commission (1978) acknowledges the effect time pressures have on audit 
quality, however, as clients are less prepared (even though they have been provided 
with a list of deliverables) it is the auditor that inevitably feels additional pressures. As 
noted by the finance directors, other reporting time limits/daily tasks interfere with 
preparing for the auditors. Alternatively, there is a misinterpretation or ambiguity in 
what the auditors require  
A common theme arose with the finance directors in relation to the deliverables listings 
and the lack of communication between auditors and themselves. If the expectations 
of the auditors and their clients could be managed, the time pressures could in some 
way be alleviated. Furthermore, clients feel that the deliverables listing is not always 
tailored towards their specific organisation and as a result largely irrelevant, the impact 
upon the audit is that little audit evidence is prepared/available for the auditors when 
they arrive. Concurring with this, FD1 noted that although they receive a deliverable 
listing, this is not followed up prior to the audit to ascertain if everything is ready for the 
commencement of the audit. More importantly for them (the client), is for the auditors 
to ascertain if sufficient evidence and evidence of the correct quality that the auditor 
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requires has been collated to enable the auditors to complete a particular audit task 
and not delay the audit. 
Frustratingly, it is not always a client that appears to add pressures to their audit, it 
was noted by discussion with finance directors that their auditors (during their two-
week audit) were not always on site and continued to work remotely some three weeks 
after the scheduled audit visit time. Such an approach had an adverse impact on 
clients as they had scheduled their daily tasks around the predetermined audit visit.  
As Kreps and Wilson (1982) indicate, reputations are built on client satisfaction, this 
approach to their audit could taint any reputation. However, the approach could 
suggest that balancing audits as a result of time pressures, (as Willett and Page (1996) 
suggest) was the result of completing other more time pressured audits. In some way 
this could reflect on a particular client’s high level of preparedness whereby all 
information was readily available, thus enabling (as frustrating for their client it may 
be) a remote audit to be undertaken.  
Driven by the identified two-way relationship between the auditors and their clients, 
the auditors focus on actively promoting the use of a deliverables listing. A common 
statement from the finance directors “we don’t want them here any longer than they 
need to be” or “get them in and get them out”, potentially indicates that the better 
prepared a client can be, the amount of disruption caused by the auditors could be 
minimised.   Although subject to revision and clarification via meeting with clients prior 
to the reporting period end, the provision of a listing may not always be perceived as 
a positive step forward in assisting with audit quality. FD3 noted “as an auditor if they 
disclosed everything they were going to do and wanted, for some companies they 
could exploit that so the auditors need to hold something back …….. keep us on our 
toes”. An opposing view offered from FD7 “some form of pre-approval so that things 
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we have not been asked for in advance can be prepared in a format that is 
understandable, maybe some pre-planned dates when things will be required for”. 
These opposing views are interesting, as some finance directors appear to welcome 
an element of surprise tests or questions, whereas others welcome as much notice as 
possible to prepare. Interestingly, auditors should include an element of 
unpredictability is built into their audit approach as a matter of routine thus alleviating 
the concerns of the finance directors above. 
Both clients and auditors alike noted communication throughout the year as an area 
of concern and something they would like to improve upon and have built into the audit 
process. With increased communication the agreements of deliverables, times, quality 
of information and any implications for non-delivery would be discussed and also 
bringing to the attention of client staff that some tests/questions will not appear on the 
deliverables list and will arise throughout the audit process. 
4.1.4.4 Education / Knowledge / Specialisation 
 
With reference to the FRC requirement that auditors must rotate off a client’s audit 
after five years, this concept is challenged by both the auditor and their clients. 
Although it is recognised that a level of independence must be maintained, and as 
such, continuous challenges on clients and their processes and systems etc will 
continue, the independence benefits of doing so may not in all instances yield returns. 
Audit quality is inevitably affected by the amount of time available to complete audit 
tests, when pressures arise during peak auditing times it could be argued that audit 
quality reduces (Lopez and Peters, 2012). In such peak times, it could be considered 
to be imperative that clients are as prepared as possible to mitigate the risk of 
increased audit pressure. 
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It has been regularly noted that the finance directors and their staff feel like they are 
‘training the auditors’, “each year we have a new team of auditors many of which don’t 
understand our business sector” FD1, “may be helpful to use more qualified than less 
qualified members of staff due to their level of understanding as sometimes it feels like 
we are teaching their staff as opposed to explaining something” FD7. Where an 
auditors time budget is tight, as Otley and Pierce (1996) note, prior knowledge of the 
client and/or their business sector could in some way alleviate time accumulating 
knowledge on how a system/process operates and focus that time on the more 
challenging/high risk areas of the audit, as a result aiming to increase the overall 
quality of that audit. 
With stress being built into the accounting profession (Kelly and Seller, 1982), 
accumulated knowledge and experience is a key contributor to conducting an audit in 
as efficient and quality manner as possible. As a result, auditors rotating off a client 
within what could be deemed to be a relatively short period of time may not always be 
beneficial in providing a quality audit. Systems and process knowledge is understood, 
and the auditor has a better understanding of any weaknesses and risk areas within 
that clients’ business. As auditor A7 notes “I think there is a lot to be said for not being 
rotated, if we rotate the fee remains the same but the clients have to educate our staff 
and that can impact on our recovery [as more time is needed for auditors to get that 
new knowledge], not the clients fault, we will always have something unpredictable in 
there”. These comments echo those of finance directors recognising the preference to 
maintain their current auditing team (without jeopardising independence). 
Many theoretical implications arise from these context related characteristics of audit 
regulations and procedures. Primarily there is the need to maintain a level of 
independence between the auditors and their clients as independence is critical to 
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providing the independent audit opinion. Secondly, there is the desire to ensure client 
knowledge is utilised in conducting a quality audit, saving time and focus on quality 
documentation of the audit and reducing the potential for premature sign off (Gibbins 
and Newton, 1994). However, a counter argument for not rotating exists, as Kunda 
(1990) suggests premature sign off could be as a result of anticipated conclusions 
potentially drawn from an auditor’s prior particular client audit experience.  
 
4.1.4.5 Fees and Performance Management 
 
Lopez and Peters (2012) argued that the level of fees could affect the levels of audit 
quality, with targets having been ‘imposed’ on the audit team, the amount of time 
tailoring a client specific approach may thus be reduced, therefore focusing the time 
budget on the actual substantive testing of the financial statements whilst attempting 
to meet internal recovery rate targets 
Driven by the need to meet targeted recovery rates, it was noted in Chapter 2 that 
pressure is felt not only by the senior members of auditing teams, but also the juniors 
conducting the work. As Alderman and Deitrick (1982) note, all members of the audit 
team are subjected to pressures of varying levels, Turley and Cooper (1991) suggest 
that the auditing trainees suffered from increased pressures as they progressed 
through their training. Such pressures were as a result in competition driving a 
reduction in audit fees and the resultant audit costs in order to meet internal target 
recovery rates (Emmanuel et al, 1990). As audit costs are predominantly audit time, 
the impact is essentially working to a shortened timescale whilst completing the same 
levels of audit work.  In the case of issues arising during the audit, it could be argued 
that to maintain the recovery rate, the optimum levels of additional audit work to 
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resolve such issues may not be conducted (as previously noted via the potential 
fabrication of audit work). By employing such practices, there is the increased risk of 
an inappropriate audit opinion being concluded and an adverse effect on the quality of 
the audit.  
As Asthana and Boone (2012) argue, there is a notable decline in quality when audit 
fees reduce, and as noted above, recovery rates remain unchanged. Accordingly, 
Houston, Peters and Pratt (2005) recognise that audit fees not only reflect the amount 
of time required auditing the financial statements, but must also reflect the amount of 
perceived risk within a client’s organisation. In addition to this, the levels of client 
preparedness are also a key factor in agreeing a fee for the audit. 
Fees for audit can be a significant cost to any organisation, if a client could be greater 
prepared for audit the opportunity to receive a reduction was welcomed by all finance 
directors and auditors alike. As an incentive to be better prepared a potential refund 
or additional work was seen (in most cases) to appeal. It was recognised by the 
auditors that this would be the main focus (reducing costs) for their clients, interestingly 
the clients felt that maintaining high quality was the main focus for their auditors, 
irrespective of the amounts of work conducted. The fear of losing reputation and the 
impacts on market share were evident, as DeAngelo (1981) argues, value is based on 
the reputations of an auditing firm. As an example, confirming this FD10 noted that 
“quality [is important to their auditors] as the firm we have, have to put their reputation 
on the line”.  
Indeed, a quality audit is at the forefront of any auditor’s mind as the implications of 
providing a sub-standard audit could have profound consequences, from forming an 
inappropriate audit opinion and exposing themselves to litigation, to producing inferior 
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quality documentation/audit work recorded on their audit files and facing internal 
disciplinary action or issues arising with the professional body.  Setting the fee at the 
right level in the attempt to provide a quality audit is paramount, however as 
Humphrey, Moizer and Turley (2006) argue, audit fees are set intentionally low with 
the intention of selling additional premium priced products onto clients (low balling). 
Such practice is recognised by FD8 who stated that “I think once they have sold us 
the audit it is an opportunity to be in with an organisation and then provide the 
opportunity to provide the more lucrative sexier side of things such as VAT, health 
checks and reclaims and contingent fees where we get a refund and they get a 
percentage”, by employing tactics in essentially using the audit as a ‘loss leader’, this 
argument supports the additional views of DeAngelo (1981). With the reduced ‘loss 
leader’ audit fee, the pressure to minimise audit time and costs could be argued to be 
significant. Those junior staff completing the less risky areas of the audit may have 
reduced time to conduct their tasks (Willet and Page, 1996), as Turley and Cooper 
(1991) argue, those tasks provide the foundations for the audit and support the 
concluding audit opinion. 
During fee negotiations, the fee is not always the deciding factor (albeit a significant 
factor) when audit tenders are received by clients. FD6 raises a crucial point when 
they decided upon their auditors “I doubt during our tender there was much between 
them [auditing tenders received] in terms of price hence why we use a big 4 company 
only as they are top notch internationally recognised quality organisations”, thereby 
supporting the arguments of Kreps and Wilson (1982) in relation to building 
reputations. 
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Reflecting on the perspective of seeing the audit as “a necessary evil”, “get the auditors 
in and out as quickly as possible” the audit is “just an overhead”, in certain situations 
this is the view of both clients and auditors alike. With such opinions on the audit 
process, it is seen predominantly by the smaller client firms as a compliance task and 
should be priced accordingly. As Moctezuma and Benau state “In this sense, the 
auditor election process is simply reduced to the mere fact of hiring any auditor in order 
to cover their obligation, and in that case, the most rational solution for certain 
companies, it seems that is, the hiring of the auditor who offers the service at the 
lowest possible price” (Moctezuma and Benau, 2017, P232). Such clients do not 
appear to place any value on the audit, in support of such views auditor A2 notably 
stated that “…… they know it [a financial statements audit] is a legal requirement, but 
they have to have it done whether they like it or not as it is not adding value”. It would 
appear from these statements that such clients (as mentioned in the sections above) 
could relate to owner managed businesses and as such little or no benefit is envisaged 
to be received by the directors / shareholders / stakeholders of such organisations. 
4.1.4.6 Automation / Monitoring 
 
With developments in auditing practices and auditing techniques/approaches, the way 
clients and auditors alike prepare for their audits is evolving. The nervousness noted 
above of auditors and clients in preparing for audit may become more transparent with 
the introduction of the computerisation of auditing techniques (automation). In the 
previous sections it was evident that the larger auditing practices are investing in 
technology or ‘client portals’. Computer Assisted Auditing Techniques (CAAT’s) is not 
a new phenomenon within the auditing profession, however they do appear to be 
evolving at increased rates.  
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The functionality of such portals allows clients to upload documents and the system 
then records the date and time it was uploaded. In addition to this the portal records 
the date and time an auditor accessed the document, however, it is unclear as to the 
actions the auditor took once accessing the document (they may have merely 
opened/accessed it without performing an audit test), and also as to the 
quality/appropriateness of the document originally uploaded. Such a system could 
therefore alleviate some of the concerns raised by the auditors and clients in relation 
to measuring/monitoring of the preparedness levels therefore forming the basis to 
inform any subsequent ‘new preparedness’ audit opinion disclosures. In corroboration 
of such automated techniques, auditor A8 notes: 
“Our system records dates things were received by us during the audit so 
we can demonstrate when things were received. Things becoming more 
automated with date stamps on them seems to be the way to go” (A8). 
Auditor A5 confirms and extends on this approach: 
“More automation [is required in the audit approach], the less time spent 
shuffling papers would reduce time and costs to us which could potentially 
be passed onto clients. If so, automated samples may disappear and 100% 
checks could be possible. Clients would just give access to systems and 
we can then access those systems and essentially interrogate the data, we 
can’t automate those balances that require an element of judgement, by 
pushing the boundaries of automation that must surely enhance overall 
audit quality and the clients therefore needs to be less prepared and thus 
focus on those judgemental balances” (A5). 
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Corroborating such a positive attitude to automation, FD10 stated that “loading things 
onto the portal is great, and avoids going back and forth asking for documents etc.”  
With such advancements in automation the risk of human intervention could be argued 
to decrease, however such practices could then give rise to increased cyber risks 
requiring additional investment in training of auditors. 
If such automations were employed by the auditors, they may need to revisit their 
current approaches to their audits. Indeed, finance directors do appear to welcome a 
revision to some auditor approaches as they do not see that it fits with their 
organisation. 
“Using a large firm for a small organisation it feels like the approach does 
not fit and it feels as if some things are being done for the sake of doing it 
because it is in the firm’s own approach, some of it maybe because they 
have no choice as it is an audit standard. however, if a more tailored 
approach could be made it would be beneficial” (FD7). 
 
4.1.4.7 Audit Opinion 
 
Considering that the auditors face a significant amount of pressure (as a result of 
clients not being prepared for them), they recognise that there is a potential impact on 
the quality of the audit test recording and conclusions of the audit as a whole. As 
demonstrated, auditors attempt to help their clients prepare, however due to some of 
the issues already discussed, such issues are not communicated to a wider audience 
and interested parties.  
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The current standard audit opinion discloses the truth and fairness of the financial 
statements, and the other information within the annual report, however as the audit 
is part of a company’s procedures there is no reference as to how well this procedure 
was executed. Both auditors and clients supported the theory that some form of 
disclosure could be included within the financial statements either in the audit opinion 
itself or other disclosure note in relation to how well prepared for audit they were. 
Francis (2004) agrees that a fee structure should be agreed at the commencement of 
the audit, both auditors and clients felt that although this is disclosed in the operating 
costs notes with the financial statements, additional disclosures would be beneficial. 
Suggestions included amending the audit fee disclosure in terms of refunds if the 
clients have been well prepared or adverse fee variations in terms of overrun costs 
where clients have been less prepared and such disclosures would be beneficial to 
financial statement users, as auditor A2 states;  
 “Anything that whereby an opinion that would have an adverse comment in the 
audit report would mean that clients would take action on their part. All of our 
clients are conscious of having an adverse opinion” (A2). 
 
Auditor A4 adds: 
 “Also, if clients were to report on variations they had to pay to the auditors 
because that is probably a greater indicator as to whether they have not 
been ready or not delivered what they were supposed to deliver because 
that sends a message to the world that they agreed a commercial fee for 
the audit but they have had to pay more due to the auditors doing more 
work due to the quality of the information provided or the time in which it 
was prepared. If we want to be transparent I think there is value in bringing 
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the fee being disclosed in the audit opinion, maybe in a box at the bottom 
detailing variations as that is greater indicator as to the preparedness of the 
clients. We are constantly concerned with the auditors delivering other 
things to avoid impairing our independence, the box could show the audit 
fee, audit fee variation, other fees charged by the auditors in the provision 
of other work. If it is important to be transparent then let’s be transparent 
and show everything” (A4).  
Indeed, the concept of reporting weaknesses within client’s organisations was noted 
in Chapter 2, Krishnan, Krishnan and Song (2011) related higher fees being charged 
and disclosed as per USA Auditing Standard 5 (AS No5) as a reflection of the level 
and number of internal control weaknesses. As the internal control weaknesses 
declined so did the audit fee, the disclosure of a reduced fee from the previous year 
would indicate to a user of the financial statements that the clients had responded to 
audit findings, which could be interpreted to include the level of preparedness for 
auditors. In an equivalent manner to the proposals by the auditors quoted above, the 
introduction of similar disclosures within the UK, would not be too dissimilar in practice. 
Indeed, in recognising that there could be some benefit with disclosing something in 
the audit opinion or fee variations, finance directors were quite surprisingly in support 
of such additional disclosures. FD2 noted that their financial statements were used by 
banks as well as investors and if there were any preparedness issues that were 
highlighted in their opinion “that would alert a bad process……. And would give a bad 
impression of the company” (FD2). FD3 supported this approach as “this could 
indicate any underlying issues [potentially resource related] and the importance of the 
audit report” (FD3). 
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With such positive responses from both the auditors and the finance directors to 
amend the audit opinion in some way that reflected their level of preparedness for 
audit, it could be seen that they wish to bring to the attention of a wider audience that 
they were better prepared than others.  
Ultimately, the financial statements and annual reports do include in the relevant 
director’s reports, OFR (Operating and Financial Review) an overview as to the 
performance of the organisation over the reporting period and other information as to 
the organisations past performance. In addition to this any adverse issues that have 
arisen over the year that may have had an adverse effect on the organisation, such 
instances may include financial in terms of additional costs (restructuring for example), 
or alternatively explanations as to adverse trading conditions. It could therefore be 
argued that the performance of an organisation in terms of levels of preparedness and 
assistance throughout the audit process should also be reported within this document 
as ultimately the audit is a part of the annual (and indeed business) processes of such 
an organisation. 
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4.1.4.8 Audit review / Premature Sign Off 
 
It was suggested by Lightener, Adams and Lightener (1982) that the review process 
(where time pressures exist) may not be as robust and thorough when compared to 
an audit where a client is well prepared, and time allows for the work to be conducted 
efficiently and a subsequent thorough audit work review completed. It may therefore 
be argued that the better prepared a client is, the greater the quality of the audit, as a 
thorough review should have been completed ensuring the audit tasks have been 
completed, documented and concluded upon correctly, thus adding value to the quality 
of the subsequent signed audit opinion. This argument is supported by auditor A5 who 
noted that “auditors have to either get information themselves or make information up”, 
clearly this is an unacceptable practice, however indicating that time pressures, 
impending deadlines and meeting the audit recovery rate may have been contributory 
factors in making this decision.  
The author of this thesis has extensive experience in the audit of financial statements 
and is aware that such practices existed in the profession whereby audit work was 
fabricated and not picked up during the review process. As Waggoner and Cashell 
(1991) suggest, had there been sufficient review time such practices may have been 
discovered, as a result tests and results (which may have a damaging affect not only 
on the quality of the audit but also potentially informing an incorrect audit opinion on 
the financial statements) could be revisited and correctly documented and concluded 
upon. It was suggested by Raghunathan (1991) that premature sign off of the audit 
work may have an effect on the quality of the audit, potentially as Gibbins and Newton 
(1994) not as a result of time pressure, but as highlighted above, due to the auditor’s 
knowledge and experience.  
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The ultimate responsibility for signing off the audit and the audit opinion is the audit 
engagement leader (holder of an auditing practicing certificate, usually a designated 
audit partner or director), their decision as to the audit opinion is based on the 
conclusions drawn from the audit work undertaken. As Ricchiute (1999) suggests, the 
signing off of the audit working papers should be done after a senior review and this 
will influence the engagement leader’s decision.  Notably time pressures (which has 
been a recurring theme) impact on such thorough reviews taking place. Consideration 
must therefore be given to the arguments raised by Lightener, Adams and Lightener 
(1982) whereby the audit quality in respect of the review process could be enhanced 
by incorporating an independent reviewer into the process.  
 
The key findings discussed in this chapter are summarised in Diagram 2 below, which 
combines the outcomes of the current literature with the outcomes of the empirical 
qualitative study conducted in this thesis. 
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Professionalism (Attributes and 
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➢ Familiarity threat 
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Diagram 2: Proposed framework for assessing the factors 
adversely impacting on audit quality (Auditor/ Client). 
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Preparedness 
➢ Availability of financial 
statements 
➢ Availability of audit 
evidence 
➢ Education / Knowledge / 
Specialisation 
➢ Fees and performance 
management 
➢ Automation 
➢ Audit opinion 
 
 
 
 
Audit Regulations 
➢ Planning 
➢ Self-audit 
➢ Owner managed business 
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5.1 Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1.1.1 Introduction 
 
Whilst the quality of a financial statements audit has received a significant amount of 
attention in business literature, there is a lack of both theoretical and practical 
knowledge in respect of the levels of preparedness for the commencement of a 
financial statements audit. Given the extreme pressures that can be faced by 
predominately the auditors, but also the finance directors to prepare for and deliver (in 
the case of the auditors) a quality audit, the focus of this thesis was on the perceived 
levels of financial statement preparedness from the perspective of the auditors and 
finance directors of audited organisations. Additionally, this thesis investigated the 
issues and challenges faced by both auditors and clients in preparing for a financial 
statements audit. 
To meet the overall purpose, the objectives of this thesis were threefold:  
• To provide a thorough critical literature review in order to identify and evaluate 
the concepts and factors impacting upon the improvement of the quality of the 
UK financial statements audit. 
 
• To undertake qualitative research through the use of semi structured interviews, 
with a range of UK auditor partners (the registered ultimate auditor with sole 
responsibility for the audit) and UK finance directors (the ultimate audited body 
senior official responsible for ensuring auditors are supplied with high quality 
information). 
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• To develop a conceptual framework with links to professional practice for the 
contribution to enhance financial statements audit quality in the UK. 
As outlined in Chapter 3, guidance on meeting these objectives was constrained by 
the methodological limitations of audit quality literature. It is not possible to transfer 
those theories or concepts that arose from the literature and apply those to the 
preparedness for audit study. It was therefore apparent that in order to generate 
knowledge that was both practical and useful, this thesis needed to take a pragmatic 
approach in order to enable that meaningful practical knowledge to be generated. 
Employing a qualitative data collection technique when carrying out the interviews, the 
views from ten audit engagement leaders from a range of qualified auditing firms of 
various sizes who took overall responsibility for the signing of the audit opinion and 
the quality of the audit were acquired. To complement this thesis, the views from ten 
finance directors from a range of organisations varying in size and business sector, 
were also acquired. Exploring their views on the pressures they face preparing 
for/executing an audit and the pressures they faced has highlighted some interesting 
issues and reflections on key areas that could be improved to ensure a quality audit is 
delivered and correct conclusions drawn.    
This thesis has provided some extremely valuable insights as to how the research 
could be built into the practical application of the financial statements audit. As detailed 
below a number of recommendations for consideration are raised in the attempt to 
benefit both auditors and clients alike to enhance the audit quality on financial 
statements. Additionally, there may be increased comfort to users of financial 
statements in determining not only the value of the audit opinion based on the financial  
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disclosures, but also a reflection of the management of the organisation preparing 
those financial statements. 
 
Diagram 3 demonstrates the summary of the key issues adversely impacting on 
audit quality as identified in this research, and the corresponding proposed 
recommendations for enhancing the quality of a UK financial statements audit. 
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AUDIT 
QUALITY 
AUDITORS CLIENTS 
Performance management  
➢ Time pressures  
➢ Fee pressures  
➢ Targets (Recovery rate) 
Characteristics of the auditing firm 
➢ Size 
➢ Location (scale of 
operations) 
➢ Big 4 / Non-Big 4 
Professionalism (Attributes and 
Conduct) 
➢ Independence 
➢ Audit Review  
➢ Expertise / industry 
knowledge 
➢ Familiarity threat 
➢ Low balling 
➢ Audit firm / partner rotation 
/ tenure 
 
Characteristics of clients 
➢ Size / Economic 
importance of the client 
➢ Geographical proximity 
➢ Client affiliation with 
auditor 
Diagram 3: Proposed framework for enhancing audit quality. 
Preparedness 
➢ Availability of financial 
statements 
➢ Availability of audit 
evidence 
➢ Education / Knowledge / 
Specialisation 
➢ Fees and performance 
management 
➢ Automation 
➢ Audit opinion 
 
 
 
 
Audit Regulations 
➢ Planning 
➢ Self-audit 
➢ Owner managed business 
 
ENHANCEMENT OF AUDIT QUALITY 
Recommendations 
 
➢ Advanced preparation of draft financial statements 
➢ Restriction/Segregation of audit and financial statement 
preparation providers 
➢ Amendments in audit planning regulations 
➢ Tailored audit planning standards 
➢ Client specific deliverables 
➢ Staff availability 
➢ Mandatory time between reporting period end and audit 
➢ Mandatory number of auditor/client meetings 
➢ Mandatory board audit update 
➢ Auditor / Client briefing 
➢ Engagement leader knowledge 
➢ Fee incentives 
➢ Deliverables monitoring 
➢ Amended audit opinion/preparedness disclosures 
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5.1.1.2 Availability of Financial Statements 
 
As a result of the interviews, a difference of opinion arose into the levels of 
preparedness for audit between auditors and clients, auditors believed clients were 
rarely ready and finance directors felt they were well prepared. In addition, as per the 
auditors’ opinion, it was evident that a completed set of financial statements including 
full disclosures were rarely ready for the auditors when they arrived at a client on the 
first day of the audit commencing. Concerns were raised from the auditors that this 
then put them behind with the audit as items would essentially be ‘drip fed’ to them 
throughout the audit. If the financial statements were late and such statements were 
to be audited in the January to March ‘audit busy period’, as Lopez and Peters (2012) 
allude, this could have an adverse effect on the audit quality due to time pressures. 
With such time pressure and in line with the theories highlighted in Chapter 2, both 
auditors and finance directors alike were not averse to having (along with other matters 
discussed below) reference made to the level of preparedness in terms of the draft 
financial statements and supporting audit evidence available for audit included within 
the published audit opinion. It was acknowledged by both participant groups that 
additional disclosures within the audit opinion could reinforce the importance of the 
audit as mandatory annual process, even though the financial statements may warrant 
a clean (un-qualified) audit opinion the preparedness opinion may receive a 
qualification (adverse opinion for that element of the audit). 
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An additional issue identified by the interviewees was the advanced preparation of the 
financial statements, it has been discussed above that, in the auditor’s opinion, it is 
rare that clients prepare such a document prior to the audit commencing. Such issue 
could be addressed by the following recommendation: 
• Advanced preparation of draft financial statements – Where the full financial 
statements are not available at the commencement of the audit, a qualification 
is included in the financial statements/disclosures. 
However, data revealed that some smaller organisations employ their auditors to 
prepare their financial statements on their behalf, which could be interpreted as ‘self-
auditing’ and thus contradictory to current ethical regulations. Additionally, highlighted 
during the interviews, newly appointed auditing firms refused to take over the 
preparation of the financial statements from a new client when acquiring the audit from 
a previous auditor (who previously prepared the financial statements for their clients’). 
The reasoning was that the new auditor did not wish to fall foul of any independence 
rules, irrespective of the ethical codes of practice. Such issue gives rise to the following 
recommendation: 
 
• Restriction/Segregation of audit and financial statements preparation providers 
- To increase independence, no auditor should be allowed to prepare and audit 
the financial statements of a client. Financial statements should be prepared by 
either the client themselves or outsourced to an alternative (independent of the 
auditing firm) accountancy provider. 
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Auditors believe the amount of time being invested in adhering to planning all audits 
is becoming excessive and absorbing the time budget allowed for the full audit. 
Performing mandatory audit planning tasks to satisfy Auditing Standards and other 
planning regulations resulted in less time to perform the audit as the additional time 
costs could not be passed onto their clients. It is therefore recommended that: 
• Amendments to audit planning regulations – Reducing the amount of 
mandatory audit planning to ensure the primary focus of the audit remains on 
ensuring the balances and related financial statement disclosures are true and 
fair thus enhancing the quality of the audit opinion thereon. 
• Tailored audit planning standards – Mandatory audit planning regulations could 
be revisited and revised/tailored to address the organisation being audited, 
whereby less audit time is invested in planning the audit and the focus of time 
is directed at opining on the truth and fairness of the financial statements.  
 
5.1.1.3 Availability of Audit Evidence 
 
Focussing on the levels of preparedness for audit and the availability of supporting 
financial statement audit evidence for the first day of the audit fieldwork commencing, 
this study utilised the knowledge, qualifications and experience of individuals in the 
participant group. There was some consensus as to the elements of the required 
documentation that auditors require for the commencement of the audit, however 
differences of opinion as to the information/access to staff required, format and 
timescales arose. Where such deliverables listing did not exist, or were not client 
specific, ambiguity of information could result in overruns of the audit and deadlines 
missed or insufficient / sub-standard audit work completed / reviewed.  
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The following recommendations are proposed to address the above-mentioned 
issues: 
 
• Client specific deliverables – An agreed upon listing of the client specific items 
(in addition to the draft financial statements) is discussed and provided in 
advance of the audit fieldwork commencing. The agreement of such listing 
should be documented in the audit file and copies provided to clients. 
 
• Staff availability – Where possible staff as identified by auditors remain 
accessible to auditors for the duration of the scheduled audit fieldwork. 
 
A major factor that impacts on the rationale for companies to have their financial 
statements audited and signed off is the accounting standard IAS10 (Events after the 
reporting period). This standard requires that companies need to consider anything 
that comes to light in the period between the reporting period end and the financial 
statements being signed by the auditors and the relevant company signatory, the 
shorter this period is, the less likely anything will arise affecting the financial results 
reported to stock markets and other interested parties. However, with such short time 
periods, financial statements and supporting information is not readily available to 
audit. It is therefore recommended that:   
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• Mandatory time between reporting period end and audit - A mandatory period 
between the reporting period end and the date the audit commences (for 
example 3 months) is put in place to allow for financial statements to be 
prepared and auditor required information collated and made available for audit. 
Accordingly, such additional time would allow for a rigorous going concern 
review to be undertaken and a more robust audit opinion provided. 
 
The thematic analysis of the interviewees’ responses highlighted there was concern 
surrounding the lack of communication throughout the reporting period, whereby 
contentious issues, changes in regulations or other related reporting / audit issues that 
may impact on the financial statements and subsequent audit could be discussed.  To 
address this concern: 
• Mandatory minimum number of auditor/client meetings - Mandating the number 
of meetings could alleviate some of these issues whereby (amongst traditional 
business updates) matters potentially affecting the financial results/audit 
requirements can be addressed early to avoid impacting adversely on the final 
audit. 
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5.1.1.4 Education / Knowledge / Specialisation 
 
Similarly, the amount of importance of the audit to the board of an organisation was 
indicated as being questionable. Both participant groups noted that there was on 
occasion little buy in from the board into the audit process. Indeed, the incidents where 
the board did not even pass comment on the draft financial statements provided to 
them prior to audit, were highlighted by the interviewees. It is therefore recommended 
that: 
• Mandatory board audit update - Consideration should be given to mandating a 
meeting between the auditors and key audit and client staff personnel outlining 
the importance of the audit, the reporting requirements of the organisation, the 
pressures the finance department faced and that the preparedness levels would 
be reported within the financial statements (adverse and favourable) should the 
client be well prepared/overruns due to being ill prepared/sub-standard 
information be provided, and the impact upon the audit opinion. 
 
Auditors allude to improvements that their clients could make to assist and reduce 
pressures faced by them, finance directors also suggested that the auditors could 
change some factors within the audit process and approach. A common theme being 
that auditors lacked knowledge regarding their businesses, they get new auditors 
every year and they felt as though they were training their junior auditors. To alleviate 
such frustrations the following recommendations are proposed: 
• Auditor/Client briefing – Adding to the increased levels of continuous 
communication, the full audit team attend a client briefing regarding their sector, 
their systems and processes as well as key contacts. If auditors are ill prepared 
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for an organisation, how they operate and are unfamiliar with the recording 
systems (albeit such items should be recorded in some form in the auditors 
planning file) it would be more difficult to trace information flows and audit 
balances. There lies an inherent risk that the lack of expertise of the auditor 
could provide the opportunity for a client to manipulate financial statements and 
thus mislead the ill prepared auditor.  
The thematic analysis of the interviews highlighted concerns raised (in addition to 
junior audit staff not understanding a client’s business) in relation to the knowledge an 
engagement leader accumulates during their audit tenure. Current FRC requirements 
to avoid the threat of an audit and a client becoming too familiar with each other 
(familiarity threat), is that no auditor (engagement leader) shall work on an audit in that 
capacity for a period exceeding five years. The interviewees also argued that it takes 
several years before fully understanding an organisation, the knowledge that has been 
gained is subsequently lost once the engagement leader rotates off that client. Whilst 
acknowledging that becoming too familiar is a threat, there is also the risk that the 
incoming engagement leader could make similar inappropriate conclusions as audit 
juniors if they are unfamiliar with that client and their sector. It is therefore argued that 
once an audit engagement leader understands their client they have the knowledge of 
where the underlying risks lie and how to address those risks, consideration should 
therefore be given to: 
• Engagement leader knowledge – Consideration is given to reviewing and 
extending the five-year rotation rule to enable accumulated client/sector 
knowledge to be capitalised upon.  
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5.1.1.5 Fees and Performance Management 
 
Finance directors indicated that a quality audit is at the forefront of any auditor’s mind 
as the implications of providing a sub-standard audit could have profound 
consequences, from forming an inappropriate audit opinion to exposing themselves to 
litigation. The result would include litigation and reputational damage both of which 
would adversely affect any commercial organisation. Low-balling the audit fee to sell 
additional services is a practice that is recognised throughout the auditing field from 
both auditors and clients alike. There is little that can be done in terms of 
recommended pricing policies and targeted recoveries, however, the implications of 
clients increasing their levels of preparedness and assisting audit to reduce the 
pressures they are under, can only have a positive impact on the audit for the financial 
statements and subsequent quality of the audit.  However, incentives were seen as 
being a positive motivator for clients to increase their levels of preparedness. 
• Fee incentives -  Where clients are perceived to add pressures to the auditors 
which could adversely affect the quality of their work by being ill prepared. 
Offering incentives in terms of favourable fee variations or additional services 
could change clients attitude to audit and prioritise their audit preparations. 
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5.1.1.6 Automation / Monitoring 
 
The thematic analysis of the interviewees’ responses highlighted that the issue of 
automation is of significant relevance for both; auditors and clients. Some auditors 
provide portals for clients to access the deliverables listing and upload those items 
ideally when required, however the affordability of such software is currently excessive 
for smaller auditing practices who provide word-based deliverables lists. 
 
• Deliverables monitoring -  In order to monitor client agreed deliverables and 
provide feedback upon the supporting documentation quality and suitability / 
potential implications for substandard information and delays. Agreed 
monitoring systems need to be put in place to provide reliable evidence to 
support the levels of preparedness a client achieves at each reporting period 
end. 
5.1.1.7 Audit Opinion 
 
A recurrent theme throughout the discussions with the interviewees was the 
willingness to have the audit opinion amended to include a statement regarding the 
client’s levels of preparedness. However, due to the potentially contentious inclusion 
of such a disclosure, careful consideration would be required to ensure a consistent 
approach was adopted by auditing firms as well as agreement as to the wording, 
terminology and other related disclosure information (fee variations). Additionally, 
ensuring a pre-agreed level of preparedness, timeliness and quality of the documents 
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being made available to auditors was ‘signed up to’ by all relevant parties prior to the 
audit commencing to avoid any ambiguities and conflicts. It is therefore recommended: 
• Amended audit opinion / preparedness disclosures – The audit opinion includes 
reference to a client’s levels of preparedness, also to include fee variations both 
favourable and adverse. 
5.1.1.8 Audit Review / Premature Sign Off 
 
Time pressure has been a theme that auditors and clients have raised throughout this 
study as the major threat to overall audit quality. The issues and subsequent 
implementation of the recommendations above would assist both parties in ensuring 
that commitment to being prepared for an audit is paramount. In doing so the 
pressures on auditors to ‘fabricate’ results would be reduced allowing for a thorough 
review of the audit work that underpins the final audit opinion to be undertaken. With 
reduced pressures on valuable time higher quality work would be undertaken, 
complementing this would be the increased time between a reporting period end and 
audit thereon. With greater preparation, a higher quality audit will be the resultant 
quality product. The summary of the combined proposed recommendations mitigating 
the issues adversely affecting audit quality, is provided in diagram 3.  
5.1.1.9 Additional reflections on the conclusions 
 
It must be acknowledged that the recommendations proposed in this study are subject 
to the acceptance of both parties involved in the audit process, as well as the relevant 
regulatory bodies. The key issues which can impact on the practical application of the 
recommended practices of enhancing audit quality include not only cost, but also the 
time and resource implications for both auditors and auditees. Despite the agreement 
188 
 
reported by this study that there is a pressing need to enhance audit quality, it is 
important to note that the competitive environment of auditing services, and the 
ongoing pressures on cost effectiveness in business sector, could lead to possible 
objections to the implementation of the recommendations above. These could be 
potentially mitigated if the relevant regulatory bodies consider incorporating the 
recommendations of this study into the statuary audit regulations.  
As this study is explanatory in its nature, its main theoretical contribution addresses 
the shortcomings of the literature in the field of audit quality. Despite the importance 
of the auditees’ engagement in the audit process, the literature to date failed to report 
on the views of auditees on the factors relevant for enhancing the quality of a UK 
financial statements audit. It is also important to note that this study, by adopting non-
positivistic methods, addresses the limitations of the existing research on audit quality 
that are predominantly based on a quantitative approach, which limits the opportunities 
for in depth explorations of the auditees views and perceptions.  
5.1.1.10 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research   
 
Whilst this study aimed at providing a contribution to the theoretical knowledge and 
profession practice, it is important that certain limitations in the process of achieving 
this objective are acknowledged. As the overall aim of this study was to explore the 
importance of audit client commitment to comprehensive audit preparation to improve 
the quality of a UK financial statements audit, this study covered the perspectives of 
auditors and clients. This could be considered as a limitation as this study did not 
include other stakeholders, whose opinions may inform the theoretical and practical 
understanding of the issues affecting audit quality. Thus, future research could focus 
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on exploring opinions of other groups of practitioners, directly involved in the audit 
process. 
 
A second limitation of this study is the sample size of the participants included in the 
study. Due to the practical constraints and the sensitive nature of the topic, the 
researcher had to limit the number of interviewees from each group. This led to the 
subsequent limitation of providing a generalised set of recommendations. It is felt   that 
a qualitative study based on semi structured interviews may not generate universally 
applicable conclusions, however it can provide an enhanced theoretical understanding 
of the phenomenon researched and, equally importantly, it can lead to the 
enhancement of professional practice. 
 
As this study contributes to an extremely limited body of literature, certain references 
to previous findings, comparisons with published empirical research material could not 
be incorporated in the manner typically expected from any research project. Yet, it has 
to be recognised that despite its limitation, this study addresses a very topical issue, 
which has been mostly ignored in the current literature, thus opening up possibilities 
and directions for further explorations of the ‘audit client ‘as a research object, 
specifically in the context of the enhancement of audit quality. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Auditor Interview Questions 
Q1 
How well prepared would you consider your clients to be on the first day of the audit 
fieldwork? 
Q2 
What do you / your team do as part of audit planning to assist your clients in 
preparing for the first day of the audit? 
Q3 
What would you consider to be the main failings (if any) of clients when preparing for 
the first day of the audit fieldwork? 
Q4 
Do you feel that clients make preparing for the auditors a priority? 
Q5 
Do you think that clients make sufficient time for auditors during the audit fieldwork? 
Q6 
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section 
in relation to the client’s preparation for audit, do you think clients would place an 
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emphasis on ensuring they were fully prepared for the auditors at the 
commencement of the audit fieldwork (if so, how - if not why not)? 
Q7 
Considering the previous question, do you feel users of audited financial statements 
would take additional value from including such disclosures within the audit opinion? 
Q8 
If clients were to be any better prepared do you feel this would reduce time / 
reporting pressures on auditors? and if so could this enhance audit quality in any 
way? 
Q9 
Is there anything you feel that auditors could be doing / providing to their clients to 
ensure clients are fully prepared on day one of an audit to avoid potential overruns / 
poor quality supporting evidence? 
Q10 
If clients were considered to be well prepared for the first day of the audit, other than 
this being acknowledged in the audit opinion, could there be incentives (i.e. fee 
reductions)? 
Q11 
Is there anything else that you feel clients should be doing in order to ensure good 
quality information is readily available on the first day of an audit? 
Q12 
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Do client management review information before it is shared with auditors? 
 
Q13 
Do you feel quality or price is important to your clients? 
Q14 
Other that the information provided, what do you feel could be done by either the 
auditor or the clients to increase the quality of an audit? 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
Finance Director Questions 
Q1 
How well prepared would you consider you and your staff to be on the first day of the 
audit fieldwork? 
Q2 
Have / Management reviewed and approved the information that is shared with the 
auditors? 
Q3 
What do you / your team receive from your auditors to assist you with preparing for 
the first day of the audit? 
Q4 
What would you consider to be the main shortcomings (if any) of you/your team 
when preparing for the first day of the audit fieldwork? 
Q5 
Taking into account that finance departments are busy and daily tasks need to be 
completed, would you/your team consider preparing for an audit to be a priority? 
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Q6 
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section 
in relation to the client’s preparation for audit, do you think you / your team would 
place greater emphasis on being fully prepared for the auditors at the 
commencement of the audit fieldwork (if so, how - if not why not)? 
Q7 
Considering the question above, do you feel users of audited financial statements 
would take additional value from including such disclosures within the audit opinion? 
Q8 
Would you consider that if audit clients could be any better prepared for their 
auditors this could reduce time / reporting pressures on auditors? If so do you feel 
that this could enhance the quality of an audit in any way? 
Q9 
Do you have sufficient time to be prepared for the audit after the year end? 
Q10 
Do you understand the professional sceptic approach that the FRC requires of 
auditors? 
Q11 
216 
 
Is there anything you feel that auditors could be doing / providing to their clients to 
ensure clients could be considered to be fully prepared on day one of an audit to 
avoid potential overruns / poor quality supporting evidence? 
Q12 
If you were considered to be well prepared for the first day of the audit, other than 
this being acknowledged in the audit opinion, could there be incentives (i.e. fee 
reductions)? 
Q13 
Is quality or price more important to your auditors? 
Q14 
If there was any room for improvement in your current procedures etc, is there 
anything else that you feel you could be doing / preparing in order to ensure good 
quality information (as required by auditors) is readily available on the first day of an 
audit? 
Q15 
Other that the information provided, what do you feel could be done by either the 
auditor or the clients to increase the quality of an audit? 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 1. 
How well prepared would you consider your clients to be on the first day of the audit fieldwork?  
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Not prepared for 
an audit. 
  They are not 
prepared on day 
one of the audit. 
    Some 
organisations 
are never ready. 
 
Code 2  Quite well 
prepared. 
    Some are ready. Some are 
particularly 
ready. 
  
Code 3 No idea what 
they need to do. 
 Companies do 
not really know 
what to do. 
       
Code 4     It varies, we 
have some with 
longer 
timescales but 
even those are 
not prepared. 
No one single 
answer as it 
varies as we 
have clients at 
both ends of the 
scale. 
Varies as we 
have both ends 
of the spectrum. 
Some are ready. I would say 
variable. 
 
Code 5          Somewhat 
prepared based 
on what we have 
one during 
planning. 
Code 6 We prepare the 
accounts and 
audit them. 
 Other than a TB 
we audit it and 
prepare the final 
accounts. 
       
 
 
 
 
219 
 
 
 
Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 2  
What do you / your team do as part of the audit planning to assist your clients in preparing for the first day of the audit fieldwork?   
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Other than the 
schedule we 
provide they are 
not ready. 
  We have an 
online portal and 
we agree with 
them what we 
are going to 
need. 
We do more 
than we used to, 
we have a 
deliverables list 
loaded onto the 
client portal. 
We prepare a 
deliverables list 
which is loaded 
onto a client 
portal. 
We don’t provide 
a list of 
deliverables. 
We have a 
tailored list of 
deliverables 
loaded onto a 
client portal 
We provide a 
detailed list of 
deliverables and 
requests. 
We provide a 
detailed list of 
deliverables that 
we can monitor 
electronically 
Code 2 Some they want 
to meet and 
discuss 
I prepare the 
accounts so 
there is 
communication 
between us and 
them. 
 It’s about 
agreeing what 
you ought to 
have but don’t 
give too much 
away to avoid 
the level of 
unpredictability. 
We agree what 
we want from our 
side and from 
theirs and the 
dates items 
should be posted 
on the portal. 
 We meet with 
clients during the 
planning phase 
a few months 
before the year 
end. 
We have a 
proper planning 
meeting. 
 We meet and 
discuss with our 
clients to 
understand key 
risk areas. 
We contact out 
clients to check 
if they are ready 
for us. 
Code 3  Of the stuff they 
send us to 
prepare the 
accounts part 
will be used later 
for the audit. Our 
accounts 
preparation team 
are separate 
from the auditing 
teams. 
Nothing, we 
prepare 
everything for 
them. 
       
  
220 
 
Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 2 (continued)  
What do you / your team do as part of the audit planning to assist your clients in preparing for the first day of the audit f ieldwork?  
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4    The planning 
stage is done 
around month 
ten and we pull 
samples so the 
clients can start 
to dig out that 
information. 
We perform 
some tests at 
the interim audit 
and we have 
more computer 
tests. 
     
Code 5  A lot earlier than 
the planning 
phase as part of 
the accounts 
preparation we 
start to collate 
information and 
then plan the 
audit. 
 Invest time to 
understand how 
they collate 
information. Do 
early GAAP 
check to see 
what info they 
are planning to 
have in the 
annual report. 
 We talk through 
all the facets of 
planning and 
about planning 
and 
expectations. 
We certainly do 
far more 
planning than we 
used to do in the 
‘good old days’ 
   
Code 6     Having some 
overseas 
assistance 
matching 
invoices to other 
documents etc 
overnight 
relieves some of 
the pressures on 
our time. 
     
Code 7  As the team 
needed more 
time to prepare 
the accounts we 
moved the audit 
so the 
information was 
ready for the 
start of the audit. 
  Clients not ready 
and we were 
pushed for time 
this would allow 
for corners to be 
cut. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 3 
What would you consider to be the main failings if (any)? Of clients when preparing for the first day of the audit fieldwork?  
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1   No proper 
finance function 
as they are 
owner managed 
businesses. 
Lack of client 
staff availability 
due to holiday 
etc whilst we are 
on site, staff too 
busy with day to 
day running of 
the business 
than dealing with 
audit.  
Leaving it up to 
me to decide 
what I want. 
    Poor clients are 
smaller and 
under resourced. 
  
Code 2 No accounts are 
prepared 
 Not having 
accounts 
prepared for the 
first day of the 
audit. 
Financial 
statements are 
only half 
complete with 
the numbers 
even though they 
know they are 
not going to 
move. We don’t 
get the annual 
report in the 
financial 
statements until 
incredibly late in 
the audit 
process. 
Statutory 
accounts are 
never prepared 
on the first day 
of an audit. Key 
reconciliations 
are not ready / 
and may not 
appear until late 
in the audit 
process. 
Some clients 
have been 
provided with a 
set of 
deliverables and 
then say they did 
not know what 
we wanted. 
Accounts not 
ready, 
information 
being held off 
site and not 
knowing who is 
responsible for 
signing the 
accounts. 
Conflicting tasks 
– running the 
business or 
providing 
information and 
accounts to the 
auditors. 
  
Code 3    They don’t give it 
enough time 
regrettably as 
everyone has a 
full-time job. 
 
They don’t invest 
enough time to 
get ready. 
     They 
underestimate 
there is quite a 
bit in terms of 
face to face time 
needed. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 3 (Continued)  
What would you consider to be the main failings if (any)? Of clients when preparing for the first day of the audit fieldwork?  
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4    Not enough 
client resources 
to assist the 
audit. They are 
never prepared 
and this is a 
great frustration 
as they fail to 
coordinate the 
accounting team. 
Working 
overtime by 
client junior staff 
is no longer 
acceptable to 
them. 
   People being 
available when 
we are in as they 
are essential in 
completing some 
elements of our 
work. 
 
Code 5      The preparation 
for the audit is 
pretty reflective 
as to the 
strength of the 
finance team. 
 
It is always a 
good barometer 
as to how well 
the finance team 
within an 
organisation is 
run. Those 
clients that run 
their finance 
team properly 
tend to have less 
adjustments and 
the audit runs 
smoother. 
   Staff availability 
as it is not 
always the case 
of a document 
being the 
evidence that is 
needed, it is 
people. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 4 
Do you feel that clients make preparing for the audit a priority? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 No, as it is more 
questions and 
hassle. 
  No, they don’t 
prioritise. 
Consider the 
audit as not 
important to 
them. 
 No, I don’t think 
they do. 
 Other clients do 
not consider it to 
be important and 
could not give 
two hoots 
 
Code 2         Some clients do. Only as long as 
we have made it 
clear about 
timetables and 
deadlines. 
Code 3      Clients put audit 
lower down the 
priority list and 
this puts 
additional time 
pressures on us 
where things 
may not be 
completed within 
the required 
timescales. 
  Clients expect 
us to report 
around them 
irrespective of 
our or their 
reporting 
requirement 
regulatory 
deadlines this 
puts additional 
time pressures 
on us. 
 
Code 4  Clients see it as 
a necessary evil. 
It is a cost. It is a 
cost they have to 
go through. It 
does not add 
pounds to their 
top line. 
They see it as a 
necessary evil. 
    Clients are less 
concerned with 
quality, but they 
just want to get 
us in and out. 
 If they know they 
will get 
additional 
billings then this 
focusses their 
minds. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 4 (continued)  
Do you feel that clients make preparing for the audit a priority? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 5     Clients leave 
digging out 
invoices etc for 
us, my guys just 
don’t have the 
time to do this. 
This results in 
overruns that 
clients have to 
pay for as a 
result of us 
digging around. 
 They do not see 
the value, on the 
whole it is just 
compliance to 
them. 
Smaller clients 
see it as a 
compliance task 
and they 
perceive a good 
audit as an 
efficient one. 
  
Code 6    They don’t 
prepare the OFR 
or Corporate 
Review, these 
are reporting on 
events from the 
whole year 
ended, why can’t 
these be ready. 
 If we have to 
report to the 
audit committee 
that we are not 
receiving things, 
if they hear this 
more than once, 
things happen.  
  Sometimes we 
just need to walk 
away when they 
are not ready 
and we are 
doing that more 
regularly now, 
that tends to 
escalate things 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 5 
Do you think that clients make sufficient time for auditors during the audit fieldwork? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 No not really.   No, they don’t 
prioritise. 
If there is little or 
no incentive, no. 
     
Code 2  All ours do yes. 
They have a 
holiday embargo 
on staff. 
  If there is group 
reporting to do, 
then yes, staff 
are more willing 
to help. 
In general, yes. Mostly yes  Most of them do 
yes. 
Generally, yes. 
Code 3      They want us in 
and out. 
    
Code 4   Where there is 
no input from 
client’s queries 
have to be done 
via e-mail. 
 For those clients 
that are 
unhelpful audit 
staff have to get 
information out 
for themselves. 
If it drags on it is 
an issue for both 
us and the client. 
  Client staff can 
be unavailable. 
 
Code 5    The OFR and 
other similar 
documents are 
not prepared for 
the first day of 
the audit. I 
struggle to 
understand why 
not. 
Some auditors 
have ‘made 
information up’  
   Clients with 
extremely short 
reporting 
deadline may 
have some staff 
who require time 
booking with 
them when we 
need to question 
them on an ad 
hoc basis due to 
questions 
coming out of 
the audit. Where 
finance teams 
are rigid this is 
very unhelpful. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 6 
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section in relation to the clients’ preparation for audit, do you think clients 
would place an emphasis on ensuring they were fully prepared for the auditors at the commencement of the audit fieldwork (if so, how, if not, why not)? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1  I think the 
answer is yes. 
 I think it would. 
 
Could be similar 
to a charity 
whereby they get 
3 green blobs on 
a traffic light 
system. 
For individual 
company 
accounts it could 
be OK. 
Simple answer is 
yes. 
If clients were 
aware of this 
they would go all 
out to avoid 
anything 
adverse going in 
the audit 
opinion. 
I think it probably 
would. 
Yes definitely. 
 
In audit 
committees we 
report on a traffic 
light system. 
Possibly yes. 
Code 2 Could create 
pressure on the 
relationship 
between 
accountants and 
auditors. 
   Could be difficult 
to manage if 
different group 
companies had 
different levels of 
preparedness. 
 Initially it could 
cause a bit of 
friction. 
   
Code 3 Could be 
interpretations 
as to where they 
ready or not? 
We would have 
to standardise 
what information 
is required, 
larger firms may 
have a 
completely 
different idea to 
those of smaller 
firms. 
   One person’s 
level of 
preparedness if 
different on 
another’s. 
 It could be hard 
to measure 
scientifically. 
 Could be a bit 
too judgemental 
and more of a 
rule based thing 
as to how well 
prepared they 
are. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 6 (Continued)  
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section in relation to the clients’ preparation for audit, do you think clients 
would place an emphasis on ensuring they were fully prepared for the auditors at the commencement of the audit fieldwork (if so, how, if not, why not)? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4   For those clients 
having a 
voluntary audit 
as opposed to 
mandatory, they 
would think 
again. 
 
Audit 
requirements are 
overkill. 
       
Code 5  Audit report 
modifications 
would have to be 
standardised 
and that may 
cause a few 
discussions. 
 If everything was 
ready on day 
one that would 
drive 
transparency.  
 
Also disclosing 
fee variations for 
audits is a good 
indicator as to 
how ready 
clients were. 
 
Perhaps disclose 
fee and fee 
variations 
(positive and 
negative) in the 
opinion is a good 
indicator / idea. 
 If it is measured 
it gets actioned. 
 
Needs a level of 
consistency from 
one audit to 
another. 
Could be argued 
that such 
inefficiencies are 
built into the 
audit fee. 
If it were 
mandatory to 
disclose could 
be good. 
If something is 
going to be 
disclosed there 
needs to be a 
robust way of 
measuring it. 
 
However, if it 
were published it 
would make 
them better. 
It would draw 
attention and put 
more pressure 
on the finance 
director. 
 
Regulators 
would have a 
view as to how 
good that team 
and finance 
director were as 
well. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 7 
Considering the previous question, do you feel users of audited financial statements would take additional value from including such disclosures within the 
audit opinion? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 No, I do not think 
they would care. 
No, I don’t think 
it would. 
I don’t think they 
read the 
accounts other 
than dividend 
disclosures. 
I don’t think they 
would get 
additional 
comfort.  
Would indicate 
level of 
investment in 
producing the 
annual report. 
Level of 
preparedness 
drives the 
indication as to 
the appetite and 
culture 
surrounding 
financial 
statements. 
     Commercial 
sector yes. 
Code 2  It would have a 
negative on the 
client and could 
raise issues with 
HMRC. 
       Public sector, 
not so much. 
Code 3      You would get a 
snapshot of the 
management. 
 
Investors may 
have a sense of 
the quality of the 
individuals. 
 I suppose it 
would. Two 
companies 
under the 
current system 
could have the 
same audit 
report but that 
does not tell the 
same story. 
I think investors 
would find that 
interesting. 
It definitely 
would be useful 
and have an 
impact. 
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Appendix 3 – Auditors Responses - Question 7 (Continued) 
Considering the previous question, do you feel users of audited financial statements would take additional value from including such disclosures within the 
audit opinion? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4     It would be 
beneficial to 
disclose the 
auditor 
remuneration 
and any 
additional 
overrun costs 
due to audit 
ineffectiveness, 
that could be 
beneficial 
 Every company 
having an audit 
would go all out 
to prevent it 
happening, 
disclosure would 
need some 
thought. 
 
Overrun costs 
disclosure could 
be a way. 
The letter of 
weakness is 
private and 
discloses the 
weaknesses of 
companies that 
have similar 
audit reports but 
very different 
control / 
preparedness 
issues. 
Could publish 
without detail the 
number and 
levels of 
weaknesses. 
  
Code 5       Charity audits 
have some good 
practice gold 
standards, not 
external but is 
best practice. If 
that standard is 
not met it affects 
how we go about 
our audits. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 8 
If clients were to be any better prepared, do you feel this would reduce time/ reporting pressures on the auditors? And if so could this enhance audit 
quality in any way? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 They may just 
want you to do 
your compliance 
and get out of 
there. 
         
Code 2 Most clients 
want you out. 
         
Code 3   If they had 
accounts 
prepared on the 
first day this 
would help. 
 
Costs could 
outweigh the 
audit fee. 
       
Code 4  Certainly, an 
element of time 
pressure. It is 
potentially more 
profitable. 
 Yes definitely, 
time pressure 
affects the time 
obtaining and 
analysing audit 
evidence. 
Less pressure 
improves 
documenting. 
Additional time 
could be spent 
on 
documentation 
Yes, no doubt 
about it. 
We could do our 
job properly and 
more efficiently 
and focus the 
stuff we need to 
focus on, benefit 
quality. 
Work on the 
judgemental 
things could be 
better. 
Yes, and this 
would avoid 
having to argue 
about overruns. 
Yes, it is 
definitely a 
challenge if I am 
not happy with 
the quality of 
information or a 
delay in 
receiving it. 
Code 5  We could 
potentially 
reduce the audit 
fee. 
 
We could use 
any saved time 
to do some other 
value-added 
work. 
  Enhances the 
quality of 
documentation 
on file, not what 
we do. 
We could spend 
more time 
adding value or 
providing a fee 
reduction. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 9 
Is there anything you feel that auditors could be doing / providing to their clients to ensure clients are fully prepared on day one of the audit to avoid 
potential overruns / poor quality supporting evidence? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Implement 
systems 
throughout the 
year so 
accounting 
systems are 
better. 
   More 
automation. 
  Our systems are 
automated and 
records report 
names and also 
date stamps 
things received. 
Portals / 
automation 
appears to be 
the way to go. 
How we sample 
is more 
automated 
Communication 
of what we are 
going to do and 
when we intend 
to do it. 
Code 2  Vast majority of 
clients are not 
aware how an 
audit works. 
We write to 
clients and say 
we need stock 
lists and debtors 
reports etc. 
Invest time in 
clients to get 
them to do things 
sooner rather 
than later. 
 Ensure 
expectations are 
agreed before 
going out. 
Meet with the 
clients to say 
what can we / 
they do better 
and prevent 
overruns. 
 Knowing about 
major 
transactions 
early. 
 
Code 3 Provide the 
information that 
is required for an 
audit. 
 Some clients 
provide a file 
with everything I 
need. 
 Automation 
spends less time 
shuffling papers 
and thus reduce 
time and costs. 
 
Automation must 
enhance overall 
audit quality. 
   If better 
prepared the 
team has more 
time to scrutinise 
and not rush 
through. 
 
Code 4  Clients see an 
audit as 
checking rather 
than confirming. 
   Make sure 
everyone knows 
their role. 
  Having a dry run 
would be useful 
Communication 
both ways so we 
/ they deliver 
what we agree 
upon and when. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 10 
If clients were considered to be well prepared for the first day of the audit, other than this being acknowledged in the audit opinion, could there be any 
incentives (i.e. fee reductions)? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 They would 
need to assess 
the cost against 
the benefit. 
       Need to avoid 
arguing over the 
fee variation as 
opposed to 
discussing audit 
issues. 
 
Code 2  I don’t really see 
vast amounts of 
added value, 
clients would be 
keen to reduce 
any costs. 
 Yes, I would like 
to think so. I 
have revisited 
fees for those 
clients that have 
become more 
efficient. 
 
Price should go 
up if clients have 
not delivered. 
Either a lower 
fee or a lower 
than inflation 
increase. 
Yes, most 
definitely fee 
reductions, or us 
to do additional 
work. 
Yes, and I think 
audits are cost 
sensitive. 
We quote a fee 
on the 
assumption 
everything will 
be ready on 
time. 
Yes, this is done 
to some extent 
already, difficulty 
is arguing over a 
fee variation. 
Yes, most clients 
are financially 
motivated. 
Code 3  We have an 
issue recovering 
overrun costs we 
have incurred. 
Our engagement 
letter explains 
the fee is not 
fixed. 
  We show last 
years’ time 
sheets to the 
Finance Director 
as evidence of 
overruns due to 
them not being 
prepared. 
 In a competitive 
market, fees can 
go down as well 
as up. I think 
clients would 
definitely 
respond to that. 
Whether a 
reduction is an 
incentive or a 
financial penalty. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 10 (Continued)  
If clients were considered to be well prepared for the first day of the audit, other than this being acknowledged in the audit opinion, could there be any 
incentives (i.e. fee reductions)? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4    If the audit 
becomes 
simplified 
because of the 
level of 
preparation and 
quality of what 
we deliver, we 
should share that 
saving. 
 
Well controlled 
clients with 
better systems 
are less 
substantive and 
thus attract a 
lower fee. 
We can monitor 
the deliverable in 
terms of when it 
was received, 
however not the 
quality of that 
deliverable. 
  Clients could 
provide better 
information, 
could be a result 
of not knowing 
exactly what we 
are after. In 
particular for 
those areas 
outside of 
finance. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 11 
Is there anything else that you feel clients should be doing in order to ensure good quality information is readily available on the first day of an audit? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Meeting with us.        Meet and talk us 
through the 
working papers, 
don’t leave us to 
figure them out. 
Communication. 
Code 2 Have the items 
from the pre-
prepared list of 
deliverables we 
sent them. 
Provide 
everything on 
the list of 
deliverables is 
ready and make 
sure their staff 
are available. 
  Ensure good 
quality 
information 
arrives on time. 
Deliver on 
expectations. 
  There is no 
standard 
template for 
clients to present 
information 
Deliver to 
agreed 
timetables. 
Code 3   Nothing as they 
would need to 
pay for 
additional 
resource. 
They could 
invest in IT. 
 
Systems could 
produce the 
financial 
statements as 
removing human 
intervention 
reduces the risk 
of manipulation 
and thus we 
could perform a 
technology audit. 
 
Payback for 
client’s 
investment 
would be a 
smooth and 
efficient audit. 
      
 
 
 
235 
 
Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 11 (Continued)  
Is there anything else that you feel clients should be doing in order to ensure good quality information is readily available on the first day of an audit? 
 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 4       A lot to be said 
for not rotating 
off clients, if we 
rotate the fee 
stays the same 
but clients have 
to educate audit 
staff. 
 
We always have 
some levels of 
unpredictability 
built into our 
testing. 
   
Code 5    Automation 
removes human 
intervention and 
the spreadsheets 
we receive have 
a human risk 
error in them. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 12 
Do client management review information before it is shared with auditors? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Yes, otherwise 
their reputation 
is on the line. 
They do review 
it. 
For some 
clients, yes. 
      Junior managers 
yes in terms of 
reconciliations. 
Code 2 Need a filter to 
make sure it is 
right 
Sometimes ask 
us to look into 
certain areas so 
it is reported 
formally, staff 
react to auditors 
more positively 
than line 
managers. 
Others, the 
information is left 
for me to obtain. 
Not on all 
occasions as 
information 
requests are 
delegated. 
Management 
review 
information as 
part of running 
their business. 
Managers 
review 
information as 
part of month 
end procedures, 
judgemental 
areas may need 
greater 
management 
review. 
Depends on the 
nature and size 
of the 
organisation. 
I have 
reconciliations 
where there is 
an error on 
every single one, 
it is evident 
management do 
not review those. 
No, it is the 
basics that come 
up time and time 
again. 
Draft financial 
statement – No. 
Code 3    Directors don’t 
have the time to 
review 
everything. 
  Varies from one 
client to another. 
Management 
don’t review as 
there are errors. 
It is obvious the 
CEO has not 
reviewed the 
draft accounts. 
 
It is always low-
level 
management we 
have issues 
with. 
Why are they 
giving me 
something they 
have not 
reviewed 
themselves? 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 13 
Do you feel quality or price is important to your clients? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 A clean audit 
report is 
obviously 
important to 
them. 
    Clients want you 
to do your audit 
and provide a 
clean audit 
opinion. 
The want a 
clean audit 
report. 
   
Code 2 I would say 
price. 
Price. It is a necessary 
overhead. 
 No clients want 
to overpay. 
 Price. Price is very 
important. I 
would say price 
is the main 
factor. 
Price is driving 
what they need. 
Basically, come 
in and do your 
work as cheap 
as you can. 
Price. 
Code 3  Quality is for the 
auditors to 
control. 
Quality is 
important and 
may result in 
bank/press 
issues. 
 Clients want a 
quality audit at a 
commercial rate. 
 Quality issues 
go at the top of 
client’s agendas. 
 Quality is 
important to 
larger clients. 
Big issues 
arising in clients 
indicates that 
they should go 
for quality over 
price. 
Quality is always 
important and 
this is 
paramount for 
the big 
accounting firms. 
Code 4   People here 
have very good 
tax knowledge. 
 WE are better 
equipped to help 
with non-audit 
issues as 
opposed to fees, 
basically added 
value. 
Clients want to 
know what we 
did on specific 
areas. 
   Commercial 
organisations 
like the value of 
other work done 
during the audit. 
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Appendix 3  – Auditors Responses - Question 14 
Other than the information provided, what do you feel could be done by either the auditor or the clients to increase the quality of an audit? 
Question 
coding 
A1 A2 
(Self-audit) 
A3 A4 A5 
(nothing to 
add) 
A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 
Code 1 Have the 
accounts 
prepared on day 
one of the audit. 
     Need more time 
to analytically 
review the 
financial 
statements. 
 Get those not 
involved in the 
numbers 
involved in the 
production of the 
financial 
statements 
early.  
Clients could 
complete the 
front part of the 
accounts. 
Code 2   Reduce the 
amount of 
planning and 
regulations 
surrounding 
audit. 
Reduce the 
amount of 
information in 
financial 
statements that 
no one reads. 
They are so 
complex no one 
reads them. 
   Reduce the 
amount of 
regulation as it 
seems to be 
increasing year 
on year. 
  
Code 3      Provide 
information on a 
timely basis, 
give us tie to 
review it. 
    
Code 4       More talking, 
meet with clients 
to discuss the 
audit and 
judgemental / 
subjective areas. 
   
Code 5      Clients need to 
prepare and 
review 
information on a 
timely basis. 
 
FRC note things 
go wrong when 
things not 
reviewed 
properly. 
 Clients need to 
be more 
organised and 
buy into the 
audit process 
 Clients to buy 
into the process, 
it is a 2-way 
process with a 
common goal. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 1. 
How well prepared would you consider you and your staff to be on the first day of the audit fieldwork?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 We are 
extremely well 
prepared. 
95% of the audit 
file is done by 
me, when they 
come in I hand 
them the file. 
WE are quite 
well prepared. 
 I would say well 
prepared. 
 We have around 
95% of what the 
auditors have 
asked for. 
Pretty well 
prepared. 
We are pretty 
well prepared. 
Normally quite 
well prepared/ 
Code 2 We receive a list 
of deliverables 
from our auditors 
outlining what 
they require. 
  We receive client 
deliverables but 
the list is quite 
loose. 
We usually 
receive a list of 
deliverables. 
This year we did 
not get a list. 
Receive a 
deliverables list. 
    
Code 3    The timeframes 
are quite tight. 
Requests for 
information were 
quite late even 
though we 
thought we were 
well prepared. 
 
Auditors were 
less experienced 
than in previous 
years. 
We don’t have 
enough time 
from finishing 
the draft 
accounts and 
having their 
deliverables list 
completed. It is 
difficult, very 
time pressured. 
    
Code 4   We have a plan 
in place so 
everything is 
ready, draft 
accounts are 
prepared. 
Draft stat 
accounts are 
done with the 
exception of the 
director’s 
narrative bits. 
 We finish the 
draft accounts 
(in adv of the 
audit) 
Having draft 
accounts ready 
for audit is a 
problem for us. 
 
Previous 
auditors used to 
prepare those 
for us. It would 
be useful if the 
auditors did that 
for us now. 
We have 2 of 3 
subsidiary 
accounts ready 
but not the third 
or the parent. 
 
Shame the 
auditors no 
longer do that for 
us. 
We have a first 
draft ready for 
them but there 
are different 
versions 
throughout. 
We have draft 
accounts ready 
for them. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 2. 
Have management reviewed and approved the information that is shared with auditors ?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Yes, I do review 
it. 
I prepare most of 
it from my audit 
file. Staff provide 
backup invoices 
Yes.    Yes. 
Judgemental 
areas I work on 
myself. 
Only high-level 
stuff. 
Yes, we would. Yes. 
Code 2    We would 
always look into 
areas that could 
be contentious. 
 Auditors 
comment that 
we don’t review 
information, we 
simply don’t 
have the time or 
resource. 
  Anything 
contentious 
would have been 
discussed with 
audit during the 
year. 
 
Code 3     We don’t have 
time to review 
everything they 
get. 
No, there is not 
really time to 
allow for 
independent 
review. 
    
Code 4   Make the 
auditors job as 
easy as possible 
so they are not 
here any longer 
than need be. 
Main  areas we 
would always 
flag with audit. 
    Make 
contentious 
items and 
policies available 
to audit 
throughout the 
year. 
We try to get 
comments from 
senior members 
on draft 
accounts ready 
for the auditors, 
but rare we get 
any. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 3. 
What do you/ your team receive from your auditors to assist you with preparing for the first day of the audit?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 A Checklist. A list if 
deliverables 
expected on day 
one of the audit. 
We get a listing 
of 
requirements. 
Deliverables list. A deliverables 
list. 
A prepared by 
client list in 
advance of the 
audit. 
They provide a 
list. 
We get a full list 
of deliverables 
on excel.  
WE get a 
deliverables list 
We use a 
deliverables 
listed provided 
by audit. 
Code 2  We have about 3 
months between 
a planning 
meeting and the 
final audit.  
 
Frustrating how 
we may not get 
same staff on 
both audits. 
We have a pre-
meeting to 
discuss the year 
and identify any 
major 
transactions. 
       
Code 3    Access to an 
online portal. 
  They have an 
online platform 
we have access 
to with things 
they have asked 
for. 
Staff are 
assigned to the 
deliverables and 
they upload 
them onto the 
auditor’s portal. 
 The list is on the 
portal audit gives 
us access to. 
Code 4   The deliverable 
list we get 
seems pretty 
applicable to us. 
   List has some 
amount of 
tailoring that has 
developed over 
the years. 
A lot of it is 
tailored as 
auditors have 
gotten to know 
us over the 
years. 
The list has 
evolved over 
time and we 
have some input 
into this list. 
The list is quite 
relevant to us, in 
some respect it 
is tailored. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 4. 
What would you consider to be the main shortcomings (if any) of you / (your team) when preparing for the first day of the audit 
fieldwork?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Where a control 
has not been 
followed there 
may not be 
control evidence 
for the auditors. 
       Some things are 
outside our 
control and we 
get information 
late. 
 
Code 2  Waiting for 
figures to go into 
the accounts 
(accruals, 
SWAPS etc) 
  We have issues 
relying on others 
in other 
departments / 
organisations. 
     
Code 3          Providing the 
disclosures or 
the more 
technical 
treatment of 
transactions. 
Code 4      Technical 
guidance coming 
out late so we 
are still adjusting 
even on the day 
the accounts are 
signed. 
If audit could 
give us an 
example of what 
they want so we 
can provide it in 
the format they 
want it could 
save time. 
We have late 
complex 
transaction that 
take place at the 
end of the year. 
We get some 
information late. 
We are not as 
technically up to 
date as our 
auditors. 
Code 5  I wouldn’t put the 
team in a 
position whereby 
the audit would 
start without a 
completed audit 
file. 
Get the auditors 
out of the way as 
quickly as 
possible. 
Making sure we 
have provided 
the staff to fit in 
with the auditors 
to ensure 
availability during 
the relevant 
work. 
 We would love 
to give them a 
file and say get 
on with it, but we 
know we will not 
be able to 
deliver 
everything. 
Getting things in 
the format the 
auditor require is 
a challenge. 
We have to run 
our business so 
audit is 
secondary. 
We let audit 
know what is 
happening and 
when so they 
can schedule 
their work 
accordingly. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 5. 
Taking into account that finance departments are busy and daily tasks need to be completed, would you / your team consider 
preparing for the audit to be a priority?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Yes.   Fundamentally, 
yes. 
We never put it 
on the back 
burner. 
We look at our 
audit timetable 3 
months before 
the year end. 
 I think we do. Yes 100% Yes. 
Code 2    By virtue of the 
day to day 
operations we 
are ready for the 
audit. 
We want them in 
and out as 
quickly as 
possible. 
 
We would 
prioritise and 
make sure we 
deliver 
   We want the 
audit to go 
smoothly and 
quickly and a 
delivered-on 
time. We do 
whatever we can 
to prioritise the 
audit. 
We have a 
holiday embargo 
to get the 
accounts done 
and signed off. 
Code 3 Audit is when it 
is a quiet time 
for us so it has 
little impact on 
daily activities. 
Day to day job 
will always come 
first. 
We do not deem 
auditors to be as 
much of a 
priority as 
perhaps we 
should. 
   We need to run 
our business 
and that requires 
daily financials.  
 
We need to 
provide daily 
information and 
not really an 
efficient audit. 
It’s about timing 
the audit just 
right to fit in with 
other 
commitments. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 6. 
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section in relation to the clients preparation  for audit, 
do you think you / your team would place greater emphasis on being fully prepared for the auditors at the commencement of the 
audit fieldwork (if so how, if not why not)?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Yes definitely. Yes, most 
definitely.  
I think it would 
be a good idea. 
Could be good 
idea including it if 
it is brought to 
the attention of 
management 
and noted by 
shareholders 
(i.e. they are 
incurring an 
extra fee due to 
XYZ. 
Public sector no 
– listed 
companies yes. 
I think some 
disclosure would 
be very useful. 
I think yes. I think they 
possibly would 
yes. 
Not sure, but 
initially it is good 
idea. 
It potentially 
could be. 
Code 2 A clean audit 
report does not 
currently reflect 
on the senior 
management 
team. 
Would not be 
welcomed by 
anyone in my 
team. 
From external 
user’s 
perspective it 
could be good 
and indicate 
underlying 
issues and the 
importance of 
the audit report. 
 Good to see if 
the company got 
its clean audit 
report by the 
skin of its teeth. 
Could see how 
the management 
team were. 
    
Code 3  Would not be 
welcomed. Give 
bad impression 
of the company. 
 Need to see if 
additional 
information can 
be measured 
and included in 
the report if the 
company is well 
managed or not. 
 Need to carefully 
select the 
wording, but only 
monitored on 
things within our 
control. 
Client and 
auditor need to 
agree on what is 
good. Maybe we 
provide 
information and 
the auditor did 
not understand it 
as they were too 
junior. 
It depends on 
the personalities 
involved. 
 Letting people 
know you are 
not prepared is 
not ideal is it. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 6. (Continued)  
If the published financial statements audit opinion were modified to include a section in relation to the client’s  preparation for audit, 
do you think you / your team would place gre ater emphasis on being fully prepared for the auditors at the commencement of the 
audit fieldwork (if so how, if not why not)?  
 
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 4   Focus other 
departments on 
the importance 
of the audit. 
I would have no 
objection to 
some overrun 
costs and 
reasons in the 
notes. 
Shareholders 
may want to 
know it is good 
in comparison to 
other 
companies. 
From the outside 
it is not evident 
how well the 
management 
team were. 
Fee over run 
disclosures if 
proven would be 
useful. 
If it is overtly 
mentioned.  
Present to our 
management 
team how well 
the finance team 
is doing. Could 
be a stick to use. 
People may be 
driven to avoid a 
negative opinion. 
  
Code 5        Internal audit 
gives us a traffic 
light system 
which we 
present to the 
exec team. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 7. 
Considering the previous question, do you feel users of audited financial statements would take additional value from including such 
disclosures within the audit opinion?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 The governing 
corporation - 
Yes. 
Would give 
value of an 
investor as it 
gives an insight 
into the strength 
of the 
management 
team 
I suppose it 
would yes (if 
there were an 
underlying issue) 
Yes, for large 
companies and 
public-sector 
organisations. 
Yes. Yes, very much. They might do. Yes definitely. A little yes. Yes. 
Code 2 Other users – 
possibly not. 
Shareholders 
would not want 
to publicise 
anything 
negative to third 
parties. 
 Not for a close 
company. 
     However, just 
one department 
is not a true 
reflection of the 
whole 
organisation. 
Code 3  Figures don’t tell 
the strength of 
management, so 
it would 
definitely add 
more value, third 
parties want it as 
it gives them 
more 
knowledge. 
 Depends on the 
exact disclosure, 
management co-
operation with 
auditors within 
the opinion could 
be useful. 
I would want to 
know if the 
company got a 
clean opinion by 
the skin of its 
teeth. May think 
again before 
investing. 
To see how the 
management are 
performing. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 7 (Continued)  
Considering the previous question, do you feel users of audited financial statements would take additional value from including such 
disclosures within the audit opinion?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 4     Even having 
overrun fees 
identified and 
disclosed could 
be in the 
opinion. Need to 
agree it is the 
clients fault. 
 The efficiency of 
an audit should 
be built into the 
fee. 
   
Code 5     Deliverables 
needs to be 
standard but 
also note that 
receiving a load 
of garbage is not 
going to be 
acceptable. 
    Subjective as to 
the audit partner 
if we are 
prepared or not, 
i.e. if there is not 
a full set of 
accounts with 
full disclosures 
you are not 
ready. Needs to 
be agreed up 
front. 
Code 6     The ISA260 
report is more 
use to public 
sector governing 
bodies. 
   They could have 
access to our 
ISA 260 report. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 8. 
Would you consider that if audit clients could be any better prepared for their auditors this could reduce time / reporting p ressure on 
auditors? If so do you feel that this could enhance audit quality in any way? 
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Yes Yes. Yes. A bit more time 
could always 
help. 
 Yes definitely.  Yes, I think so. Yes, absolutely. Potentially it 
could do. 
Code 2 Each year we 
have a new audit 
team which don’t 
understand our 
business. 
 New auditors 
don’t really know 
what they are 
doing whereas 
an experienced 
auditor knows 
what they want 
and additional 
time could add 
value. 
       
Code 3  That’s the 
reason I prepare 
an audit file for 
them 
From experience 
audit is a tick 
box exercise. 
     We spoon feed 
auditors today. 
They ask for 
loads of 
information up 
front – do they 
really need to 
come? 
 
They can audit 
in 5 minutes if 
they have 
everything 
uploaded onto 
their portals. 
 
Looking at 
operations is 
and added 
benefit when 
they do come. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 8. 
Would you consider that if audit clients could be any better prepared for their auditors this could reduce time / reporting p ressure on 
auditors? If so do you feel that this could enhance audit quality in any way?  
 
 
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 4 It takes a lot of 
time each year 
explaining how 
our systems and 
processes work. 
Focuses them 
on getting 
through the audit 
quicker. 
Feels like a 
waste of time as 
new auditors 
don’t know what 
they are doing. 
 More time will 
obviously ease 
the pressure on 
auditors. 
Working with us 
resolves issues. 
Reduced time 
pressures would 
not necessarily 
give better 
quality.  
 
I can’t see if the 
big firms were 
able to save 
time, the clients 
would benefit. 
 
 
Anything that 
could help both 
clients and 
auditors 
throughout the 
year by being 
better prepared 
will help reduce 
pressures and 
avoid tight 
deadlines. 
 I am not really 
bother on the 
pressures 
auditors are 
under, they 
provide a service 
I am paying for. 
 
If I am better 
prepared the 
less stressful it 
is. 
Code 5     Auditors are 
always looking 
for something to 
report. If they 
found nothing I 
don’t think they 
would be 
comfortable with 
that.  
 
Audit don’t want 
us to be too 
prepared as they 
may have 
nothing to report. 
     
Code 6      We are open 
and transparent 
throughout the 
year. 
 They do pre- 
testing analytical 
review to get a 
feel on the risk 
areas in 
advance. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 9. 
Do you have sufficient time to be prepared for the audit after the year end?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Yes.          
Code 2  It is a challenge 
building audit 
into the process. 
Ultimately, we 
are never 
prepared. 
Timetables are 
outside of our 
control. 
We could do 
with more time. 
Note really, it is 
extremely tight 
anyway we have 
to report. 
Just enough 
time with a fixed 
timetable. 
Our timescale is 
being brought 
forward, it is a 
resource issue. 
We could always 
do with more 
time. 
There is never 
enough time. 
Code 3  It needs to be 
built into a 
timetable 
If the board 
understood the 
importance of 
audit we could 
get ore time. 
 More time to 
review the draft 
accounts would 
help. However, 
giving more time 
means people 
may just sit on 
things for longer. 
 If the audit 
slipped we 
would have 
issues with 
timings of board 
meetings etc. 
We will do more 
during the year 
so less to 
reconcile at year 
end. 
Areas we could 
do better are 
those with 
conflicting 
deadlines. 
Having more 
time would just 
result in taking 
longer to get 
there. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 10. 
Do you understand the professional sceptic approach that the FRC requires of auditors?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 No.     No.. Not really the 
detail. 
I wouldn’t have 
known that 
terminology in 
the question. 
 No I don’t. 
Code 2  Yes. To a point. Yes Yes      
Code 3  I used to be an 
auditor. 
 They are there to 
give an objective 
view via tests. 
I used to be an 
auditor. 
     
Code 4    Audit are not 
disbelieving they 
are merely doing 
what is required. 
They are being 
sceptical. 
Whatever your 
audit clients tell 
you, assume it is 
a lie. 
 Its guilty until 
proven innocent, 
isn’t it? 
Audit have to be 
challenging but 
not aggressive, I 
do worry about 
the current 
challenging 
approach. 
 
Code 5 Audit don’t look 
at what I deem 
to be significant. 
   I don’t expect 
auditor to come 
who do not have 
a clue about my 
business, but 
more often it is 
that they just 
don’t have a 
clue. 
    I understand 
why they ask 
challenging 
questions. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 11. 
Is there anything you feel that auditors could be doing / providing to their clients to ensure clients could be considered to be fully 
prepared on day one of an audit to avoid potential overruns / poor quality supporting evidence?  
c FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Follow up on 
deliverables list 
before the audit 
to see if we have 
it covered.    
         
Code 2  The deliverables 
list is standard 
and not 
applicable to my 
company. 
    Some form of 
format approval 
of documents 
etc required 
   
Code 3   The auditors 
should disclose 
everything they 
want and are 
going to do. 
       
Code 4    There are late 
technical issues 
often viewed in 
earnest and we 
have different 
views based on 
technical 
guidance. 
   We have to rely 
on audit being 
technically up to 
date, they were 
great during the 
transition 
through 
FRS102, audit 
should educate 
us throughout 
the year. 
 Provide us with 
pro forma 
accounts so we 
can populate to 
avoid formatting 
comments. 
Code 5    Discussion 
between audit 
and FD on 
technical 
guidance is 
needed. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 11 (Continued).  
Is there anything you feel that auditors could be doing / providing to their clients to ensure clients could be considered to be fully 
prepared on day one of an audit to avoid potential overruns / poor quality supporting evidence?  
 
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 6     Audit team need 
to be more up to 
speed and 
trained efficiently 
on the sector 
they are 
auditing. 
Changes in audit 
members needs 
to be reduced as 
it takes them 
longer to get up 
to speed and 
review the work. 
Use more 
qualified staff as 
it feels like we 
are teaching 
their staff as 
opposed to 
explaining 
something. 
 We need 
knowledgeable 
auditors, in the 
past we have 
had incompetent 
auditors who do 
not have the 
knowledge or 
experience. 
 
We need 
auditors with 
industry specific 
experience. 
Having junior 
members who 
understand our 
sector would 
help. 
Code 7       The audit 
approach does 
not fit, some 
things are done 
for the sake of 
doing them.  
 
A more tailored 
approach would 
be beneficial. 
 The audit 
approach for 
large groups 
should be the 
same person 
doing the same 
sections on all 
companies not 
split companies 
over several 
individuals. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 12. 
If you were considered to be well prepared for the first day of the audit, other than this being acknowledged in the audit op inion, 
could there be incentives (i.e. fee reductions)?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Fee reduction 
would be nice. 
Reduction in the 
tax fees. 
For some 
companies’ fee 
is important. 
  Yes – fee 
reduction. 
Yes, provided 
the specification 
is right. 
 
If you put more 
effort and 
resource into 
getting ready it 
would be good 
to be recognised 
for that 
additional effort 
and resource. 
A fee reduction 
is always helpful. 
Fee reduction 
would be nice. 
Fee reduction 
would be nice. 
Code 2 Free additional 
work. 
 Spend more 
time on 
judgemental 
areas or other 
value-added 
controls work. 
Additional work 
could be dodgy, 
 
Incentivising is a 
good idea. 
   Audit is a loss 
leader for 
additional 
services, isn’t it? 
  
Code 3  You don’t know 
how the fee is 
calculated in 
terms of hours. 
  Auditors will 
always find a 
way to keep the 
fees up. 
  Most companies 
see audit as a 
necessary evil – 
get in and get 
out. 
Ensure audit are 
not initially over 
pricing. It would 
look good for us 
and receive 
some benefits 
I don’t think 
people sit back 
and don’t care if 
they are not 
ready. 
Code 4 When audit staff 
do not turn up it 
took 3 weeks 
longer than the 
scheduled 
completion date. 
  I would be 
reluctant to have 
a framework 
where one size 
fits all.  
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 13. 
Is quality or price more important to your auditors ?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1  Quality  They focus on 
quality and the 
delivery of an 
audit is a certain 
standard. 
    In our case – 
quality. 
Quality – 75% 
price 25%.. 
We look for 
quality when 
tendering. 
Quality, using a 
large 
professional firm 
has quality and 
knowledge and 
that is important 
to us. 
Code 2 They want to 
make a profit, 
don’t they? 
   Price. The big boys are 
there to make a 
profit. 
  Getting the fees 
right and getting 
enough fee to 
operate a 
business and 
reinvest in good 
staff. 
 
Code 3    It’s a balance.  They have to 
maintain high 
quality. 
    
Code 4      Don’t want to 
risk their 
reputation. 
 
 
   If not doing a 
good job we 
would look 
elsewhere and 
that would 
impact on their 
reputation. 
The have to put 
their reputation 
on the line. 
Code 5        Audit provides 
the firms with the 
opportunity to 
provide the more 
lucrative sexier 
things. 
  
Code 6      Big companies 
know that 
reputation is 
what keeps them 
in the market. 
We are a small 
client using a 
large firm 
   
Code 7    They want to get 
in and get done. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 14. 
If there was any room for improvement in your current procedures etc, is there anything else that you feel you could be doing / 
preparing in order to ensure good quality information (as required by auditors) is readily available on the first day of an a udit?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1 Knowing who 
they want to talk 
to as right 
people not 
always available. 
 Meeting with 
them and sitting 
face to face 
earlier in the 
year. 
Conversations 
could be done 
earlier in the 
year. 
  Communication 
and staggered 
deadlines. 
   
Code 2 Having a work 
schedule in 
advance so we 
know what they 
are going to look 
at and when. 
We could be 
better at getting 
the going 
concern review 
ready. 
        
Code 3   Meet so they 
understand our 
business and the 
issues / changes 
that have 
occurred 
throughout the 
year to date. 
   Meet pre- year 
end so we can 
discuss what is 
happening / 
happened in our 
business and 
they would be 
better prepared 
for the audit. 
 At my old place I 
provided audit 
training in 
advance to my 
staff.  
 
Audit also 
showed what a 
good schedule 
and 
reconciliation 
should look like. 
Having a good 
audit team and 
not a rubbish 
one. 
Code 4          Loading things 
onto the portals 
is great and 
avoids going 
back and forth 
for documents. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 14 (Continued).  
If there was any room for improvement in your current procedures etc, is there anything else that you feel you could be doing  / 
preparing in order to ensure good quality information (as required by a uditors) is readily available on the first day of an audit?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 5       Departments not 
checking the 
information 
provided to 
finance. There 
are too many 
irrelevant 
disclosures and 
audit report on it 
if not correct – 
that’s outside 
finance control 
    
Code 6    We have to work 
late and at 
weekends, could 
impact on 
quality. 
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Appendix 4  – Finance Director Responses - Question 15. 
Other than the information provided, what do you feel could be done by either the auditor or the clients to increase the quality of an 
audit?  
Question 
coding 
FD1 FD2 FD3 FD4 FD5 FD6 FD7 FD8 FD9 FD10 
Code 1  Audit to provide 
changes in audit 
staff a briefing 
so they 
understand our 
business before 
coming out. 
Juniors spending 
time in our 
company 
watching the 
manufacturing 
process etc so 
they understand 
our business. 
 Have an 
agreement 
whereby junior 
audit staff come 
and learn about 
our business. 
 
We could go to 
the auditor’s 
office and give 
them an inside 
view of our 
business and its 
sector. 
     
Code 2    The regulations 
are excessive 
and keep 
changing, too 
much pointless 
planning – I am 
considering 
leaving the 
profession. 
      
Code 3   People are 
scared of audit 
and try to hide 
things. They 
could be 
educated better. 
       
Code 4 For us to make 
sure everything 
is filed in the 
right place in a 
timely manner. 
   Audit should 
engage and 
speak to us 
throughout the 
year. 
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Second level coding - Auditors 
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Appendix 5 – Auditor second level coding 
 
 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 Code 6 Code 7 
Q1 Not prepared for 
auditors. 
Well prepared for 
auditors. 
Company has no idea 
what to do. 
Varies between clients. Clients are somewhat 
prepared for auditors. 
Auditors prepare and 
audit the accounts. 
 
Q2 Deliverables listing. Meet / discuss with 
clients. 
Auditors do everything 
and the accounts. 
Do an interim audit. Auditors do more / too 
much planning. 
Time and pressure. Impacts on quality of 
audit work. 
Q3 No proper finance 
functions. Clients rely 
on auditors. 
No accounts are ready. Time. Client staff availability. Better prepared clients 
result in less audit 
adjustments. 
   
Q4 No, audit not a priority. Yes, audit a priority Additional pressure on 
auditors. 
Audit is 
overhead/necessary 
evil. 
Costs / overruns. Escalate problems to 
make things happen. 
 
Q5 N0, do not make 
sufficient time for 
auditors. 
Yes, make sufficient 
time for auditors. 
Get auditors in and out 
ASAP. 
Unhelpful clients, audit 
make information up. 
Auditors pressured.   
Q6 Yes, include in the 
opinion. 
Could be 
contentious/cause 
friction. 
How to measure / 
manage. 
Drop / remove audit 
altogether. 
Disclose level of 
preparedness / 
additional fee 
disclosure. 
  
Q7 No additional value. Raise issues / 
awareness. 
Yes, additional value. Disclose overrun fees / 
weaknesses 
Differing standards 
between companies / 
rank companies. 
  
Q8 Just do the compliance 
audit. 
Get audit in and out as 
fast as possible. 
Clients prepare the 
accounts on day one. 
Reduce time and 
pressures on auditors. 
Benefit clients, reduced 
fee / other audit work. 
  
Q9 Implement / improve 
client systems. 
Automate processes 
etc. 
Communication. Improve audit tests / 
audit quality. 
Educate clients.    
Q10 Cost versus benefit. Reduce fees / pass 
efficiency savings to 
clients. 
How to evidence 
savings. 
Audit quality / quality of 
client produced 
information. 
   
Q11 Meet / discuss. Deliver / provide 
information on the 
deliverables. 
Invest in systems. Know your clients and 
industry, not rotate off. 
Automation.   
Q12 Yes, review 
information. 
No, do not review 
information. Delegate 
to junior management. 
Poor quality – impact 
on time and audit 
pressures. 
    
Q13 Clean audit report. Clients focus on price. Clients focus on audit 
quality. 
Clients want auditor’s 
knowledge / other 
services. 
   
Q14 Have accounts 
prepared. 
Reduce the amount of 
accounting / audit 
regulations. 
Timeliness of 
information. 
Meet / talk. Client review of 
information and client 
buy in. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Second level coding – Finance Directors 
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Appendix 6 – Finance Director second level coding 
 
 Code 1 Code 2 Code 3 Code 4 Code 5 Code 6 Code 7 
Q1 We are well prepared. Receive deliverables. Time and pressures. Accounts prepared.    
Q2 Yes, information 
reviewed. 
No, information not 
reviewed / contentious 
information. 
Don’t have time. Help get audit in and 
out as fast as possible. 
   
Q3 Receive a checklist / 
deliverables list. 
Pre-audit meeting. Auditors portal. Tailored checklist.    
Q4 Controls. Reliance on others 
outside finance. 
Disclosures (accounts). Late technical 
guidance. 
Time / pressures.   
Q5 Yes, a priority. Get audit in and out as 
fast as possible. 
Daily job is priority.     
Q6 Yes, include in opinion 
would make audit 
preparation a priority. 
Reflection of 
management. 
Cause problems. Possibly benefit / other 
(overrun costs). 
Traffic light system.   
Q7 Yes, additional value. Publicise negatives. Explain how company 
has performed. 
Disclose fees / 
overruns. 
Agreed deliverables. ISA 260 report.  
Q8 Yes, reduce time. Change in audit staff. Audit from isolated 
place (no need to be on 
site). 
Pressure / time. Audit findings, audit 
must report something. 
Interim audit.  
Q9 Yes, sufficient time. No, not enough time to 
prepare. 
More time, would be 
better prepared. 
    
Q10 No, do not understand 
FRC requirements. 
Yes, understand FRC 
requirements. 
Ex auditor. Assume we are lying. Audit have no clue, 
therefore challenge 
clients. 
  
Q11 Follow up on checklist / 
deliverables. 
Checklist / deliverables 
is standard. 
Lack of communication. Technical support. Late technical 
guidance. 
Educate audit on client 
industries. 
Pro forma accounts / 
audit approach. 
Q12 Reduce fees. Provide additional 
services. 
Audit may not pass on 
fee reduction / 
efficiency savings. 
No incentive.    
Q13 Audit quality. Audit price / fee. Quality and price. Reputation. Audit is loss lead for 
other services. 
Size of audit firm. Time. 
Q14 Meetings / talking. Audit work schedule. Understand client’s 
businesses. 
Have portals. Silly disclosures. Time / quality.  
Q15 Audit juniors / Educate 
auditors / change audit 
staff. 
Regulatory changes. Scared of what audit 
do. 
Meeting / speaking with 
clients. 
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Appendix 7 
Consolidated final level coding 
 
 
Code Theme 
1 Availability of financial statements No accounts preparation / Self audit / Auditor prepares accounts / Regulations / too 
much planning Regulations. 
2 Availability of audit evidence Level of preparedness / Deliverables / Communication / Agreement of what is delivered / 
quality and timeliness / unpredictability. 
3 Education / Knowledge / Specialisation Rotation of staff / Continuity of audit staff / Training of audit. 
5 Fees and performance management  Time pressures on both clients and auditors / Fee pressures / audit quality Low balling. 
7 Automation Automation / portals / audit approach.   
6 Audit opinion Amend the audit opinion / costs / reflect levels of preparedness. 
 
 
C
o
d
e
 4
 –
 A
u
d
it
 R
e
v
ie
w
 a
n
d
 
P
re
m
a
tu
re
 S
ig
n
 O
ff
 
  
217 
 
 
 
Appendix 8 
Participant information sheet 
 
        
 
 
Study title 
This study forms part of the Doctorate in Business Administration at the University of 
Central Lancashire. 
 
The title of this study is: 
To explore the importance of audit client commitment to comprehensive audit 
preparation to improve the quality of a UK financial statements audit.  
Invitation paragraph 
 
You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or 
not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done 
and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully. 
 
What is the purpose of the study? 
 
As a professionally qualified accountant and auditor it has been noted during my 
professional life that clients and auditors have differences between their expectations 
for the commencement of the audit fieldwork. This study aims to ascertain if there 
are any commonalities / differences between the expectations of both the auditor or 
the organisation being audited from those persons within each respective 
organisations who take overall responsibility for the audit. 
 
 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
 
You have been asked to participate due to the fact that you are the person within 
your organisation who takes overall responsibility for the financial statements 
external audit. 
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Do I have to take part? 
 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you 
will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If 
you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a 
reason. You have the opportunity to withdraw up to one month after the interview, 
should you wish to withdraw your data (recording and any notes etc) will be deleted / 
destroyed. All data is anonymised at the time of collection, after one month from the 
interview date withdrawal will not normally be possible. If at this or any stage of the 
process you do have any issues with your involvement in this research project 
please contact the researcher to discuss these concerns   
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
You will be interviewed for normally between 30 and 60 minutes and the interview 
will be digitally recorded following consent, or alternatively hand-written notes will be 
recorded.  
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
 
Upon completion of the study the findings may inform the current process / 
regulatory frameworks of preparing for audits on the first day of an audit, your 
contribution may well aid with informing how an audit is conducted from both a client/ 
auditor perspective in the future. 
 
What are the possible risks of taking part? 
 
There are no risks involved in participating in this study as all recordings, any notes 
and subsequent findings will be anonymised and no individual or organisation will be 
identifiable. 
 
Will what I say in this study be kept confidential? 
 
All information collected will be kept strictly confidential (subject to legal limitations) 
and, there will be no reference to an individual or organisation and all information will 
be password protected on the researchers own computer and will not be stored on 
any network or other transportable storage device. Data generated by the study must 
be retained in accordance with the University's policy on Academic Integrity which 
can be made available to you should you so wish. However, the data generated in 
the course of this research must be kept securely in paper or electronic form for 5 
years from the end of the project. This research project has been through and is 
bound by a strict ethical research policy of the University. 
 
What should I do if I want to take part? 
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If you wish to take part please acknowledge by responding to an e-mail inviting you 
to participate and please sign a participant’s sheet that will be made available to you 
at the commencement of the interview.  
 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
 
The results will form the basis for the data collection and analysis of the Doctorate in 
Business Administration programme I am enrolled upon at the University of Central 
Lancashire and will form part of my thesis. Should you wish to see copy of the final 
thesis this can be made available to you upon completion and graduation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
 
I am conducting the research as a student of the School of Management at UCLan.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
The research has been approved by the University Research Ethics Committee 
(BAHSS Ethics Committee).  
 
Contact for Further Information 
 
I can be contacted on my e-mail address: s.marsh@bolton.ac.uk should need any 
further information from me. Should you have any concerns about the way in which 
the study has been conducted, please contact the University Officer for Ethics (email 
address OfficerforEthics@uclan.ac.uk). 
 
Thank you 
 
May I take this opportunity to thank you for taking the time to read this information 
sheet. 
 
Date 
 
xx/xx/xxxx 
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Appendix 9 
Participant consent form 
 
        
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Full title of Project: Stuart Marsh DBA Thesis (Module DB5000) 
 
Name, position and contact address of Researcher: Stuart Marsh. DBA Student. 
University of Bolton, Dean Road, Bolton, Lancashire, BL3 5AB 
 
Please read the following statements and initial the boxes to indicate your agreement 
 
 
 Please initial box 
 
I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet, dated ………….. for the 
above study and have had the opportunity to consider the information, ask questions and 
have had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
  
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving a reason. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
  
 
  
I agree that my data gathered in this study may be stored (after it has been 
anonymised) and may be used for future research. 
 
 
I understand that it will not be possible to withdraw my data from the study after 
final analysis has been undertaken 
  
 
  
I agree to the interview being audio recorded   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
269 
 
   
 
I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Name of Participant    Date    Signature 
 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher    Date    
 
 
